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Depressed individuals show altered responding to positive events relative to healthy individuals. This
altered responding predicts greater symptom severity and functional impairment, and is not adequately
addressed in current treatments. The present research aimed to utilize recent advances in the field to
develop a more sophisticated understanding of positive event reactivity in depression. Chapter 1
evaluated responses to daily positive events in individuals with major depression and generalized anxiety
disorder. In contrast to studies conducted in the lab, which typically find blunted responses to positive
stimuli in depression, depressed individuals showed larger changes in emotions, cognitions, withdrawal
behaviors, and symptoms than healthy controls following positive events in daily life. These changes were
largely specific to depression relative to anxiety. This chapter highlights the importance of context when
measuring responding to positive events, as well as the importance of considering outcomes beyond
emotion and examining the role of co-occurring anxiety. In Chapter 2, the Positive Valence Systems Scale
(PVSS) was developed to provide a broad assessment of responding to positive events. The scale
measures the major types of events and phases of event responding delineated in recent research. The
PVSS showed evidence of internal consistency, retest reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity,
and was more closely related to depression than anxiety. Chapter 2 supplies the field with a more
nuanced measure of responding to positive events that can be used to assess altered reactivity across
diagnostic boundaries. Chapter 3 evaluated emotional reactions to future, as well as past, positive events
in depression and examined cognitive responses hypothesized to enhance or dampen these reactions.
Depressed individuals reported greater use of dampening responses than controls, but similar levels of
enhancing responses. Results point to specific cognitive responses that predict emotional reactivity to
positive events and may play a role in explaining altered reactivity in depressed individuals. Collectively,
these studies demonstrate the importance of context in understanding reactivity to positive events in
depression, propose that differences in reactivity are relatively specific to depression vis-à-vis anxiety, and
identify cognitive processes that may help explain altered emotional responding in depression.
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ABSTRACT
RESPONSES TO POSITIVE EVENTS IN DEPRESSION: WHEN, HOW, AND WHY?
Gabriela Kattan Khazanov
Ayelet Meron Ruscio
Depressed individuals show altered responding to positive events relative to healthy
individuals. This altered responding predicts greater symptom severity and functional
impairment, and is not adequately addressed in current treatments. The present research
aimed to utilize recent advances in the field to develop a more sophisticated
understanding of positive event reactivity in depression. Chapter 1 evaluated responses to
daily positive events in individuals with major depression and generalized anxiety
disorder. In contrast to studies conducted in the lab, which typically find blunted
responses to positive stimuli in depression, depressed individuals showed larger changes
in emotions, cognitions, withdrawal behaviors, and symptoms than healthy controls
following positive events in daily life. These changes were largely specific to depression
relative to anxiety. This chapter highlights the importance of context when measuring
responding to positive events, as well as the importance of considering outcomes beyond
emotion and examining the role of co-occurring anxiety. In Chapter 2, the Positive
Valence Systems Scale (PVSS) was developed to provide a broad assessment of
responding to positive events. The scale measures the major types of events and phases of
event responding delineated in recent research. The PVSS showed evidence of internal
consistency, retest reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity, and was more
closely related to depression than anxiety. Chapter 2 supplies the field with a more
iii

nuanced measure of responding to positive events that can be used to assess altered
reactivity across diagnostic boundaries. Chapter 3 evaluated emotional reactions to
future, as well as past, positive events in depression and examined cognitive responses
hypothesized to enhance or dampen these reactions. Depressed individuals reported
greater use of dampening responses than controls, but similar levels of enhancing
responses. Results point to specific cognitive responses that predict emotional reactivity
to positive events and may play a role in explaining altered reactivity in depressed
individuals. Collectively, these studies demonstrate the importance of context in
understanding reactivity to positive events in depression, propose that differences in
reactivity are relatively specific to depression vis-à-vis anxiety, and identify cognitive
processes that may help explain altered emotional responding in depression.
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PREFACE
Major depressive disorder is one of most prevalent mental disorders (Kessler,
Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005) and the leading cause of disability
worldwide (World Health Organization, 2017). Only about 50% of patients experience
symptom remission following the best available treatments and relapse rates are high
(Cuijpers et al., 2014; DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 2008). Improved understanding of
one of the two core symptoms of depression, anhedonia, may help researchers and
clinicians better understand and treat the disorder.
Anhedonia describes the decreased interest and pleasure in positive stimuli
experienced by many individuals with depression (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). There are several reasons that investigating anhedonia may improve understanding
and treatment of depression. First, it represents a deficit in positive emotions that is
distinct from elevations in negative emotions and that predicts functioning, wellbeing,
and future depression (Carl, Soskin, Kerns, & Barlow, 2013; Fredrickson, 2004;
Naragon-Gainey, Gallagher, & Brown, 2013). Second, patients with depression report
that they are particularly interested in increasing their experience of positive emotions
and their interest and enjoyment in activities during treatment (Demyttenaere et al., 2015;
Zimmerman et al., 2006). Despite these preferences, current therapies for depression do
not explicitly target anhedonia (Craske, Meuret, Ritz, Treanor, & Dour, 2016; Dunn,
2012) and having anhedonia predicts poorer treatment response (McMakin et al., 2012;
Spijker, Bijl, de Graaf, & Nolen, 2001; Uher et al., 2012).
Third, alterations in positive emotions may occur in disorders apart from
depression, including anxiety disorders and schizophrenia (Der-Avakian & Markou,
ix

2012; Khazanov & Ruscio, 2016). Therefore, investigating anhedonia may shed light on
the relationships between depression and these disorders. It would be particularly helpful
to further investigate the relationship of depression to anxiety, as most people with
depression have at least one anxiety disorder and the two disorders are strongly related
(Ruscio & Khazanov, 2016). Preliminary evidence suggests that while deficits in positive
emotions are found in both depression and anxiety, they may be more strongly related to
depression than anxiety (Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Watson, Stasik, EllicksonLarew, & Stanton, 2015). Confirmation of these findings would provide the opportunity
to use measures of anhedonia to differentiate depression from anxiety, thereby improving
diagnostic specificity and allowing for more personalized treatment recommendations.
Recent research on anhedonia has led to several important discoveries. First, this
broad construct can be broken down into different phases of responding to positive
stimuli. The best supported of these distinctions is that between pursuing positive stimuli
that are not yet available and responding to positive stimuli that are already there
(Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Dichter, 2010; Treadway & Zald, 2011). Pursuing
positive stimuli that are not yet available includes both the motivation to get the positive
outcome and the pleasure experienced when anticipating the outcome (Proceedings,
2011). Other, potentially differentiable components of anhedonia include sustaining
responses to positive stimuli in the longer-term (McMakin, Santiago, & Shirk, 2009) and
learning to more efficiently pursue them over time (Pizzagalli, 2014). Additionally,
individuals can respond in different ways to separate types of positive stimuli, like food,
monetary rewards, and social interactions (Forbes & Dahl, 2012; Rizvi, Pizzagalli,
Sproule, & Kennedy, 2016).
x

Studies have examined depressed individuals’ reactivity to these different phases
of responding, and, to some extent, different types of positive stimuli. They have found
that overall, depressed individuals are less reactive than non-depressed individuals when
presented with positive stimuli in the lab (Bylsma, Taylor-Clift, & Rottenberg, 2011).
Studies have also found evidence for reduced willingness to pursue positive stimuli
(Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012; Yang et al., 2014) and diminished pleasure
during the anticipation of positive stimuli (MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; McFarland &
Klein, 2009; Wu et al., 2017) in depressed relative to non-depressed individuals.
Neuroimaging studies of depressed persons have found alterations in striatal regions, and
to some extent frontal regions, during anticipation and experience of positive stimuli
(Admon & Pizzagalli, 2015; Chow, Kennedy, & Rizvi, 2018). Some research suggests
that depression is more closely related to deficits in the anticipation and pursuit of
positive stimuli than in reactivity to available stimuli (Shankman et al., 2014). However,
this research is inconclusive, partly due limitations in the measurement of these
constructs and our understanding of their relationships to one another (Rizvi et al., 2016;
Treadway, 2015). Research regarding depressed individuals’ reactivity to different types
of positive stimuli is even more limited, but suggests that those with depression can
experience diminished pleasure in both physical and social domains (Shankman et al.,
2014).
Another important outcome of recent research has been the realization that the
context in which anhedonia is measured greatly impacts findings. Depressed individuals
may report greater anhedonia when rating their reactivity to positive stimuli
retrospectively or prospectively than when rating their reactivity in the moment (K. R.
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Thomsen, Whybrow, & Kringelbach, 2015). This may help explain discrepancies
between studies showing no differences between depressed and healthy individuals’
responses to sweet tastes in the moment (Dichter, Smoski, Kampov-Polevoy, Gallop, &
Garbutt, 2010; Swiecicki et al., 2009) versus the substantial differences found when
responses to similar stimuli are assessed with global self-report measures (Berlin, GivrySteiner, Lecrubier, & Puech, 1998; Fawcett, Clark, Scheftner, & Gibbons, 1983; Rizvi et
al., 2015). Furthermore, depressed individuals’ reactivity to positive stimuli presented in
the lab differs from their reactivity to positive events during the course of daily life
(Bylsma et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2012).
While research on anhedonia has grown more sophisticated, advancement in this
field has been limited in several ways. First, the majority of studies have examined
reactivity to standardized positive stimuli in the lab, neglecting to describe how these
processes unfold during the course of daily life. Second, the few studies that have
examined reactivity to positive events in daily life have stopped short of examining (a)
non-affective responses to positive stimuli; (b) separate phases of responding to positive
stimuli; and (c) the processes by which differences in responding to positive stimuli may
occur. Third, the field lacks a tool to measure reactivity to positive stimuli that reflects
current understanding of the different phases of responding and the relevant types of
positive stimuli. Fourth, research has focused almost exclusively on the relationship
between depression and reactivity to positive stimuli, failing to account for the role of
comorbid anxiety and to test the potential specificity of positive emotional deficits to
depression vis-à-vis anxiety.
This dissertation addresses these gaps with three studies. In Chapter 1, we
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investigated a wide range of responding to positive events in the daily lives of individuals
with major depressive disorder (MDD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), both
disorders, and no psychopathology. We found that in contrast to studies conducted in the
lab, depressed individuals responded to positive events with larger changes in positive
and negative emotions, cognitions (rumination and worry), reported withdrawal (but not
approach) behaviors, and symptoms of MDD and GAD compared with healthy controls.
Importantly, despite these larger changes following positive events, depressed individuals
continued to report lower positive emotions and higher negative emotions, as well as
other negative outcomes, over the course of the day. Altered responding to positive
events showed evidence of being a dimensional construct that was relatively specific to
MDD, but that extended in milder form to GAD. This study provided additional support
for the finding that reactivity to positive events in daily life differs from reactivity to
positive stimuli in the lab in important ways, and highlighted the need to understand the
specific processes by which depression is associated with altered reactivity to daily
positive events. This study also showed that similar to other positive emotional processes,
reactivity to daily positive events was relatively specific to depression, even when
comparing major depressive disorder to GAD, the anxiety disorder most closely related
to it.
In Chapter 2, we developed and validated the Positive Valence Systems Scale
(PVSS). The PVSS measures the phases of responding to positive stimuli represented in
the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project
Positive Valence Systems domain. A long form of the scale with 45 items was condensed
into a short form with 21 items that measures responses to 7 types of rewards: Food,
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Physical Touch, Outdoors, Positive Feedback, Social Interactions, Hobbies, and Goals.
The scale was tested in four samples, and showed that the PVSS had high internal
consistency, retest reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity. The PVSS was
also more closely related to depression than anxiety symptoms. Chapter 2 provided
support for the utility of the PVSS, a scale assessing the types of positive stimuli and
phases of responding delineated in recent research. This study also confirmed the relative
specificity of these diverse responses to depression vis-à-vis anxiety. The PVSS is a
response to requests for self-report measures that map directly onto RDoC constructs and
that can be used to examine processes that cut across diagnostic boundaries.
Chapter 3 furthered the examination of responding to positive events in daily life
by separately evaluating anticipatory responses to future positive events and responses in
the immediate aftermath of positive events in depressed and non-depressed individuals.
We also measured cognitive responses hypothesized to enhance or dampen emotional
responding to positive events. We found that compared to controls, depressed individuals
reported higher negative affect and lower positive affect during the anticipation of
upcoming positive events, as well as in the aftermath of positive events. Depressed
individuals reported higher dampening responses than controls, but similar levels of
enhancing responses. The cognitive responses evaluated predicted affect levels, as well as
changes in affect, during both phases of responding. This study showed that altered
reactivity to positive events in depressed individuals extends to the anticipatory phase of
responding. Additionally, it identified cognitive responses that predict emotional
reactivity to positive events and that may aid in understanding differences in reactivity
among depressed and non-depressed persons.
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The findings described in this dissertation highlight directions for future research.
As depression treatments must target anhedonic symptoms as they occur in daily life,
studies examining additional aspects of reactivity to positive daily events may be
particularly fruitful. For example, researchers can examine the time course of responding
to determine whether depressed individuals experience quicker returns to baseline levels
of affect following positive events than controls. These studies can also examine the
impact of event characteristics (e.g., social vs. non-social events) on responding.
Applying findings from studies of daily life to experimental research would
improve its validity and help resolve the inconsistencies in the literature discussed above.
For example, experimental research could test self-reported and neural responding to
more personally relevant positive events in social and recreational domains. These studies
could include assessment of cognitive dampening and enhancing responses, perhaps also
manipulating levels of these responses to test their impact on positive event reactivity.
While similar investigations have been initiated for understanding reactivity to negative
events (D. K. Thomsen, 2006), they have rarely been conducted in the context of positive
events. Examining the relationship between responding to positive events in the lab and
in daily life would be particularly useful.
Studies of treatments that target anhedonia, which are in their early stages (Carl,
2015; Craske et al., 2016), could shed light on whether symptom improvement is tied
more closely to normalization in responding to particular phases or types of positive
stimuli. These studies could also evaluate whether improvement is limited to depression
symptoms or extends to anxiety, and whether anxiety severity moderates treatment
outcome. Given depression’s heterogeneity and its high levels of comorbidity with
xv

anxiety, it would be particularly exciting if measures of responding to positive stimuli
could help categorize individuals with emotional disorders in order to recommend
particular interventions. In sum, understanding of anhedonia that is informed by
experimental, daily life, and treatment studies shows promise for improving the precision
with which depression and its features are assessed and treated.

xvi

CHAPTER 1
The “Brightening” Effect: Reactions to Positive Events in the Daily Lives of Individuals
with Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder1
Abstract
Depressed individuals are less reactive than healthy individuals to positive stimuli in the
laboratory, but accumulating evidence suggests that they are more emotionally reactive to
positive events in their daily lives. The present study probed the boundaries of this
curious “mood brightening” effect and investigated its specificity to major depressive
disorder (MDD) vis-à-vis generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), its closest boundary
condition. We used ecological momentary assessment to measure reactions to positive
events over one week in individuals with MDD (n = 38), GAD (n = 36), comorbid MDDGAD (n = 38), and no psychopathology (n = 33). Depressed individuals responded to
positive events with larger changes in affect, cognition, reported withdrawal (but not
approach) behavior, and symptoms than healthy controls. More severe depression
assessed before the sampling week predicted greater brightening. Altered reactivity to
positive events was relatively specific to MDD when compared with GAD, similar to
patterns found for other positive emotional processes. The robustness, scope, and relative
specificity of the brightening effect highlights the need to resolve conflicting findings
across laboratory and non-laboratory studies to advance understanding of altered
reactivity in emotional disorders.
1

This chapter is published as:
Khazanov, G. K., Ruscio, A. M., & Swendsen, J. (2019). The “brightening” effect:
Reactions to positive events in the daily lives of individuals with major depressive
disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Behavior Therapy, 50(2), 270-284.
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Anhedonia, a loss of interest or pleasure in previously enjoyed activities, is one of
two cardinal symptoms of major depressive disorder (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). As a relatively homogenous construct with an increasingly well-defined neural
circuitry, anhedonia is viewed as a promising target for illuminating the etiology of MDD
(Proceedings, 2011). Anhedonia is also an important clinical target, given its impact on
daily functioning (Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggiero, & Eifert, 2003) and its prediction of poor
treatment response (Spijker, Bijl, de Graaf, & Nolen, 2001), chronic course of illness
(Moos & Cronkite, 1999), and risk for future depression (Wardenaar, Giltay, van Veen,
Zitman, & Penninx, 2012).
In line with clinical descriptions of anhedonia, experimental research has
generally found that depressed individuals are less reactive to positive stimuli than
nondepressed individuals (Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 2008; Dichter, 2010). Assessed
via self-report, behavioral, or neural measures, depressed individuals typically show
reduced reactivity to positive images (e.g., Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, Cusack, &
Ogilvie, 2004), words (e.g., Canli et al., 2004), films (e.g., Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, &
Gotlib, 2002), and monetary rewards (e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 2009) presented in the
laboratory (but see Swiecicki et al., 2009 for a study that did not find differences in
reactivity to pleasant smells and tastes).
Surprisingly, studies outside the laboratory have found exactly the opposite:
depressed individuals show greater emotional reactivity to positive experiences than
nonclinical controls. In ecological momentary assessment (EMA) studies, depressed
individuals report larger increases in positive affect (Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof,
Delespaul, & deVries, 2003) and larger declines in negative affect (Bylsma, Taylor-Clift,
2

& Rottenberg, 2011; Peeters et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2012) than nondepressed
individuals following positive events in their daily lives. Past studies have also ruled out
several methodological explanations for this unexpected “mood brightening” effect.
Bylsma et al. (2011) and Thompson et al. (2012) controlled for average daily affect levels
and for affect levels at the signal prior to the event2, respectively, ruling out differences in
baseline affect between depressed and nondepressed individuals as an explanation for
brightening. Bylsma et al. (2011) also utilized objective event coding to test whether
depressed individuals had higher thresholds for rating events as positive than nonclinical
controls, and found no differences in ratings thresholds between groups. Peeters et al.
(2003) controlled for event frequency and found that the lower frequency of positive
events among depressed relative to nondepressed individuals did not account for
brightening. All three studies found that while depressed individuals’ responses to
positive events were enhanced relative to controls, this difference did not extend to
negative events (Bylsma et al., 2011; Peeters et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2012),
suggesting that brightening is specific to positive experiences.
Although several EMA studies have now reported this surprising mood
brightening effect, the boundaries of the effect are poorly understood. As prior studies
focused on affective responses to positive events, it is unknown whether brightening
extends to other aspects of internal experience, to overt behavior, or to clinical symptoms.
Measuring reactivity across a wider range of outcomes would clarify the magnitude and
extent of the brightening effect, as well as shed light on types of responses that are
particularly amenable to intervention efforts.
2

The analyses presented in this paper also control for levels of the outcome variable
assessed at the signal prior to the event.
3

Prior studies also compared depressed participants only to nonclinical controls.
As most individuals with MDD have a comorbid anxiety disorder (Ruscio & Khazanov,
2017), isolating abnormalities of emotional responding that are specific to MDD requires
comparisons with anxiety. Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), the disorder most
strongly associated with MDD (Goldberg, Kendler, Sirovatka, & Regier, 2010), offers a
particularly stringent test for specificity. Theoretical models and psychometric studies
suggest that positive emotional processes should distinguish MDD from GAD (Watson,
2009; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010). However, these models presume that overall
levels of positive emotionality are diminished in depression, leaving open the question of
whether heightened responding to positive stimuli distinguishes the disorders. No study
has yet compared the reactions of depressed and anxious individuals to positive events in
daily life, nor evaluated whether comorbid anxiety influences event responding in those
with MDD. Establishing the specificity of the brightening effect is important for
illuminating processes that are common across emotional disorders versus those that are
uniquely important for understanding, and treating, depression.
Study Aims
The present study used EMA to characterize reactions to positive events in the
lives of individuals with MDD, GAD, comorbid MDD-GAD, or no psychopathology.
The study had two aims. Our first aim was to broaden understanding of differences in
positive event responding between depressed and nondepressed individuals by assessing
affective responses alongside cognitive, behavioral, and symptomatic responses to daily
events.
Our assessment of cognitive responses focused on rumination and worry. These
4

cognitive processes are robust predictors of depressive and anxiety symptoms (Watkins,
2008) and share particularly close relationships with MDD and GAD (Ehring & Watkins,
2008; Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell & Gotlib, 2015). Promising early studies
with nonclinical samples have reported larger declines in rumination (Takano, Sakamoto,
& Tanno, 2013) and other depressive cognitions (Nezlek & Gable, 2001) following
positive daily events in dysphoric undergraduates compared to less-dysphoric peers,
hinting at the potential value of cognitive constructs for probing the brightening effect in
MDD.
We also examined behavioral responses to daily positive events. As several
prominent theoretical models organize behavioral responses into approach versus
withdrawal behaviors (Davidson, 1998; Gray, 1994), we included measures of both
behavior categories as reported by participants. Whereas depression and anxiety have
both been linked to heightened withdrawal behaviors, only depressed individuals are
thought to exhibit blunted approach behaviors (Shankman & Klein, 2003). Evidence of
abnormal approach or withdrawal reactions in the wake of positive events could shed
new light on how disorders are maintained in daily life, as well as identify behaviors with
high potential as treatment targets.
The last outcomes we assessed were symptoms of MDD and GAD. Previous
studies have examined differences in event responding between depressed and
nondepressed groups, but have not examined within-person associations between positive
events and momentary symptoms of depression. We were interested in testing the extent
to which events “moved” symptoms of depression and anxiety experienced throughout
the day. In addition to comparing depressed and nondepressed individuals on a variety of
5

response dimensions, we sought to identify clinical characteristics that predict heightened
responding in order to better understand which specific features of depression and anxiety
are associated with mood brightening.
Our second aim was to evaluate the specificity of the brightening effect to MDD
versus GAD. We examined whether responses to positive events distinguished
individuals with MDD from those with GAD, and whether the responses of individuals
with comorbid MDD-GAD differed from those with MDD alone. We tested both GAD
and MDD severity as predictors of positive event responding, individually and when
controlling for one another. In addition to disorder severity, we investigated other clinical
characteristics of GAD and MDD as predictors of brightening. Lastly, we examined
positive events as predictors of momentary GAD, as well as MDD, symptoms.
Based on the results of previous EMA studies, we hypothesized that depressed
(MDD and comorbid) participants would rate their daily events as less positive and report
fewer positive events than nondepressed (GAD and control) participants. Previous
research also prompted us to hypothesize that affective reactions to events rated as
positive by participants would be amplified in persons with MDD, although we lacked a
strong basis for predicting whether the brightening effect would extend to cognitions,
reported behavior, and symptoms. Finally, the work previously described suggesting that
positive emotional processes distinguish depression from anxiety led us to speculate that
the brightening effect would be specific to MDD vis-à-vis GAD.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The present study has previously been described (Ruscio et al., 2015). Participants
6

were recruited from the community through electronic (Craigslist) and print (flyers)
advertisements, and from the student body of a private university through a psychology
department website. Participants first completed a screening survey online or by phone
that included the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-4; Newman,
Zuellig, Kachin, Constantino, & Cashman, 2002) and the Diagnostic Inventory for
Depression (DID; Zimmerman, Sheeran, & Young, 2003), self-report measures of DSMIV symptoms of GAD and MDD. Those reporting MDD and/or GAD symptoms above
diagnostic thresholds were eligible for the clinical groups. Those reporting symptom
levels below diagnostic thresholds and no history of depression or anxiety that
significantly interfered with their lives, as well as scoring below 56 on the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Molina & Borkovec,
1994), were eligible for the control group.
After providing informed consent, eligible participants were administered the
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV–Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV-L;
DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). Inclusion in one of the three clinical groups required
a current, principal diagnosis of MDD or GAD, defined as the disorder currently causing
the greatest interference and distress (Brown, DiNardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001).
Active psychosis and active suicidal intent, assessed during the ADIS, were exclusion
criteria for all groups. Having a current substance use disorder was also an exclusion
criterion for all groups, given its high potential to compromise the accuracy of
participants’ responses. Approximately 65% of interviewed participants met these
eligibility criteria and were enrolled in the study. Of the 151 participants who began the
study, two participants’ data were lost due to technical problems, one participant did not
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return the electronic diary, and three participants withdrew due to time conflicts.
The final sample included 145 participants (127 community residents and 18
students) from the following four groups: (1) an MDD group (n = 38) diagnosed with
MDD but not GAD, (2) a GAD group (n = 36) diagnosed with GAD but not MDD, (3) a
comorbid group (n = 38) diagnosed with both GAD and MDD, and (4) a control group (n
= 33) with no current or past psychopathology and no mental health treatment. Consistent
with patterns in representative community samples (Ruscio & Khazanov, 2017) and with
the episodic course of MDD, most participants (61%) in the GAD group had past MDD,
whereas one participant (4%) in the MDD group had past GAD. The four groups did not
differ in education, marital status, or race/ethnicity (see Table 1.1). They did, however,
differ in age and sex: the MDD group was older than the control group, and the GAD
group included more females than the comorbid group. We therefore included age and
sex as covariates in all multilevel models.
Procedure
During the first laboratory visit, participants were interviewed by a diagnostician
with a Master’s or Bachelor’s degree in psychology who had received extensive training
on the clinical interviews and achieved a high level of interrater agreement with the
supervising licensed psychologist. The clinical assessment team discussed each interview
and reached decisions about diagnosis and clinical severity by consensus. A second rater
who was blind to initial diagnoses independently rated a random subset of the audiorecorded interviews (n = 32). Interrater reliability was high for both GAD (Κ = 1.00) and
MDD (Κ = 0.88) diagnoses.
Participants attended an orientation session, after which they completed the
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experience sampling protocol for one week. During this week, participants responded to
prompts from an electronic device (Palm Pilot Z22) eight times daily during the 12-hour
period they selected (typically 10 AM-10 PM; 12% of participants chose a different 12hour period that better fit their schedules). They were signaled using a time-stratified
random sampling strategy in which one signal occurred at a random time within each 90minute block, with signals separated by at least 20 minutes. Upon receiving the auditory
signal, participants had 15 minutes to respond before the signal was coded as missed.
Participants could set the device not to signal for one hour if they were entering a
situation in which responding was infeasible or unsafe.
At each assessment, participants first rated their thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and
symptoms at the time they were signaled (Time 1, or T1). They then described the most
significant positive or negative event that occurred since the previous signal, defined as
the event that had the biggest impact on them. After answering questions about the event,
participants rated the thoughts and feelings they experienced immediately after the event
(Time of Event, or TE). Behaviors and symptoms were not rated again at this time to
minimize participant burden. T1 and TE ratings consequently were made at the same
assessment, with T1 ratings describing the participant’s current state and TE ratings
reporting retrospectively on an event that occurred since the previous signal (0 to 180
minutes earlier). T1 ratings preceded TE ratings to avoid the potential impact of recalling
emotionally evocative events on ratings of current experience.
Participants were introduced to these procedures and completed two practice
assessments during the orientation session, with the weeklong study beginning the next
morning. Participants were contacted on the second day to confirm that study procedures
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were being followed and were debriefed in person after seven days. A research ethics
committee approved all procedures.
Measures
EMA variables
Event valence. Participants rated the valence of each TE event on a Likert scale
ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), with 4 being neutral. Similar to a
previous study of positive events among individuals with depression (Bylsma et al.,
2011), we considered positive events to be events rated moderately or highly positive (6
or 7 on the 7-point scale) and compared these to all other events (rated 1-5 on the 7-point
scale).
Outcomes.
Affect. Emotions experienced immediately after the TE event and at the signal
were rated using three positive affect (PA; happy, proud, determined) and three negative
affect (NA; sad, anxious, dissatisfied with myself) terms capturing dimensions of
emotional experience important for MDD and GAD. The terms were drawn from the
basic emotion scales of the expanded Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X;
Watson & Clark, 1994), although we used “anxious” instead of a term from the Fear
scale given the greater relevance of anxiety than fear for GAD (Roemer, Orsillo, &
Barlow, 2002). Each emotion was rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5
(very much). Items were averaged at each time point to form momentary PA (withinperson ω = .63-.72) and NA (ω = .75-.77) variables. Within-person ω was calculated
using estimates from the within-subjects portion of a confirmatory factor model; these
coefficients can be interpreted like Cronbach’s alpha (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013).
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Between-person correlations, calculated from pseudo R2 extracted from hierarchical
models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), were high between momentary PA and trait PA
assessed by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988; .60-.63). Momentary NA correlated highly with trait NA on the PANAS
(.60-.61).
Cognition. Participants rated the extent to which they were ruminating and
worrying immediately after the TE event and at each signal. Worry was assessed with the
items “I was worrying about how things will turn out” and “I kept thinking about
something bad that COULD happen.” Rumination was assessed with the items “I kept
thinking about something negative that has happened” and “I was dwelling on my
mistakes, failures, or losses.” These items were based on theoretical and empirical
descriptions of negative, repetitive thought as central to both worry and rumination, with
worry focusing on future events and rumination focusing on past events and themes of
personal failure (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky,
2008). Items rated on separate 1-5 scales were averaged to form momentary worry
(within-person α = .84-.853) and rumination (α = .82-.85) variables. Within-person α was
also calculated using estimates from the within-subjects portion of a confirmatory factor
model and can be interpreted like Cronbach’s alpha (Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur,
2014). Momentary worry correlated highly with trait worry assessed by the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (.58-.59). Momentary rumination correlated highly with trait
rumination assessed by the Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991; .57-.58).
3

Within-person α was calculated as it is an acceptable alternative when the model for
calculating within-person ω fails to converge (Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014).
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Reported behavior. At each signal, participants rated the extent to which they
were currently engaging in approach and withdrawal behaviors on a 1-5 scale. Approach
behaviors included social engagement (“seeking out or connecting with other people”)
and productive activity (“keeping active and busy”). Withdrawal behaviors included
social withdrawal (“distancing or isolating myself from others”) and inactivity (“unable
to make myself get up and do things”). We assessed social interaction and activity level
to represent the domains typically included in measures of behavioral approach and
withdrawal (Ball & Zuckerman, 1990; Carver & White, 1994). Reported behaviors were
analyzed separately as they did not form reliable composites.
Symptoms. At each signal, participants were presented with each DSM-IV
symptom of MDD and GAD and indicated which, if any, they were currently
experiencing. Given the large number of symptoms included, dichotomous responses
were collected to minimize participant burden. Endorsement of suicidal ideation
branched to emergency referrals. The symptom ratings were summed into MDD (15
items) and GAD (9 items) composites, which correlated strongly with ADIS clinical
severity ratings for MDD (.58) and GAD (r = .52), respectively.
Clinical variables
Clinical predictors. Clinical predictors were derived from the ADIS. Interviewers
rated the overall severity of MDD (ICC = 0.97) and GAD (ICC = 0.97) using 0-8 scales.
MDD and GAD severity were strongly related, but differentiable (r = .63, p < .001). They
also assessed the course of MDD and GAD, including current episode duration among
current cases, age of onset of the first episode, history of single vs. recurrent episodes,
and lifetime persistence (total months in episode over the lifetime) among lifetime cases.
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Other clinical predictors included the number of current and past comorbid disorders (out
of 13 anxiety, mood, and substance-related disorders other than MDD and GAD), history
of mental health treatment (pharmacotherapy or psychotherapy), and family history of
psychopathology (any mental health diagnosis or treatment in first- or second-degree
relatives).
Statistical Analyses
Means were compared across diagnostic groups using SPSS v23 (IBM SPSS
Statistics for Macintosh, 2015). Multilevel analyses were performed using Hierarchical
Linear and Nonlinear Models 7.01 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2013). All models
included age and sex as covariates. For outcome variables demonstrating significant timeof-day effects, time was included as a covariate as well. EMA assessments were in a twolevel model, nested within individuals. Continuous level 1 variables were centered
around each individual’s mean and continuous level 2 variables were centered around the
overall sample mean. One type of model tested associations between event valence rated
retrospectively (TE) and outcomes occurring either immediately after the event (TE) or
one signal after the event (T1); these event and outcome variables were assessed at the
same signal. The second type of model examined time-lagged associations between event
valence (TE) and outcomes two signals after the event (T2); these event and outcome
variables were assessed at consecutive signals, always within the same day. The role of
positive events was investigated by including in models a dichotomous variable in which
positive events were contrasted with all other events. As described below, most analyses
presented controlled for the outcome variable assessed at the previous signal.
Multilevel regression models were performed using assessments from the entire
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sample. As we were interested in comparing the event responses of depressed individuals
to controls and to individuals with GAD, some models tested whether the relationships of
interest differed for the MDD and comorbid groups versus the control group, or for the
MDD and comorbid groups versus the GAD group. To test whether comorbid GAD
influenced responsiveness to positive events, we also tested whether the relationships of
interest differed for the MDD group versus the comorbid group. To test for moderation
by diagnoses, we constructed dichotomous variables for each contrast. For example,
depressed participants were compared to controls using a dummy variable in which MDD
and comorbid participants were coded 1 and controls were coded 0. As an illustration of
the analyses performed, the relationship between positive events and rumination can be
described by the following equation:
ruminationij = β0j + β1j(positive eventij) + rij
where ruminationij is the rumination rating for individual j at observation i; intercept β0j is
the expected rumination rating for non-positive events; slope β1j is the expected change in
rumination with the occurrence of a positive event for individual j; positive eventij is
whether a positive or non-positive event was reported at observation i for individual j;
and rij is the error term associated with observation i for individual j. These Level 1
intercepts and slopes for individual j can then be predicted at Level 2 by the following
equations:
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Age) + γ02(Sex) + γ03(MDD and comorbid groups vs. controls) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11(Age) + γ12(Sex) + γ13(MDD and comorbid groups vs. controls) + u1j
where γ00 is the intercept for control participants; coefficients γ01 through γ03 indicate the
expected change in the average intercept attributable to between-person variance in age,
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sex, or MDD status; u0j is the unique increment to the intercept associated with individual
j; γ10 is the regression slope for control participants; coefficients γ11 through γ13 indicate
the expected change in the average regression slope attributable to between-person
variance in age, sex, or MDD status; and u1j is the unique increment to the slope
associated with individual j. This model was then repeated with the inclusion of a
covariate adjusting for the status of rumination at the previous observation (ruminationi1).

We focused on the average within-person regression coefficients (γ10) and their

moderation by diagnostic status (γ13). We then tested MDD and GAD severity, as well as
other clinical predictors (e.g., number of current comorbid disorders) as moderators of
within-person regression coefficients in the full sample.
In some analyses, we included group variables as covariates. In these analyses, we
constructed three dichotomous variables comparing the MDD, GAD, and comorbid
groups to the control group and included all three diagnostic variables in the model.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Participants received 7,988 signals and completed 5,724 assessments. The mean
response rate was 72% (SD = 12.7, range 41–98%), similar to response rates in validation
studies with depressed and anxious samples (Husky et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2009).
The proportion of completed assessments did not differ by signal, diagnostic group, or
any clinical predictor.
Frequency of Positive Events in MDD and GAD
A total of 5,700 events were reported during the sampling week. Events ranged in
valence from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), with the average event rated about
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neutral (M = 4.30, SD = 0.72). Mean event positivity was significantly lower in the three
clinical groups (MDD = 4.00 (.65); Comorbid = 4.05 (.62); GAD = 4.33 (.62)) than the
control group (M = 4.88, SD = 0.68), F(3, 141) = 13.78, p < .001. In total, 22% of events
were rated as moderately or highly positive. The MDD and comorbid groups each
reported significantly fewer positive events (16%) than controls (32%), with the GAD
group intermediate (24%), F(3, 141) = 5.01, p = .002. While this pattern held when
comparing positive to only neutral events (F(3, 141) = 3.33, p = .021), power was
reduced and the MDD and comorbid groups differed from controls only at a trend level
(both p < .058).
Associations Among Outcome Variables
We examined within-person relationships among the outcome variables by
calculating the proportion of variance explained in one variable when the other variable
was added to the hierarchical model (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), although these effect
size estimates should be interpreted with caution (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998). The largest
associations were observed between MDD and GAD symptoms (which shared 57% of
their variance) and between NA, worry, and rumination (which shared 31-61% of their
variance); these outcomes overlapped substantially yet were still differentiable. The
associations were lower for symptoms with affective and cognitive outcomes (11-38%
shared variance) and lowest for PA and reported behaviors with all other outcomes (223% shared variance).
Positive Events as Predictors of Level of, and Change in, Outcomes
Mean levels of the outcome variables (1) over the week and (2) following positive
events are shown in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. To predict overall levels of
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functioning following positive events, we ran a first set of models using the occurrence of
a positive event to predict the level of each outcome (see Table 1.2, left column). Positive
events predicted higher levels of all positive outcomes (positive affect and approach
behaviors) and lower levels of all negative outcomes (negative affect, rumination, worry,
withdrawal behaviors, and symptoms of MDD and GAD). The associations were
observed mainly within one signal (up to 180 minutes) after the event, although
associations with three of four reported behaviors were still evident two signals later, all γ
> -0.33, all p < .040. The occurrence of a positive event predicted higher levels of
positive outcomes and lower levels of negative outcomes more strongly for depressed
(MDD and comorbid) participants than controls (all γ > 0.24, all p < .008), with the
exception of PA two signals after the event and reported approach behaviors at all time
points. Positive events predicted lower levels of a few negative outcomes more strongly
for depressed (MDD and comorbid) participants than GAD participants, and for
participants with comorbid rather than pure depression, but these differences were
inconsistent across time points.
We reran each model controlling for the level of the outcome variable at the
signal prior to the event in order to evaluate positive events as a predictor of change in
these outcomes and to rule out the possibility that baseline differences in outcome
variables could account for the findings (T0; see Table 1.2, right column). Positive events
predicted increases in PA and reductions in NA, rumination, and worry immediately after
the event and at the next signal, all γ > -0.51, all p < .001. Positive events also predicted
increased approach and decreased withdrawal behaviors, and decreased symptoms of
MDD and GAD up to one signal later, all γ > -0.42, all p < .031. These changes largely
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dissipated two signals after the event, although reductions in inactivity persisted two
signals (up to 4.5 hours) after the event.
Replicating the mood brightening effect, depressed (MDD and comorbid)
participants showed larger increases in PA and larger reductions in NA than controls after
experiencing a positive event, both immediately after the event and at the next signal, all
γ > 0.17, all p < .039. Extending the mood brightening effect, depressed participants also
reported larger reductions in rumination and worry immediately after the event and larger
reductions in rumination, social withdrawal, inactivity, and MDD and GAD symptoms at
the next signal than controls, all γ > -0.25, all p < .010. While most of these differences
did not extend past the first signal after the event, depressed participants continued to
report larger reductions in inactivity and MDD symptoms two signals after a positive
event than controls, both γ > -0.18, both p < .030. Most differences between depressed
(MDD and comorbid) and GAD participants, and all differences between pure and
comorbid MDD participants, declined to nonsignificance once prior levels of the outcome
variable were controlled.
We performed follow-up analyses to check whether the greater changes reported
by depressed participants following positive events resulted in outcome levels similar to
controls. With the exception of reported approach behaviors, which did not consistently
distinguish among study groups, depressed individuals reported lower levels of PA and
higher levels of all negative outcomes than controls immediately after the event and at the
next signal, even after controlling for event positivity, all γ > -0.44, all p < .006. In other
words, depressed individuals were still functioning more poorly than controls despite
experiencing greater change in these outcomes following positive events.
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MDD and GAD Severity as Predictors of Positive Event Responding
To further investigate the relative contribution of MDD and GAD to positive
event responding, we repeated the analyses using MDD and GAD severity as predictors.
As described above, the models controlled for the level of the outcome variable at the
signal prior to the event so that we could examine change in outcomes following positive
events. We included as predictors only MDD severity, only GAD severity (see Table 1.3,
left columns), and then both MDD and GAD severity entered simultaneously so that they
controlled for one another (see Table 1.3, right columns). When examined separately,
MDD and GAD severity predicted change in outcomes following positive events to
similar degrees. When controlling for one another, however, MDD severity continued to
predict greater changes in negative affect, rumination, and worry immediately after the
event; rumination, inactivity, and symptoms of MDD and GAD at the next signal; and
symptoms of MDD two signals after the event, all γ > 0.19, all p < .024. By contrast,
GAD severity continued to predict only greater changes in rumination immediately after
the event (γ = -0.05, p = .033). Surprisingly, GAD severity predicted fewer changes in
social engagement two signals after the event on its own and when controlling for MDD
severity (both γ > -0.08, both p < .008) despite not significantly predicting this outcome
one signal after the event (both γ = -0.01, both p > .768).
Other Clinical Predictors of Change in Affect Following Positive Events
Finally, we used clinical features aside from MDD and GAD severity to predict
change in PA and NA immediately following the positive event (TE). We focused on
affective outcomes to hold down the number of analyses while connecting our study to
prior research on anhedonia, in which short-term affective responses are the most
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common outcomes (Bylsma et al., 2008; Treadway & Zald, 2011). Confirming our
previous findings, measures of clinical severity were associated with greater brightening.
Individuals with a larger number of current (but not past) comorbid disorders showed
greater changes in positive affect (γ = 0.55, p = .029) and negative affect (γ = -0.78, p <
.001) following positive events. Individuals with a family history of psychopathology and
past (but not current) mental health treatment also reported larger changes in negative
affect following positive events (both γ > -.19, both p < .048). By contrast, indicators of
MDD and GAD course, including current episode duration, age of onset, recurrence, and
lifetime persistence, were not related to positive event responding (all γ < .35, all p >
.087).
Discussion
The present study used EMA to examine reactions to positive events in the daily
lives of individuals with MDD, GAD, comorbid MDD-GAD, and no psychopathology.
Our results indicate that the “mood brightening” effect observed in previous studies is
better understood as a broader brightening effect that is evident across multiple domains
of functioning. Depressed individuals exhibited larger changes in affect, cognition,
reported withdrawal (but not approach) behavior, and symptoms than controls at the time
of the positive event and at the signal following the event. In a particularly powerful
demonstration of the brightening effect, we found evidence for a dose-response
relationship between indicators of depression severity and the magnitude of the
brightening effect. Although reactivity to positive events did not consistently distinguish
depressed individuals from those with GAD, MDD severity was a stronger predictor of
brightening than GAD severity. These findings shed light on the breadth of the
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brightening effect and provide the first evidence for its relative specificity to depression
vis-à-vis anxiety.
First Aim: Scope of the Brightening Effect
Our results extend the findings of three previous EMA studies that observed
greater emotional reactivity to daily positive events in individuals with MDD compared
to controls (Bylsma et al., 2011; Peeters et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2012). The
consistency of these results across samples, measures, and research groups underlines the
need to explain the brightening effect and its divergence from laboratory findings of
diminished reactivity to positive stimuli. One possibility is that brightening represents a
measurement artifact rather than a substantive difference between groups. For example,
greater variability in negative outcomes like symptom severity allows more room for
change in those outcomes among depressed than nondepressed individuals. However, our
finding that brightening extends to positive affect, a variable without range restriction in
any group, indicates that range restriction does not fully account for brightening. Our
finding that brightening is greater for individuals with more severe MDD also implies
that this effect is not due solely to range restriction in controls. Similar conclusions are
suggested by past evidence for brightening in individuals with subclinical MDD,
including those with minor depression (Bylsma et al., 2011) and elevated depression
symptoms (Nezlek & Gable, 2001; Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013), whose outcome
distributions differ less markedly from controls. Although other measurement artifacts
could account for brightening, several of these, including group differences in baseline
levels of outcome variables (Bylsma et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2012; the present
study) or in thresholds for rating events as positive (Bylsma et al., 2011), have been
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tested and ruled out in previous studies.
Taken together, the available data suggest that while measurement factors may
contribute to the brightening effect, substantive explanations should also be considered.
For example, brightening may result from depressed individuals’ more negative
expectations for future events compared to controls (Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006).
As research on positive contrast effects has shown, low expectations amplify reactions to
positive stimuli (McNamara, Fawcett, & Houston, 2013). Our results align with affective
contrast theories as well, which posit that an emotional experience (e.g., a pleasant
reaction to a positive event) is heightened when it is preceded by, and therefore
experienced in direct contrast to, an opposite emotional experience (e.g., depressed
mood; Newman & Llera, 2011). Alternatively, features of typical laboratory studies, like
the use of standardized stimuli that may be less personally relevant and emotionally
salient than stimuli in EMA studies, could dampen brightening. Finally, recent research
has distinguished between the anticipation of a future event and the response to an event
that has already taken place, and has suggested that MDD is more strongly associated
with decreased anticipation of future positive events (Shankman et al., 2014). As the
present study examined reactions to positive events that had already taken place,
measuring anticipation of future positive events may have yielded different results.
Further research is needed to adjudicate among the possible artifactual and
substantive explanations for brightening. First, future EMA studies should address
restricted ranges in outcome variables for nonclinical controls by expanding response
scales to increase their sensitivity or including lower-difficulty items more readily
endorsed by nondepressed individuals following positive events (e.g., down instead of
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sad). EMA studies could also test a wider variety of positive (e.g., positive thoughts) or
neutral (e.g., continuing with the tasks of the day) outcomes that are less likely to have
floor effects. Second, there is a need to include more personally relevant stimuli in
laboratory studies to increase external validity, like interpersonally significant positive
events (e.g., Forbes & Dahl, 2012). Third, mechanism-focused EMA studies could
elucidate the sequence of internal and external experiences that lead to mood brightening.
Expanding assessments to include event-specific thoughts (e.g., event expectations) and
behaviors (e.g., sharing the positive experience with others) would be especially
informative.
Finally, research is needed to explain the discordance between depressed
individuals’ retrospective reports of diminished pleasure on clinical assessments and their
reports of heightened reactivity to positive events in momentary assessments, especially
given the reliance on retrospective reports in diagnosis and treatment planning. This
research would also help reconcile depressed individuals’ heightened reactivity to
positive daily events with the persistence of MDD. One possibility is that in experiencing
fewer positive events than controls, depressed individuals profit less from these events
both directly (through improvements in mood and other depression symptoms) and
indirectly (through declines in maladaptive cognitions and behaviors that may later
reduce symptoms). A second possibility is that the benefits of positive events are
overshadowed by the impact of stressful events, which previous analyses in this dataset
found to be more frequent—and followed by more adverse consequences—in depressed
than nondepressed individuals (Ruscio et al., 2015). A third possibility is that reactions to
positive events, although larger in peak amplitude, may be of shorter duration in
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depressed than nondepressed individuals due to diminished anticipatory pleasure before
the event (McFarland & Klein, 2009) or a more rapid return to baseline after the event
(Moses-Kolko et al., 2011). Other processes may also play a role, such as depressed
individuals’ tendency to recall negative material more easily than positive material
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Each of these explanations suggests a different path forward
for refining interventions aimed at increasing the impact of positive events on individuals
with depression.
Importantly, although depressed individuals showed greater change in outcomes
following positive events, they continued to show more adverse levels of these outcomes
relative to controls, even after adjusting for event positivity. This opens an opportunity to
strengthen clinical interventions that involve positive event scheduling like behavioral
activation (Hopko et al., 2003) by capitalizing on depressed individuals’ responsiveness
to those events. If brightening extends to non-naturally occurring events, it would support
the use of EMA in treatment (Heron & Smyth, 2010) to enhance attention to positive
events occurring in real-time, and their impact on mood, thoughts, behaviors, and
symptoms. Depressed individuals may also benefit from scheduling additional positive
events in the immediate aftermath of a positive event to translate initial responsiveness
into greater motivation to pursue additional beneficial activities.
Second Aim: Specificity of Brightening
The current study was the first to test whether the brightening effect extends
beyond depression. The preponderance of evidence supported the relative specificity of
altered event responding to MDD vis-à-vis GAD. The MDD and comorbid groups, but
not the GAD group, reported fewer moderately to highly positive events than the control
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group. There were few differences between the MDD and comorbid groups, indicating
that comorbid GAD had little impact on responsiveness to positive events among
depressed individuals. While GAD severity individually predicted larger post-event
changes (i.e., brightening) across domains, it did not continue to do so once MDD
severity was controlled. There were, however, also indications that the brightening effect
is relevant to GAD as well as MDD. Depressed participants showed greater brightening
than anxious participants on very few outcomes, and positive events predicted
improvement in GAD as well as MDD symptoms. Inspection of mean levels of outcomes
following positive events revealed that, for most variables, individuals with GAD
reported more adverse outcomes than controls and less adverse outcomes than those with
MDD.
Taken together, these findings imply that altered responsiveness to positive events
is relatively specific to MDD, but extends in milder form to GAD. These results mirror
findings showing that deficits in overall levels of positive emotions are relatively specific
to depression when compared with anxiety (Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010) at the
cross-sectional level (Khazanov & Ruscio, 2016). This similarity between the present
brightening findings and previous research on positive emotions suggests that brightening
may represent an important aspect of positive emotional processing in depression.
Additionally, brightening could potentially be used to distinguish MDD even from GAD,
the disorder most closely related to it. Interventions targeting these processes may be
especially beneficial for treating depression, although they may improve symptoms of
anxiety as well. Importantly, future research should consider anxiety when examining
positive emotional processes, which have been investigated primarily in relation to
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depression (Proceedings, 2011).
Study Limitations
This study had several limitations. First, many, though not all, outcome variables
exhibited a restricted range in the control group, which limited the amount of change that
could be observed in that group. Second, although our design greatly reduced the
possibility of retrospective recall bias relative to traditional longitudinal designs, we did
not eliminate this bias, as events and event reactions were rated from memory up to 180
minutes after they occurred. We chose this design, instead of one in which participants
initiated event reports, out of concern that asking participants to attend to and record
events as they occurred would alter event reactions (Stone & Shiffman, 2002) and that
differing levels of sensitivity to positive events would lead to differences in event
reporting. Reporting biases are a particular concern when participants are asked to initiate
reports about events that cannot be defined concretely (Reis & Gable, 2000), such as
“significant” events for which the threshold for reporting may differ by depression status.
Third, TE and T1 ratings were made at the same assessment occasion, so event-related
variables did not temporally precede the variables reflecting participants’ state at the
signal. To better differentiate the two sets of ratings, we asked participants to rate their
current experiences before rating the event that occurred earlier, separated T1 and TE
ratings with a series of questions about the event, and performed analyses with T2
outcomes. Although the findings for TE and T1 outcomes were similar, they were not
identical, and the two sets of outcomes were differentiable, sharing 40-49% of their
variance. That events and T2 ratings were separated by up to 4.5 hours likely diminished
our ability to identify proximate sequelae of positive events, although a number of
26

associations survived this delay. This sampling schedule provided good coverage of the
day and allowed enough time between signals for significant events to occur, but was not
frequent enough to characterize the time course of responding to positive events. Fourth,
participants indicated spending an average of 4-5 minutes responding to each survey. The
survey length may have led to participant fatigue, although there were no indications of
this in the data.
Fifth, as in most EMA studies, we relied on participants’ own ratings of event
positivity. Although prior research has shown that depressed participants’ subjective
judgments of event pleasantness correspond closely to those of nondepressed participants
according to the judgments of blind raters (Bylsma et al., 2011), it remains possible that
the events reported by depressed and nondepressed participants differed in systematic
ways that contributed to the differential reactivity of these groups. Sixth, reported
behaviors were measured with only one item, with some focusing more on behavior
initiation (e.g., “distancing or isolating myself from others”) and some more on behavior
maintenance (e.g., “keeping active and busy”). Seventh, due to the number of analyses,
we focused on reactivity to positive events. Past studies have found that heightened
affective responses do not extend to negative events (Bylsma et al., 2011; Peeters et al.,
2003; Thompson et al., 2012), but future research should examine whether the other types
of responses identified in the present study are similarly limited to positive events.
Finally, the limited differences observed between pure and comorbid MDD may have
been due, in part, to lower statistical power for these comparisons relative to analyses that
combined all depressed participants into a single group for comparison with GAD or
control participants.
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Importantly, our results are consistent with previous EMA studies examining
responses to positive events in depressed individuals, which each had different strengths
and limitations. While these studies found heightened affective reactivity to positive
events among depressed individuals relative to controls, we demonstrated that this
brightening effect extends to cognitive, behavioral, and symptomatic outcomes and that it
increases along with depression severity. We also showed that heightened reactivity to
positive events is relatively specific to MDD compared with GAD, but is relevant to both
disorders. With the brightening effect replicated and its boundaries more clearly defined,
future studies can focus on investigating the causes of this effect and its theoretical and
clinical implications.
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Table 1.1
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of the Sample by Group
Variable

Control (n = 33)

MDD (n = 38)

Comorbid (n = 38)

28.61 (10.42)a

36.38 (12.33)b

33.60 (11.35)a,b

GAD (n = 36)

Demographic characteristics
Age*

31.62 (9.24)a,b

% Female*

66.7a,b

71.1a,b

52.6a

83.3b

% Caucasian

54.5

54.1

56.8

63.9

Never married

75.0

60.5

71.1

47.2

Married or cohabiting

15.6

26.3

18.4

44.4

9.4

13.2

10.5

8.3

6.1

10.8

10.5

8.3

Some college

48.5

29.7

31.6

27.8

College degree or higher

45.5

59.5

57.9

63.9

0.54 (0.91)a

3.99 (1.60)b

4.95 (1.02)c

4.89 (0.66)c

Previously married
Education
High school or lower

Clinical characteristics
GAD severity***
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Marital Status

MDD severity***

0.18 (0.53)a

5.16 (0.82)b

5.16 (0.74)b

2.19 (1.13)c

Current comorbid disordersa***

0.00 (0.00)a

0.90 (0.96)b

1.33 (1.36)b

0.81 (0.82)b

Past comorbid disordersa**

0.00 (0.00)a

0.77 (1.10)b

1.00 (1.12)b

0.88 (1.56)b

Note. MDD = major depressive disorder. GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; M (SD) are presented for dimensional
variables; all other values represent percentages. Values in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05.
a

Number of anxiety, mood, and substance-related disorders, excluding MDD and GAD.
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*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 1.2
Occurrence of Positive Events Predicting Level of, and Change in, Outcomes
Level of outcome
Outcome

γ

SE

Positive affect

1.20

.20***

Negative affect

-0.60

Rumination
Worry

Contrasts

Change in outcome
γ

SE

Contrasts

Dep > Cont***

1.08

.21***

Dep > Cont**

.17***

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

-0.60

.15***

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

-0.62

.17***

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

-0.65

.16***

Dep > Cont***

-0.65

.18***

Dep > Cont***

-0.66

.17***

Dep > Cont***

Positive affect

0.89

.16***

Dep > Cont**

0.91

.17***

Dep > Cont*

Negative affect

-0.47

.15**

Dep > Cont***, Com > MDD*

-0.51

.15***

Dep > Cont***

Rumination

-0.46

.13***

Dep > Cont***

-0.54

.14***

Dep > Cont***

Worry

-0.57

.15***

Dep > Cont***, Com > MDD*

-0.58

.15***

Social engagement

1.23

.23***

1.24

.30***

Productive activity

0.71

.18***

0.70

.23**

One signal after event (T1)

Reported approach behaviors

Reported withdrawal behaviors
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Immediately after event (TE)

Social withdrawal

-0.50

.20*

Dep > Cont**

-0.50

.21*

Dep > Cont**

Inactivity

-0.33

.14*

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

-0.42

.16*

Dep > Cont*

MDD symptoms

-0.71

.34*

Dep > Cont***

-0.79

.36*

Dep > Cont***

GAD symptoms

-0.76

.27**

Dep > Cont***

-0.65

.29*

Dep > Cont***

Positive affect

0.26

.14

0.01

.16

Negative affect

-0.09

.16

Dep > Cont***

-0.20

.12

Rumination

0.00

.18

Dep > Cont**, Com > MDD*

-0.14

.14

Worry

0.07

.18

Dep > Cont*, Com > MDD*

-0.13

.16

Social engagement

0.58

.21**

-0.14

.27

Productive activity

0.66

.25*

0.15

.25

Social withdrawal

-0.03

.17

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

0.25

.25

Inactivity

-0.43

.14**

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD***

-0.33

.14*

Dep > Cont*

MDD symptoms

-0.34

.26

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD*

-0.22

.28

Dep > Cont***, Dep > GAD**

GAD symptoms

-0.10

.24

Dep > Cont**

-0.19

.23

32

Two signals after event (T2)

Reported approach behaviors

Reported withdrawal behaviors

Note. MDD = major depressive disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; Com = comorbid MDD and GAD; Dep = depressed (MDD
and Com groups); Cont = control. TE and T1 outcomes were assessed at the same sampling occasion. Models predicting level of outcome
include age, sex, and time of day as covariates. Models predicting change in outcome include age, sex, time of day, and prior level of the
outcome variable (at signal T0) as covariates. All contrast effects are in the same direction as the coefficient for the main effect.
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*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 1.3
Occurrence of Positive Events Predicting Change in Outcomes
Controlling for the severity of the other disorder
MDD severity only
Outcome

γ

SE

GAD severity only
γ

SE

MDD severity

GAD severity

γ

SE

γ

SE

Positive affect

0.05

.02*

0.08

.03**

<0.00

.03

0.08

.04

Negative affect

-0.12

.01***

-0.10

.02***

-0.10

.02***

-0.03

.02

Rumination

-0.11

.02***

-0.11

.02***

-0.08

.02***

-0.05

.02*

Worry

-0.09

.02***

-0.09

.02***

-0.07

.03**

-0.04

.03

Positive affect

0.03

.02

0.04

.02*

<0.00

.02

0.04

.03

Negative affect

-0.06

.01***

-0.05

.02**

-0.05

.02

-0.02

.03

Rumination

-0.05

.01***

-0.04

.02*

-0.05

.02*

-0.01

.02

Worry

-0.03

.02

-0.03

.02

-0.02

.03

-0.02

.03

-0.01

.03

-0.01

.03

<0.00

.04

-0.01

.04

One signal after event (T1)

Approach behaviors
Social engagement
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Immediately after event (TE)

Productive activity

<0.00

.03

-0.01

.03

0.02

.03

-0.02

.04

Social withdrawal

-0.06

.02**

-0.09

.02***

-0.03

.03

-0.07

.03

Inactivity

-0.05

.02*

-0.03

.02

-0.06

.02*

<0.00

.02

MDD symptoms

-0.18

.04***

-0.10

.04*

-0.19

.06**

0.02

.06

GAD symptoms

-0.12

.03***

-0.08

.04*

-0.12

.04**

-0.01

.05

Positive affect

-0.01

.01

<0.00

.02

-0.01

.02

0.01

.02

Negative affect

-0.02

.01

-0.01

.01

-0.02

.02

0.01

.02

Rumination

-0.02

.01

-0.02

.01

-0.02

.02

-0.01

.02

Worry

-0.03

.02

-0.02

.02

-0.04

.02

0.01

.02

Social engagement

-0.04

.03

-0.08

.03**

0.02

.03

-0.10

.03**

Productive activity

0.02

.03

-0.01

.03

0.04

.03

-0.04

.04

Social withdrawal

-0.02

.03

0.01

.03

-0.04

.04

0.03

.04

Inactivity

-0.04

.02*

-0.02

.02

-0.04

.02

<0.00

.02

Withdrawal behaviors

Approach behaviors

Withdrawal behaviors
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Two signals after event (T2)

MDD symptoms

-0.11

.04**

-0.04

.04

-0.14

.05**

0.05

.04

GAD symptoms

-0.04

.03

-0.04

.03

-0.02

.03

-0.03

.03

Note. MDD = major depressive disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder. TE and T1 outcomes were assessed at the same sampling
occasion. All models include age, sex, time of day, and prior level of the outcome variable (at signal T0) as covariates. The two left columns
include only MDD or GAD severity as predictors. The two right columns include both MDD and GAD severity as predictors in the same
model, thereby controlling for the other disorder.
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*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 1.4
Mean Levels of Outcome Variables Over the Monitoring Week
Variable

Control (n = 33)

MDD (n = 38)

Comorbid (n = 38)

GAD (n = 36)

F

Positive affect

2.62 (0.89)a

2.02 (0.55)b

2.19 (0.55)b

2.35 (0.71)a,b

4.81*

Negative affect

1.26 (0.28)a

2.26 (0.65)b

2.29 (0.66)b

1.89 (0.42)c

27.58**

Rumination

1.20 (0.23)a

2.07 (0.58)b,c

2.22 (0.63)c

1.86 (0.46)b

27.13**

Worry

1.31 (0.32)a

2.27 (0.70)b

2.47 (0.71)b

2.14 (0.56)b

24.88**

Positive affect

2.66 (0.87)a

2.04 (0.58)b

2.17 (0.56)b

2.43 (0.70)a,b

5.76**

Negative affect

1.30 (0.30)a

2.20 (0.58)b,c

2.27 (0.71)c

1.89 (0.41)b

24.18**

Rumination

1.15 (0.15)a

1.87 (0.48)b

2.04 (0.62)b

1.77 (0.40)b

25.04**

Worry

1.30 (0.29)a

2.16 (0.67)b

2.37 (0.72)b

2.07 (0.58)b

20.74**

Social engagement

2.27 (0.58)a

1.92 (0.56)a

2.18 (0.62)a

2.11 (0.49)a

2.58

Productive activity

3.26 (0.87)a

2.90 (0.70)a

2.90 (0.65)a

3.13 (0.60)a

2.36

1.23 (0.39)a

2.13 (0.84)b

1.90 (0.68)b,c

1.52 (0.54)a,c

Signal

Reported approach behaviors

Reported withdrawal behaviors
Social withdrawal

13.62**
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Event

Inactivity

1.19 (0.21)a

2.03 (0.75)b

1.95 (0.63)b

1.56 (0.43)c

17.38**

MDD symptoms

0.31 (0.35)a

2.64 (1.77)b

2.23 (1.51)b,c

1.58 (1.18)c

20.10**

GAD symptoms

0.27 (0.31)a

2.15 (1.50)b

1.96 (1.17)b

1.82 (1.09)b

20.23**

Note. Values represent M (SD). Values in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05. MDD = major depressive
disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder.
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*p < .01. **p < .001.

Table 1.5
Mean Levels of Outcome Variables Following Positive Events
Variable

Control (n = 33)

MDD (n = 38)

Comorbid (n = 38)

GAD (n = 36)

F

Positive affect

3.15 (0.80)

2.97 (0.75)

3.11 (0.78)

3.18 (0.78)

0.43

Negative affect

1.16 (0.21)a

1.61 (0.42)b

1.59 (0.59)b

1.47 (0.35)b

7.91**

Rumination

1.09 (0.23)a

1.45 (0.37)b

1.46 (0.58)b

1.38 (0.35)b

6.06*

Worry

1.23 (0.42)a

1.72 (0.60)b

1.88 (0.91)b

1.64 (0.53)a,b

5.89*

Positive affect

2.94 (0.85)

2.57 (0.69)

2.76 (0.80)

2.87 (0.75)

1.29

Negative affect

1.21 (0.32)a

1.75 (0.45)b

1.73 (0.61)b

1.61 (0.41)b

9.57**

Rumination

1.06 (0.10)a

1.46 (0.33)b

1.46 (0.47)b

1.46 (0.40)b

10.12**

Worry

1.20 (0.24)a

1.80 (0.71)b

1.77 (0.69)b

1.73 (0.65)b

7.49**

Social engagement

2.56 (0.80)

2.22 (0.75)

2.64 (0.91)

2.55 (0.70)

1.63

Productive activity

3.60 (0.87)

3.21 (0.73)

3.45 (0.84)

3.55 (0.67)

0.77

1.10 (0.27)a

1.76 (0.70)b

1.48 (0.61)b,c

1.33 (0.40)a,c

8.71**

Signal

Reported approach behaviors

Reported withdrawal behaviors
Social withdrawal
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Event

Inactivity

1.10 (0.14)a

1.56 (0.60)b

1.59 (0.65)b

1.41 (0.41)a,b

6.63**

MDD symptoms

0.25 (0.41)a

1.36 (0.93)b

1.50 (1.71)b

1.08 (1.20)b

7.39**

GAD symptoms

0.23 (0.32)a

1.10 (0.68)b

1.39 (1.63)b

1.15 (1.09)b

7.49**

Note. Values represent M (SD). Values in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05. MDD = major depressive
disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder.
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*p < .01. **p < .001.

CHAPTER 2
The Positive Valence Systems Scale: Development and Validation
Abstract
We present the Positive Valence Systems Scale (PVSS), a measure of the NIMH
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Positive Valence Systems domain. An initial long
form of the scale (45 items) providing a broad assessment of the domain was distilled
into a short form (21 items) measuring responses to a wide range of rewards (Food,
Physical Touch, Outdoors, Positive Feedback, Social Interactions, Hobbies, and Goals).
Across three diverse samples, the PVSS-21 demonstrated strong internal consistency,
retest reliability, and factorial validity. It was more strongly related to reward than
punishment sensitivity, positive than negative affect, and depression than anxiety. PVSS21 scores discriminated depressed from nondepressed individuals and predicted
anhedonia severity even when controlling for depression status. Hobbies emerged as the
strongest predictor of clinical outcomes and the best differentiator of depressed and
nondepressed individuals. Results highlight the potential of the PVSS for advancing
understanding of reward-related abnormalities in depression and other disorders.
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Individuals have long been recognized to differ in their pursuit of, and reactions
to, rewarding experiences (Clark & Watson, 1991; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Gray, 1994).
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in the implications of these
differences for psychopathology. Abnormally low interest or pleasure in rewarding
activities, often referred to as anhedonia, is a core symptom of depression (Ferster, 1973)
and a feature of disorders like schizophrenia (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012) and
anorexia (Kaye, Fudge, & Paulus, 2009). Conversely, abnormally high sensitivity to
rewarding stimuli is found in conditions like bipolar disorder (Gruber, Johnson, Oveis, &
Keltner, 2008) and addictions (Dawe & Loxton, 2004).
Recognizing the importance of altered responding to reward in psychopathology,
the National Institute of Mental Health included a Positive Valence Systems (PVS)
domain in its Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, a framework for representing
mental disorders based on broad domains of functioning (Insel et al., 2010). The PVS
was originally proposed in 2011 (PVS Proceedings, 2011) and was updated in 2018
(NIMH, 2018) to reflect emerging research findings. Constructs retained across the two
versions include desire for rewards (Reward Valuation), expectations regarding the
probability of attaining rewards (Reward Expectancy, or “reward probability”),
willingness to expend effort to attain rewards (Effort Valuation), anticipation of future
rewards (Reward Anticipation), immediate (Initial Responsiveness) and sustained
(Reward Satiation, or “sustained responsiveness”) responses to rewards, and constructs
related to reward learning.
The constructs included in the PVS domain were identified and defined via expert
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consensus based on extant theory and research (NIMH, 2018; PVS Proceedings, 2011).
Although the constructs are thought to map onto particular neural circuits (Liu, Hairston,
Schrier, & Fan, 2011), little research has examined the extent to which they are
differentiable. The available studies have focused on neurobiological differences between
the motivation to pursue a reward (involving dopamine signaling in the neurostriatal
circuit) and the pleasure experienced when a reward is attained (involving endogenous
opioids), primarily in non-clinical samples (Nusslock & Alloy, 2017; Treadway & Zald,
2011). We are unaware of research examining the differentiability of other PVS
constructs. As neurobiological studies rarely measure more than one or two PVS
constructs, nor report associations between them, the differentiability of these constructs
even at the neural level remains unresolved.
Additionally, each PVS construct can be observed in the context of different
rewards, and research has shown that responses may vary by reward type (Shankman et
al., 2014). For example, responses to social rewards, like feelings of closeness to a loved
one, may be disrupted to a greater degree in depression than responses to physical
rewards, like food (Forbes & Dahl, 2012). Additionally, responses to primary rewards
(i.e., food and sex) and secondary rewards (e.g., engaging in a hobby) may be
distinguishable (Rizvi, Pizzagalli, Sproule, & Kennedy, 2016). These findings underscore
the value of assessing PVS constructs in relation to a variety of reward types. Several
overarching categories of rewards have been identified, including social (Forbes & Dahl,
2012), physical (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976; Zhang, Harris, Split, Troiani, &
Olson, 2016), and recreational (Johnson, Fulford, & Carver, 2012; Ryba & Hopko, 2012)
rewards; however, the extent to which reward types are differentiable has not yet been
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established.
The RDoC initiative has drawn considerable attention and is already influencing
research through its impact on grant funding (Cuthbert, 2015) and publication (Morris,
Vaidyanathan, & Cuthbert, 2015). In response, there has been growing demand for
measures that provide reliable and valid assessments of RDoC constructs (Watson,
Stanton, & Clark, 2017). However, despite strong interest in RDoC in general and the
PVS in particular, there is currently no measure that comprehensively assesses the PVS
domain. Table 2.1 lists the self-report scales that were expressly designed or are
commonly used to assess reward-related processes, and details the constructs and reward
types assessed by each scale. We did not include constructs related to reward learning, as
these constructs are defined entirely by their behavioral outputs and are therefore less
amenable to assessment by self-report.
As the table shows, none of the available scales measure all relevant PVS
constructs. In fact, Reward Satiation is not measured by any scale. Most scales assess
fewer than half of the constructs. Additionally, the Behavioral Activation Scale and
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality Questionnaire assess general attitudes
toward rewards rather than responses to particular stimuli. Two newer scales—the
Motivation and Pleasure Scale–Self-Report (MAP-SR) and the Dimensional Anhedonia
Rating Scale (DARS)—assess a larger number of PVS constructs and responses to
particular stimuli. The MAP-SR, however, was derived from an interview measuring
negative symptoms of schizophrenia, and is limited by its use of global items that require
individuals to evaluate their responsiveness across reward types (e.g., “In the past week,
what is the most pleasure you experienced from hobbies, recreation, or from work?”).
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While the scale assesses several PVS constructs, the items do not clearly differentiate
them, and the score combines responses to rewards over the past week with expected
responses during the upcoming few weeks. Finally, the scale is limited to social and
recreational rewards and was developed in a small sample of individuals with
schizophrenia.
The DARS includes assessment of physical rewards. However, many items are
nonspecific and difficult to map onto a single PVS construct (e.g., “I would actively
participate in these social activities”). Moreover, the DARS requires individuals to
nominate their own rewards for each category, complicating comparisons between
individuals with and without clinical disorders, whose chosen activities may differ in
their rewarding properties. Although the authors did not compare the types of activities
nominated by depressed vs. nondepressed individuals, they noted that participants
commonly expressed difficulty coming up with rewards to rate (Rizvi et al., 2015).
Lastly, the DARS instructs individuals to respond based on how they are feeling “right
now”. This time frame may not adequately represent individuals’ recent experiences,
particularly if they are completing the assessment in an atypical environment (e.g., a lab
or clinic), and may not capture reward responding over a clinically significant amount of
time.
Behavioral PVS measures have also been developed and are gaining in popularity.
Although they serve an important role, they are unlikely to displace self-report scales.
One reason is that most behavioral tasks assess only one PVS construct. For example, the
Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, &
Zald, 2009) measures individuals’ willingness to exert effort for rewards. Other tasks
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measure multiple PVS constructs without distinguishing between them. For example,
tasks assessing response bias for rewards (Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava,
2008) conflate overall sensitivity to reward with the ability to learn reward contingencies.
Although behavioral tasks provide measures of PVS constructs free of some of the biases
associated with self-report measures, it is time-consuming and expensive to assess each
construct with a separate measure. Moreover, behavioral tasks have not yet been
validated for many relevant constructs, and the vast majority of available tasks only
measure individuals’ responsiveness to small monetary rewards (NIMH, 2016; Rizvi et
al., 2016), leaving open questions about generalizability to other reward types. Finally,
although behavioral assessments are well suited to measuring constructs defined by their
behavioral outcomes (e.g., reward learning), most PVS constructs concern individuals’
subjective experiences of stimuli as rewarding. These cognitive and emotional reactions
are not readily observable and may be assessed most appropriately via self-report.
To address these gaps, we developed the Positive Valence Systems Scale (PVSS).
Grounded in the RDoC PVS domain, this self-report scale assesses all relevant PVS
constructs, excluding explicitly behavioral constructs related to reward learning. The
PVSS assesses these constructs in the context of social, physical, and recreational
rewards, including both primary and secondary rewards. The comprehensive assessment
offered by the PVSS offers several advantages over existing measures. First, it provides a
“big picture” view of individuals’ PVS functioning instead of a partial snapshot of their
responses to a restricted range of stimuli, which may not accurately represent their
experiences. Second, it circumvents the need to administer several different scales and
combine their results—a method that, given the scales available, would likely still
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privilege certain PVS constructs or reward types. Third, it can facilitate further study and
refinement of the PVS framework itself, which has received little systematic evaluation
despite its influence in the field (Olino, McMakin, & Forbes, 2016). Finally, it can be
used to investigate PVS functioning in healthy and clinical populations, enhancing
connections between basic and applied research and advancing understanding of positive
valence constructs as transdiagnostic processes.
We first developed a long version of the PVSS (45 items) for which items were
selected to represent a strong overall factor of reward responding. Study 1 describes the
development of the PVSS-45 in a selected community sample (Sample 1) and its
validation in an unselected student sample (Sample 2). We report the scale’s internal
consistency and convergent and discriminant validity. We then developed a short version
of the PVSS (21 items) for which the items that loaded strongly on the overall factor were
further refined to represent the reward-specific subfactors that emerged in Samples 1 and
2. Given the close relationship between positive valence processes and depression, with
loss of interest or pleasure in rewards representing one of two cardinal symptoms of
major depressive disorder (MDD), we also administered the PVSS to individuals with
and without MDD (Sample 3). Study 2 describes the development of the PVSS-21 and
presents evidence for its reliability and validity in the three aforementioned samples,
including its retest reliability, ability to discriminate depressed from nondepressed
individuals, and incremental validity for predicting symptom and functional outcomes
over and above existing measures. Finally, in Study 3, we provide further evidence for
the reliability and validity of the PVSS-21 by testing only these 21 items in a new,
unselected community sample (Sample 4).
47

Study 1: The PVSS-45
Initial Development of the PVSS
We generated items for the PVSS based on the definition of each reward construct
provided in the RDoC Workshop proceedings and the available literature. Items
referenced commonly experienced positive stimuli that were expected to be applicable
regardless of respondents’ socioeconomic status, given generalizability concerns
associated with culturally specific items (Leventhal, Chasson, Tapia, Miller, & Pettit,
2006). Each PVS construct was measured by items assessing the primary rewards of food
and sex, as well as secondary rewards in social, physical, and recreational domains.
Given our interest in measuring state levels of PVS that may fluctuate over time,
particularly in clinical samples, and the requirement that loss of interest or pleasure in
rewards last two weeks to qualify for an MDD diagnosis (APA, 2013), individuals were
asked to rate their responses over the previous two weeks.
Three experts on reward processing in depression rated the face validity of each
item and commented on each item and the scale overall. After adding items suggested by
these experts and editing or deleting items flagged as problematic or assigned low face
validity ratings, the PVSS included 9-13 items for each PVS construct (74 items total).
Based on initial pilot testing with 15 unselected adults that included extensive in-person
debriefings, we clarified the PVSS’s instructions, expanded the response scale, and made
several changes to encourage individuals to attend to the differences between PVS
constructs. These changes included underlining the words in each item that differentiated
the constructs and directing individuals to pay attention to these differences (Appendix
Item 1).
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Given high item ratings across participants and our desire to avoid ceiling effects,
we generated a “high difficulty” and “low difficulty” version of each item (e.g., “I went
out of my way to admire the beauty around me” vs. “I made an effort to notice beauty
around me”). We randomly selected one item from each pair to create two alternate forms
of the scale. In a second pilot study4, we tested each form in a separate group of 25
unselected adults. We chose the best-performing item from each pair by examining the
item’s distribution (wider distributions and means below 7 out of 9 were preferred), itemtotal correlations, correlations with convergent and discriminant measures, and reports of
higher frequencies of encountering the reward. These features were considered
holistically, with particular attention paid to features indicating large differences between
items. When both items in a pair performed poorly, both were eliminated. As items
focusing on sex were encountered infrequently by participants, had low item-total
correlations, and demonstrated inconsistent correlations with other measures in both pilot
studies, these were eliminated from the scale, although items assessing other physical
contact (e.g., receiving a hug) were retained. To ensure that each PVS construct was
evaluated for primary as well as secondary rewards, we included at least one item
referencing food or drink for each construct. This resulted in a pool of 61 items, including
7-12 items per PVS construct, that was tested in Sample 1.
Method
Quality assurance. Data collection for Samples 1 and 2 was conducted online.
We ensured the validity of our data by (a) excluding participants who failed to respond
accurately to objectively verifiable questions, (b) including the same questionnaire twice
4

Two items that performed poorly in the first pilot study were excluded from the second
pilot study, so the second pilot study included a total of 72 items.
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and excluding participants whose discrepant responses to the two versions emerged as
outliers in the distribution of responses, and (c) excluding participants who completed a
majority of the surveys at a pace faster than one-third of the median response time
(Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & DeShon,
2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). Participants with invalid data (26 from Sample 1 and 18
from Sample 2) were excluded from analyses.
Participants.
Sample 1. This community sample included 356 participants recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All participants completed the PVSS and a measure
of depression, and 167 of these participants also completed a battery of convergent and
discriminant self-report measures. To enhance data quality and ensure English-language
fluency, we restricted participation to experienced individuals (those who had completed
over 5,000 assignments) with high reputations (over 95% approval ratings) living in the
U.S., and paid participants between $6 and $9 per hour, depending on how long it took
them to complete the study (Litman, Robinson, & Rosenzweig, 2015; Peer, Vosgerau, &
Acquisti, 2014).
Given our primary interest in measuring positive valence processes within the
context of depression and our desire to base item selection on a sample with an adequate
range of symptoms, we selected participants based on their current level of depression.
Participants completed a validated and widely used screening measure for depression, the
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9). Previously established cutoffs were used to enroll
participants with minimal (n = 125), mild (n = 117), and moderate (n = 114) symptoms of
depression (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001; see Table 2.2 for sample
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characteristics).
Sample 2. To test the reliability and validity of the PVSS across sample types, we
recruited unselected college students for our second sample. Given widespread use of
undergraduate samples in personality and clinical studies, this strategy also permitted us
to evaluate the characteristics of the PVSS in the context in which it is most likely to be
used.
The sample included 358 participants recruited via a Psychology Department
website, of whom 253 also completed convergent and discriminant measures. Participants
were not screened, so the final sample included more participants with minimal (n = 174)
and mild (n = 133) than moderate (n = 50) depression symptoms. Participants were
younger and more racially diverse than those in Sample 1 (Table 2.2). We offered
participants the chance to complete a follow-up study until all slots were filled. This
subsample (n = 59) completed the PVSS again two weeks later. Participants were
compensated with course credit.
Measures.
The Positive Valence Systems Scale, 45 items (PVSS-45). The PVSS-45
(Appendix Item 1) measures responding to positive social, physical, and recreational
stimuli. In addition to the RDoC PVS constructs already described, the PVSS-45 includes
a construct listed in the 2011, but not the 2018, version of the domain (Action Selection)5.

5

We retained the Action Selection items in the PVSS-45 to facilitate measurement of all
possible constructs considered to be important to reward responding in this longer scale
(Ridderinkhof, Van Den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004).
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Thus, the PVSS-45 measures seven constructs6: Reward Valuation, desire for the reward
(e.g., “I wanted to spend time with people I know”); Reward Expectancy, expectations
regarding the likelihood of experiencing the reward (e.g., “I expected to master the tasks I
undertook”); Effort Valuation, willingness to exert effort for the reward (e.g., “I invested
time in my friendships”); Reward Anticipation, anticipation for the reward (e.g., “I really
looked forward to watching a movie I heard might be good”); Action Selection, choosing
to pursue the reward among other possible courses of action (e.g., “I made time to pursue
my hobbies even when it was inconvenient”); Initial Responsiveness, immediate
responses to the reward (e.g., “I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors”);
and Reward Satiation, longer-term responses to the reward (e.g., “I felt satisfied and
relaxed for a long time after a good meal”).
Responses are rated on a nine-point scale ranging from extremely untrue of me to
extremely true of me. The response scale was expanded during pilot testing to avoid
ceiling effects in nonclinical samples. Participants indicate the extent to which the
statements describe their responses over the previous two weeks. If a statement describes
a situation they have not experienced over the previous two weeks, they are asked to rate
how they would have responded if they had experienced the situation during this time.
Participants are asked to pay attention to the underlined words in each item, which
reference the PVS construct assessed.
PVSS Frequencies ratings. To check how commonly the rewards described in
6

The 2011 PVS domain lists Reward Expectancy and Anticipation under one broad
construct, but we measured them separately because of their theoretical differences and
because they have been investigated as separate constructs (Gard et al., 2006; Greenberg
et al., 2015). The 2018 PVS domain lists these as separate constructs.
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the PVSS were experienced, we asked participants to indicate whether they had the
opportunity to experience each reward over the previous two weeks. These dichotomous
ratings were made after participants completed the PVSS. Items were phrased differently
depending on the PVSS construct from which they were derived. For example, the PVSS
item “I invested time in my friendships” (Effort Valuation) was replaced with “I had the
opportunity to invest time in my friendships”. The item “I was delighted to catch a breath
of fresh air outdoors” (Initial Responsiveness) was replaced with “I caught a breath of
fresh air outdoors”. We calculated the proportion of participants who reported
experiencing each situation over the previous two weeks, and used this as an index of the
extent to which participants perceived the rewards described in the PVSS as available to
them in their daily lives.
Measures for validity testing. The measures described below have all shown
evidence of reliability and validity in community and student samples. Due to time
constraints, Sample 2 participants completed a subset of the measures completed by
Sample 1 (Table 2.5). Sample 2 measures included one validation scale for each PVS
construct, where available, along with measures for testing convergent and discriminant
validity. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are listed below for the sample in which each
measure was administered.
Convergent measures.
Reward processing. To test convergent validity, we included a measure assessing
each PVS construct to the extent that such measures were available at the time of data
collection. We measured overall motivation with the full Behavioral Activation Scale
(BAS), Reward Valuation with the BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale, and Effort
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Valuation with the BAS Drive subscale (Carver & White, 1994; Jorm et al., 1998). The
BAS (Sample (S) 1 α = .89, S2 α = .80) measures individual differences in the sensitivity
of the behavioral system proposed to regulate motivation for rewards. BAS subscales
include Reward Responsiveness, measuring interest in rewards (S1 α = .83, S2 α = .69);
Drive, measuring persistent pursuit of desired goals (S1 α = .88, S2 α = .78); and Fun
Seeking, measuring willingness to approach a potentially rewarding event on the spur of
the moment (S1 α = .81, S2 α = .68).
We also measured Reward Valuation with the Sensitivity to Reward scale of the
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia et
al., 2001). The Sensitivity to Reward scale (S1 α = .85) measures desire for social,
physical, and recreational rewards. We measured Reward Expectancy with the
Generalized Reward Expectancy Scale, a subscale of the Generalized Reward and
Punishment Expectancy Scales (GRAPES; Ball & Zuckerman, 1990; Gomez & Gomez,
2005), which assesses expectations for experiencing positive events (S1 α = .84, S2 α =
.69). We measured Reward Anticipation with the Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale
(TEPS; Gard et al., 2006) Anticipatory Pleasure subscale, which assesses pleasure
experienced during anticipation of rewards (S1 α = .84, S2 α = .77). Initial
Responsiveness was measured with the TEPS Consummatory Pleasure subscale, which
assesses pleasure experienced upon attaining rewards (S1 α = .76, S2 α = .67), and with
the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995; S1 α = .91). As no
scales measuring Reward Satiation or Action Selection were available, no measures of
those constructs were included.
Positive emotionality. Positive emotionality, or the tendency to experience
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positive emotions like happiness, energy, and confidence, is the broad personality trait
most strongly associated with responsiveness to positive stimuli (Watson & NaragonGainey, 2010). As positive emotionality is commonly assessed with measures of positive
affect (assessing positive emotions) or extraversion (assessing positive emotions as well
as sociability, ascendance, and excitement seeking), we included both types of measures
(Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2014). This strategy also enabled us to measure positive
emotionality as a state (i.e., using a specific time frame) and a trait (i.e., without reference
to a specific time frame).
Positive affect over the “past few weeks” was measured with the Positive Affect
subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Crawford & Henry,
2004; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; S1 α = .92, S2 α = .90). These previously
validated instructions were selected to correspond most closely to the time period covered
by the PVSS. Extraversion was measured with the Big Five Inventory (BFI) Extraversion
subscale (John & Srivastava, 1999; S1 α = .91, S2 α = .88).
Mood symptoms. We measured overall depression symptoms over the previous
two weeks using the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001; S1 α =
.91, S2 α = .88). Anhedonic depression symptoms in particular were measured with the
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ) Anhedonic Depression subscale
(Watson et al., 1995; S1 α = .97, S2 α = .93). As in previous studies (e.g., Kashdan,
Zvolensky, & McLeish, 2008), only the Anhedonic Depression and Anxious Arousal
MASQ subscales were administered. Hypomania was assessed with the Hypomanic
Personality Scale–Short Form (HPS-20; Meads & Bentall, 2008), which assesses
personality traits consistent with symptoms of hypomania (S1 α = .85).
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Contact with rewarding stimuli. We used the Reward Probability Index (RPI;
Carvalho et al., 2011) to measure participants’ access to rewards in their everyday
environment. The RPI consists of the Reward Probability subscale, measuring
individuals’ likelihood of encountering rewards (S1 α = .92), and the Environmental
Suppressors subscale, measuring environmental constraints on accessing rewarding
stimuli (S1 α = .90).
Social/occupational impairment. The Social Functioning Questionnaire (SFQ;
Tyrer et al., 2005) was used to measure social and occupational impairment. The SFQ
asks individuals to rate their level of functional impairment over the previous two weeks,
with higher scores indicating greater impairment (S1 α = .83).
Discriminant measures.
Punishment sensitivity. Sensitivity to punishment, or behavioral inhibition, is the
behavioral system hypothesized to control responses to aversive stimuli. It is proposed to
be orthogonal to reward sensitivity, or behavioral approach (Torrubia et al., 2001),
although studies typically find these constructs to be correlated (Campbell-Sills, Liverant,
& Brown, 2004). To evaluate the PVSS’ discriminant validity, we used two measures of
punishment sensitivity: the Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS; Carver & White, 1994; S1 α
= .89, S2 α = .76) and the GRAPES Generalized Punishment Expectancy subscale
(Gomez & Gomez, 2005; S1 α = .76, S2 α = .65).
Negative emotionality. Just as positive emotionality is the personality trait most
associated with reward sensitivity, negative emotionality is the personality trait most
associated with punishment sensitivity (Campbell-Sills et al., 2004). As a further test of
discriminant validity, we included two negative emotionality measures, which typically
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correlate moderately with positive emotionality measures (Crawford & Henry, 2004).
Paralleling our assessment of positive emotionality, we measured state levels of negative
affect over the previous few weeks with the PANAS Negative Affect subscale (S1 α =
.95, S2 α = .87), and trait levels of neuroticism—reflecting characteristically high levels
of emotional distress—with the BFI Neuroticism subscale (S1 α = .93, S2 α = .84).
Anxiety symptoms. As positive valence processes are more strongly related to
depression than to anxiety symptoms characterized by hyperarousal (Keogh & Reidy,
2000), we used the Anxious Arousal subscale of the MASQ as an additional test of
discriminant validity (S1 α = .92, S2 α = .89). Given the PVSS’s inclusion of social
rewards, we wanted to ensure that responses to the scale were not driven by participants’
social fears. To that end, we included the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale–
Straightforward Items (BFNE-S), a measure of individuals’ fears of being evaluated by
others (Carleton, Collimore, McCabe, & Antony, 2011; Rodebaugh et al., 2004; S1 α =
.98, S2 α = .94).
Positive personality traits. We included measures of creativity, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness to test the PVSS’s ability to discriminate responsiveness to rewarding
stimuli from other, theoretically unrelated personality traits sharing the same valence.
Creativity was measured with the Creative Behavior Inventory–Short Form (CBI-SF;
Dollinger, 2003; Silvia, Wigert, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2012), which assesses the
frequency with which respondents engaged in creative behaviors as adolescents and
adults (S1 α = .90). Agreeableness (S1 α = .85, S2 α = .76) and conscientiousness (S1 α =
.89, S2 α = .85) were both measured with the relevant BFI subscales.
Social desirability. To test whether PVSS scores were related to participants’
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desire for positive self-presentation, we included a 13-item version of the MarloweCrowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD; Ballard, 1992; Loo & Thorpe, 2000). In the
MCSD, individuals rate descriptions of themselves that are positive but unlikely to be
accurate (S1 α = .82).
Results
Preliminary analyses. Participants answered questions about the PVSS as a
check on its clarity and relevance. Response scales ranged from 1-5. In both samples,
participants rated the situations described in the PVSS as very clear (S1: M = 4.81, SD =
0.42; S2: M = 4.37, SD = 0.68) and quite a bit like the positive situations they encounter
in their daily lives (S1: M = 4.16, SD = 0.81; S2: M = 4.12, SD = 0.80). They indicated
that their ratings very closely reflected their typical responses to positive events in their
daily lives (S1: M = 4.59, SD = 0.65; S2: M = 4.32, SD = 0.69) and that it was easy to
imagine how they would have responded to situations that they did not experience in the
previous two weeks (S1: M = 4.31, SD = 0.81; S2: M = 3.99, SD = 0.88). It took
participants an average of less than 5 minutes to complete the PVSS-45 (S2: M = 4.61
minutes, SD = 2.46).
Factor analyses.
Sample 1. As PVSS responses were relatively normally distributed (i.e., skewness
and kurtosis under 1; Osborne & Costello, 2005), we performed an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) using maximum likelihood estimation with SPSS 24.0 (IBM SPSS
Statistics for Macintosh, 2016). We used oblique rotation (direct oblimin) as we expected
correlations between factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling
adequacy (.95) exceeded the recommended value (Kaiser, 1960) and Bartlett’s Test of
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Sphericity was significant (p < .001), indicating the adequacy of this sample for factor
analysis.
This initial analysis produced a first factor accounting for 35% of the variance,
with each subsequent factor accounting for no more than 5% of the variance. The scree
plot also indicated the presence of one main factor (Illustration 2.1). Given evidence for a
strong overall factor in which all PVS constructs and reward types were represented, we
ran a follow-up EFA specifying the presence of one factor. To enhance the validity of the
resulting scale, we eliminated items that loaded under .5, except for two Action Selection
items whose removal would have resulted in incomplete representation of reward types
for this construct (starred items in Table 2.3). Instead of eliminating these items, we
reworded them to improve their future performance. We also eliminated redundant items
by retaining the item with the highest factor loading.
This process resulted in an internally consistent (α = .95) 45-item scale with at
least six items per PVS construct. Each PVS construct was assessed with items
referencing social, physical, and recreational rewards, including primary as well as
secondary rewards. We ran a follow-up confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in MPlus 7.0
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015; see Table 2.3 for loadings). Following current
conventions (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999), we considered
several fit indices and used the following cutoffs to indicate good fit: root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) less than .10, standardized root mean square residual
(SRMR) less than .08, and comparative fit index (CFI) greater than .90. As shown in
Table 2.4 (Model 1), this one-factor model had fit indices below conventional standards.
Sample 2. The KMO (.92) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001) indicated
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that the sample was adequate for factor analysis. As a further test of factor structure, we
performed an EFA on the PVSS-45 using maximum likelihood estimation with oblique
rotation. The first factor accounted for 32% of the variance, with all remaining factors
accounting for 4% of the variance or less; the scree plot confirmed the large contribution
of the first factor (Illustration 2.2). A follow-up CFA specifying one factor (see Table 2.3
for loadings) showed that all items had loadings of .35 or above, including the two
reworded items (total scale α = .96). Despite these strong loadings, model fit indices
again fell below conventional standards (Table 2.4, Model 2).
Convergent and discriminant validity. Correlations of the PVSS-45 with
convergent and discriminant measures are shown in Table 2.5 (left columns). Given the
similarity of the effect sizes for the PVSS-45 and the PVSS-21, we discuss validity
results in Study 2.
Discussion
In both a community sample selected for a range of depression scores and an
unselected student sample, participants judged the PVSS to be clear, relevant to their
experiences, and easy to complete. We found evidence of a strong overall factor and the
final items were chosen to load highly on this factor. The PVSS-45 is internally
consistent, and each PVS construct is represented by both primary and secondary rewards
in physical, social, and recreational domains. While there was no support for the
differentiability of the PVS constructs, these face valid groups of items can be
administered separately by researchers interested in assessing only a subset of PVS
constructs. The PVSS-45 demonstrated convergent, discriminant, and incremental
validity; descriptions of these analyses were excluded to conserve space but are available
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upon request.
Study 2: The PVSS-21
Development of the PVSS-21
Despite advantages of the PVSS-45 as a comprehensive measure of reward
responding, the inadequate fit of the data to a one-factor model indicated the need to
account for additional item heterogeneity. To provide further clarification, we ran a
parallel analysis in Sample 1 using the PVSS-45 items. We used the comparative data
procedure, which compares datasets generated from the observed correlation matrix with
known factorial structures to the actual data to determine the number of factors to retain
(Ruscio & Roche, 2012). This approach indicated that we should retain nine factors.
As we had the opportunity to utilize both the selected community and the unselected
student samples to determine the presence of additional factors, we ran models in both
samples using bifactor Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM) in MPlus.
Bifactor ESEM, used with the bi-geomin rotation, allows for the specification of a
general factor as well as correlated subfactors within the EFA framework (Jennrich &
Bentler, 2012). Given the results of the parallel analysis, we ran models specifying 1-9
subfactors in both samples. In all models, the subfactors reflected specific reward types.
The most consistent subfactors to emerge across samples related to food, physical touch,
the outdoors, and positive feedback. Additional factors that emerged in both samples
related to hobbies, social interactions, and goals.
We reran CFAs in both samples specifying one overall factor and these seven
reward-specific subfactors (Table 2.4, Models 3 and 4). All 45 items were analyzed, so
the number of items per subfactor ranged from 3 (Outdoors) to 12 (Social Interactions)
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items. Model fit improved substantially, but the relatively low CFI hinted that model fit
would improve further with fewer items. We were also very interested in developing a
shortened scale to enhance ease of administration. To capture the full range of reward
types and allow for the analysis of reward-specific subscales, we included three items per
subscale. We chose the highest-loading items for each subscale in Sample 1 (the
community sample), substituting three similarly-loading items that demonstrated higher
loadings in Sample 2 or that enabled additional PVS constructs to be represented (Table
2.6). The resulting scale, the PVSS-21 (Appendix Item 2), includes seven reward-specific
subscales (3 items each) and provides coverage of all PVS constructs listed in Table 2.1
(3-4 items each). The PVSS-21 therefore yields (a) a total score that includes
representation of the PVS constructs and (b) seven reward-specific subscale scores. We
did not include Action Selection because this construct was excluded from the updated
PVS and its items did not load strongly on the subfactors. Further details about factor
structure are provided below.
Method
Participants and measures for Samples 1 and 2 are described in Study 1.
Sample 3 participants and measures. Given the close link between positive
valence processes and depression, we evaluated the reliability and validity of the PVSS in
a new sample of participants with and without major depression. This sample also
allowed us to quantify the magnitude of differences in scores, as well as differences in
response patterns, between individuals with and without MDD.
The sample included 76 adults recruited through electronic and print
advertisements from the Philadelphia community. Participants completed the Anxiety and
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Related Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-5 (ADIS; Brown & Barlow, 2014),
widely considered the “gold standard” interview for depressive and anxiety disorders.
Interviews were administered by Doctoral, Master’s, or Bachelor’s-level diagnosticians
who underwent extensive training and demonstrated high interrater agreement with the
supervising licensed psychologist. Each interview was discussed by the assessment team
and diagnostic decisions were reached by consensus.
Inclusion in the depressed group (n = 34) required a current diagnosis of MDD.
Nondepressed control participants (n = 42) reported no past or present psychopathology.
Individuals with current substance use disorders (excluding tobacco use disorder), active
psychosis, or active suicidal intent were excluded from participating. The groups did not
differ in age (t(74) = 0.26, p = .800) or in sex, race, or ethnicity (all X2 < 9.33, all p >
.053). Interviewers diagnosed participants with DSM-5 MDD and rated anhedonia
severity on a 0-8 scale in the ADIS depression module. Participants completed the PVSS45, as well as the MASQ (described above), as part of a larger questionnaire battery.
Results
Preliminary analyses (Samples 1 & 2). Participants utilized the full response
scale, with no evidence of floor or ceiling effects. Frequencies ratings showed that the
vast majority of participants perceived the rewards in the scale as available to them over
the previous two weeks (S1 M = 83%, SD = 12%, 60-100%; S2 M = 90%, SD = 9%, 72100%). Additionally, the U.S. grade level needed to comprehend the PVSS-21 is only
5.61 (between 5th and 6th grades) according to the Flesch Kincaid Grade level index,
indicating that it is easily comprehensible to the majority of readers.
Factor analyses (Samples 1 & 2). To measure model fit, we ran CFAs in MPlus
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using maximum likelihood estimation with oblique rotation. As we conceptualized the
seven reward-specific subscales as contributing directly to the overall score, we utilized a
higher-order model in which items were indicators of reward-specific subfactors, and
subfactors were indicators of the overall factor. The PVSS-21 showed evidence of good
fit in both samples (Table 2.4, Models 7 and 8). For comparison, we show that a version
of the PVSS including only the highest-loading items in Sample 1 without substitutions
showed essentially identical fit (Table 2.4, Models 5 and 6). In both samples, PVSS-21
items loaded strongly on the subfactors (S1: ≥ .66; S2 ≥ .57; Table 2.6) and formed
reliable subscales (S1: α ≥ .71; S2 α ≥ .66). Subscales had high loadings on the overall
factor, with loadings highest for Hobbies (.90-1.00)7, Positive Feedback (.85-.89), and
Goals (.81-.91) and lowest for Outdoors (.56-.66) in both samples. Reliability of the full
scale was high (α = .91-.94).
We also tested an alternative CFA model including only three reward-specific
subfactors (social, physical, and recreational) using the PVSS-45 and the PVSS-21. These
CFAs had fit indices below conventional standards (Table 2.4, Models 9-12) and had
poorer fit than the models with seven reward-specific subfactors in both samples (all Δχ2
> 712.65, all p < .001). Finally, we tested a bifactor CFA model in which each item
loaded directly on a general factor as well as on a specific subscale factor, with all factors
constrained to be orthogonal (Reise, 2012). These models did not converge in either
sample, likely because the strong relationships between the general factor and subfactors
prevented them from being modeled as orthogonal.
7

In Sample 2 the variance of Hobbies was constrained to 0 to enable model identification
as this subscale originally had a negative residual variance and a correlation greater than
1 with the general factor.
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Internal consistency (Sample 3). Replicating results from Samples 1 and 2, the
PVSS-21 (α = .93) and its subscales (α = .69-.88) were internally consistent in Sample 3
(Table 2.6).
Retest reliability (Sample 2). An unselected subset of Sample 2 participants
repeated the PVSS two weeks later. We chose two weeks because of the PVSS’s twoweek time frame and our goal of testing reliability over a nonoverlapping period of time.
Retest reliability for the total score was high, r(57) = .83, p < .001. Retest reliability for
the seven subfactors ranged from .55 (Goals) to .91 (Social Interactions).
Convergent and discriminant validity (Samples 1 & 2). Differences between
the PVSS’s correlations with convergent and discriminant constructs (Table 2.5) were
examined using tests for dependent correlations, utilizing the absolute value of the
correlation (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 56-57). In both samples, the PVSS-21 was more
strongly associated with reward sensitivity than punishment sensitivity: its correlations
were larger with the BAS (.46 to .66) than the BIS (-.17 to -.05), and with the GRAPES
Generalized Reward Expectancy subscale (.39 to .55) than the Punishment Expectancy
subscale (-.23 to -.05), all t > 4.23, all p < .001. The PVSS-21 was also more strongly
related to positive affect (PANAS PA; r = .61) than negative affect (PANAS NA; -.40 to
-.18) in both samples, both t > 3.08, both p < .002. In Sample 2, the PVSS-21 was more
strongly correlated with BFI Extraversion (r = .42) than Neuroticism (r = -.27), t(250) =
2.13, p = .034. In Sample 1, however, the difference between correlations with BFI
Extraversion (r = .52) and Neuroticism (r = -.42) was not significant, t(163) = 1.48, p =
.141.
Evidence for the specificity of the PVSS-21 to positive emotionality vis-à-vis
65

other positive personality traits was mixed. In Sample 1, The PVSS-21 was more highly
correlated with BFI Extraversion (r = .52) than creativity (CBI-SF, r = .22), t(163) =
3.43, p = .001. It was not, however, more strongly related to Extraversion (.42 to .52)
than to either Agreeableness (.40 to .45) or Conscientiousness (.36 to .42), all t < 1.52, all
p > .131.
Finally, we examined correlations with symptom measures. As hypothesized, the
PVSS-21 was more strongly correlated with MASQ Anhedonic Depression (-.65 to -.63)
than Anxious Arousal (-.29 to -.24) in both samples, both t > 5.13, both p < .001. While
the PVSS-21 was robustly related to depression (-.48 to -.37), the magnitude of these
correlations suggests that it was not redundant with depression. The PVSS was only
modestly related to social fears (BFNE-S; -.25 to -.13) and unrelated to social desirability
(MCSD; S1 = .10).
Discriminative validity (Sample 3). Individuals with MDD scored lower than
controls on the PVSS-21, t(60) = 4.64, p < .001. Mean scores for depressed individuals
were around “slightly true of me” (M = 6.23, SD = 1.28), whereas mean scores for
nondepressed controls fell between “moderately true of me” and “very true of me” (M =
7.45, SD = 0.96). Differences between the two groups were large (Cohen’s d = -1.12,
95% CI [-1.55, -0.83]). Levene’s test for equality of variances indicated greater
dispersion of scores among depressed than nondepressed individuals, F(1, 74) = 5.67, p =
.020.
Incremental validity.
Samples 1 and 2. To test whether the PVSS-21 predicted important outcomes
over and above existing measures of positive valence constructs, we conducted
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hierarchical regression analyses predicting anhedonic depression (MASQ), overall
depression (PHQ-9), hypomanic symptoms (HPS-20), and social/occupational
impairment (SFQ). For Sample 1, we entered on the first step the set of reward
processing measures most highly correlated with the PVSS (BAS total, TEPS:
Anticipatory, TEPS: Consummatory, and SHAPS). For Sample 2, we entered all four
reward processing measures administered to this sample (BAS total, TEPS: Anticipatory,
TEPS: Consummatory, and GRAPES Generalized Reward Expectancy subscale). On the
second step, we entered the PVSS-21. Results are shown in Table 2.7.
The PVSS-21 significantly predicted lower anhedonic depression (both β < -.29,
both p < .003) and lower overall depression (both β < -.31, both p < .004) even after
controlling for these additional reward measures in Samples 1 and 2 . Similarly, the
PVSS-21 predicted lower social/occupational impairment over and above these measures
(β = -.36, p = .001).8 By contrast, the PVSS-21 no longer predicted hypomanic symptoms
when accounting for these measures (β = -.04, p = .755).
Sample 3. We tested associations of the PVSS-21 with self-reported and clinicianrated anhedonic symptoms. The PVSS-21 predicted lower MASQ Anhedonic Depression
(β = -.70, p < .001), even after controlling for MDD status (β = -.41, p < .001, ΔR2 = .13).
The PVSS-21 also predicted lower clinician-rated anhedonia severity (β = -.57, p < .001).
It continued to predict lower anhedonia severity after controlling for MDD status (β = 8

Measures of functional impairment and hypomanic symptoms were only administered
to Sample 1. In Sample 1, the SHAPS also continued to predict lower anhedonic
depression (β = -.43), overall depression (β = -.48), and social/occupational impairment
(β = -.43) when controlling for the other reward processing measures, and the BAS
continued to predict lower anhedonic depression (β = -.27). In Sample 2, the GRAPES
reward subscale continued to predict lower anhedonic depression (β = -.31) and overall
depression (β = -.28) when controlling for the other reward processing measures.
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.17, p = .001, ΔR2 = .02), although much less strongly, likely because of the close
relationship between anhedonia and MDD status (rpb = .92, p < .001). Even within the
MDD group, individuals with higher PVSS-21 scores had lower anhedonic depression (β
= -.69, p < .001) and lower clinician-rated anhedonia severity (β = -.45, p = .008).
Subscales. Inter-correlations among the PVSS-21 subscales ranged from .23 to
.72 in Samples 1-3 (mean inter-correlations = .46 to .53), suggesting that the subscales
have substantial shared variance, yet are still differentiable.
Samples 1 and 2. Correlations of PVSS-21 subscales with convergent and
discriminant measures support the validity of the subscales. Incremental validity analyses
paralleling those for the overall score (Table 2.7) show that the individual subscales often
predicted outcomes beyond the multiple full scales that were included in the analyses as
covariates. Several subscales were especially consistent predictors of outcomes
(Outdoors, Hobbies, Social Interactions, and Goals), with Hobbies emerging as the most
consistent and robust predictor.
To directly compare the subscales, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses
with the subscales entered simultaneously as predictors so that they controlled for one
another. Anhedonic depression (MASQ) and overall depression (PHQ-9) served as
outcomes. In Sample 1, Hobbies (β = -.37, p < .001) and Social Interactions (β = -.28, p =
.003) were unique negative predictors of anhedonic depression, whereas Hobbies (β = .28, p < .001), Goals (β = -.27, p < .001), and Social Interactions (β = -.26, p < .001) were
unique negative predictors of overall depression. In Sample 2, Hobbies (β = -.50, p <
.001), Goals (β = -.18, p = .004), and Physical Touch (β = -.12, p = .044) were unique
negative predictors of anhedonic depression, while only Hobbies (β = -.43, p < .001)
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remained a negative predictor of overall depression. Surprisingly, in Sample 1 Food
positively predicted anhedonic depression (β = .21, p = .004) and overall depression (β =
.18, p = .001) in these analyses and the earlier incremental validity analyses.
Sample 3. We ran a mixed-model ANOVA with MDD status as a betweensubjects factor and the PVSS-21 subscales as within-subject factors. We found main
effects of MDD status and subscales (both F > 4.01, both p < .002) as well as an
interaction indicating that the magnitude of the group difference varied by subscale, F(1,
4.98) = 3.26, p = .007. The largest differences between depressed and nondepressed
individuals were evident for the Hobbies (d = -1.23) and Social Interactions (d = -1.13)
subscales (Illustration 2.3).
Discussion
In Study 2, we developed a brief version of the PVSS that has a total score
representing a strong overall factor and seven subscales representing reward-specific
subfactors. The PVSS-21 items were administered to a selected community sample, an
unselected student sample, and a clinical sample of individuals with and without MDD.
The PVSS-21 exhibited strong factorial validity, internal consistency, retest reliability,
and convergent and discriminant validity. The PVSS-21 also predicted anhedonic
depression, overall depression, and functional impairment over and above existing reward
processing measures. Finally, the PVSS-21 showed promise as a clinical measure,
discriminating depressed from nondepressed individuals and predicting anhedonia
severity even among depressed individuals. Adding to the promise of the overall score,
the PVSS-21 subscales also evidenced convergent, discriminant, and incremental
validity. The informativeness of the subscales was suggested by their different patterns of
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associations with clinical outcomes, with Hobbies (and to a lesser extent, Social
Interactions, Goals, and Outdoors) showing particular sensitivity to reward deficits in
depression.
There were several exceptions to the robust findings described above. First, while
the PVSS-21 was more strongly related to positive than negative affect in Samples 1 and
2, it was more strongly related to extraversion than neuroticism only in Sample 2.
Interestingly, extraversion and neuroticism were themselves highly correlated in Sample
1 (r = -.53). These results highlight that the PVSS-21, like most clinical measures, has
significant associations with adverse outcomes like neuroticism even though it is
typically more strongly related to convergent constructs.
Additionally, we found mixed results for specificity to positive emotionality
versus other positive personality traits. The PVSS-21 was more strongly related to
extraversion than creativity, but was not more strongly related to extraversion than
agreeableness or conscientiousness. Finally, the PVSS-21 did not predict responses to
hypomanic symptoms on the HPS-20 over and above existing reward measures. This may
be due to low levels of hypomanic symptoms in our sample and consequent range
restriction (M = 6.4, SD = 4.63; scores can range from 0-20). Alternatively, this may be
due to the HPS-20’s focus on personality traits congruent with hypomania instead of
state-like symptoms of clinically significant hypomania. A final possibility is that the
PVSS may be more sensitive to reward processing disruptions in depression than
hypomania.
Study 3: Validation of the PVSS-21 as a Stand-Alone Measure
As the PVSS-21 items were administered as part of the PVSS-45 in Study 2, in
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Study 3 we tested the PVSS-21 as a stand-alone measure. To further diversify the types
of samples in which the PVSS was tested, we recruited an unselected community sample.
Study 3 gave us the opportunity to evaluate the PVSS-21 in relation to newer reward
processing measures, and to clarify ambiguous results from Studies 1 and 2 by retesting
the relationships of interest in an independent sample.
Method
Participants. Sample 4 included 266 participants recruited from MTurk. All
participants completed the PVSS-21 and a measure of general depression (PHQ-9); 140
participants also completed convergent and discriminant measures. The same quality
control procedures applied to MTurk participants in Sample 1 were applied to Sample 4,
resulting in the exclusion of 50 participants with invalid data. Sample 4 had a relatively
higher percentage of males (58.6%) but a similar racial and ethnic profile as Sample 1
(Table 2.2). More participants reported minimal (n = 145) than mild (n = 67) or moderate
(n = 54) depression symptoms on the PHQ-9.
Measures for validity testing.
Convergent measures.
Reward processing. To test the PVSS-21’s relationship to newer measures of PVS
constructs, we included the Motivation and Pleasure Scale–Self-Report (MAP-SR; α =
.93) and the Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (DARS; α = .92), both described in the
Introduction and summarized in Table 2.1. Due to the strong relationship between the
PVSS and the SHAPS in Sample 1 and the SHAPS’ strong performance in incremental
validity analyses, we also included this measure (α = .90).
Positive emotionality. Due to ambiguous results in Study 2 regarding the stronger
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relationship of the PVSS-21 to extraversion versus neuroticism, we readministered BFI
Extraversion (α = .92) and Neuroticism (α = .91).
Mood symptoms. As in the previous studies, we assessed overall depression
(PHQ-9; α = .90) and anhedonic depression (MASQ Anhedonic Depression; α = .96). To
further probe the relationship of the PVSS-21 with hypomanic symptoms, we included a
different measure of hypomanic symptoms: the Personality Assessment Inventory–Mania
subscale (PAI-MAN; Morey 2007). Individuals rated the extent to which core
characteristics of hypomania, including elevated activity level, grandiosity, and
irritability, described them (α = .90).
Contact with rewarding stimuli. We included the Behavioral Activation for
Depression Scale (BADS; Kanter et al., 2007) Activation subscale (α = .87) to measure
the extent to which participants engaged in activities consistent with their goals over the
previous week.
Social/occupational impairment. In Study 2 we assessed overall
social/occupational impairment with the SFQ. In Study 3 we separated these components
by including a measure of occupational and educational impairment (BADS Work/School
Impairment subscale, α = .88) and a measure of social impairment (BADS Social
Impairment subscale, α = .89).
Discriminant measures. As in the previous studies, we assessed anxiety symptoms
characterized by hyperarousal using the MASQ Anxious Arousal subscale (α = .96). We
also assessed BFI Agreeableness (α = .85) and Conscientiousness (α = .87) to reexamine
the PVSS-21’s ability to discriminate reward responding from other positive personality
traits.
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Results
Factor analysis.
Higher-order CFA. A higher-order CFA in MPlus with the same parameters as in
Study 2 showed evidence of good fit (Table 2.4, Model 13) comparable to the fit
demonstrated in Study 2. PVSS-21 items loaded strongly on the subfactors (≥ .58; Table
2.6) and formed reliable subscales (α = .77-.88) which, in turn, loaded highly on the
overall factor. As in Study 2, Hobbies loaded very highly on the overall factor (.95).
Unlike Study 2, in which Outdoors had the lowest loading, Food had the lowest loading
in Study 3 (.72). Reliability for the full scale was high (α = .96). Once again, the CFA
model including seven subfactors evidenced better fit than a model including only three
reward-specific subfactors (Δχ2 = 431.50, p < .001), which had fit indices that fell below
conventional standards (Table 2.4, Model 14).
Bifactor CFA. Next, we tested a bifactor CFA model in which items loaded on
both a general factor and reward-specific subfactors, with all factors constrained to be
orthogonal. Contrary to the results in Samples 1 and 2, this bifactor model did converge
in Sample 4 (Table 2.4, Model 15) and demonstrated essentially identical fit as the
higher-order model (Model 13). Factor loadings (Table 2.8) showed that almost all items
loaded more strongly on the general than the specific factors. Coefficient omega (ω), a
reliability estimate that reflects variance from both the total and subscale scores, was high
for each subscale (.82-.88; Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 2016). Omega hierarchical
(ωh), which estimates the proportion of variance attributed to the general factor, was also
high (.94). Omega hierarchical subscale coefficients, estimating the proportion of
variance attributed to subscale scores after controlling for the variance due to the general
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factor, were low and ranged from .11 (Hobbies) to .35 (Food). These coefficients
reflected the previously described finding that Hobbies had the strongest relationship, and
Food the weakest relationship, to the overall scale score in this sample. These results
indicate that, in this sample, most subscale variance can be attributed to the general
factor, with modest additions from the reward-specific subfactors.
Convergent and discriminant validity. As in Study 2, the PVSS-21 was more
strongly related to MASQ Anhedonic Depression (r = -.66; Table 2.5) than Anxious
Arousal (r = -.03; t(137) = 7.91, p < .001) and was related to, but not redundant with,
overall depression on the PHQ-9 (r = -.37). The PVSS-21’s correlation with BFI
Extraversion (r = .45) was marginally higher than its correlation with Neuroticism (r = .31; t(137) = 1.83, p = .069) but no higher than its correlation with Agreeableness (r =
.53) or Conscientiousness (r = .34), both t < 1.13, both p > .259.
Incremental validity. We examined associations of the PVSS-21 with anhedonic
depression (MASQ), overall depression (PHQ-9), hypomanic symptoms (PAI-MAN),
and functional impairment (BADS) after accounting for the reward measures included in
this study (SHAPS, DARS, and MAP-SR; Table 2.7). Due to the high correlation
between the PVSS-21 and MAP-SR in this sample (r = .76), the PVSS-21 did not
significantly predict anhedonic depression or overall depression when all three reward
measures were included as covariates. With the MAP-SR excluded, the PVSS-21 was the
strongest predictor of anhedonic depression (β = -.43, p < .001), predicting over and
above the SHAPS (β = -.19, p = .037) and DARS (β = -.18, p = .019). With the MAP-SR
excluded, the PVSS-21 also marginally predicted overall depression above and beyond
the remaining measures (β = -.20, p = .080), with an effect size equal to the DARS (β = 74

.20, p = .048) and greater than the SHAPS (β = -.10, p = .367).
Only the PVSS-21 significantly predicted higher hypomanic symptoms (β = .32, p
= .020) after accounting for the three other reward processing measures. However,
neither the PVSS-21 nor any other reward measure significantly predicted lower
work/school impairment with the other measures in the model, all β < -.22, all p > .087.
Although the PVSS-21 significantly predicted lower social impairment (β = -.23, p =
.036) over and above the SHAPS (β = -.20, p = .068) and DARS (β = -.18, p = .048), it no
longer predicted social impairment when the MAP-SR was also in the model.
Subscales. Inter-correlations among the PVSS-21 subscales ranged from .44 to
.71, with a mean of .59. As in Study 2, correlations with convergent and discriminant
measures supported the validity of the subscales. Incremental validity analyses (Table
2.7) showed that several individual subscales predicted anhedonic depression, social
impairment, and hypomanic symptoms beyond the SHAPS and DARS, and to some
extent beyond the MAP-SR as well. Similar to Study 2, subscales that were especially
consistent predictors of outcomes included Hobbies, Outdoors, and Goals, with Hobbies
serving as the most consistent and robust predictor.
We also directly compared the subscales by entering them as predictors of
anhedonic depression (MASQ) and overall depression (PHQ-9) simultaneously so that
they controlled for one another. As in Study 2, Hobbies remained a strong, unique
predictor of lower anhedonic depression (β = -.63, p < .001) and overall depression (β = .39, p = .002). Contrary to Study 2, Social Interaction was not a unique predictor of either
outcome (both β < -.05, p > .709), whereas Outdoors uniquely predicted lower anhedonic
depression (β = -.19, p = .026).
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Discussion
In Study 3, we tested the PVSS-21 as a stand-alone measure in an independent
sample. As in Study 2, the higher-order factor structure demonstrated good fit and both
the full scale and its subscales were internally consistent. Further replicating Study 2,
Hobbies loaded especially highly on the overall factor and remained a significant
predictor of both anhedonic depression and overall depression when controlling for the
other subscales. Goals and Outdoors were also robust predictors of clinical outcomes.
Although the bifactor model did not converge in Study 2, it did converge in Study 3, and
the higher-order and bifactor models demonstrated nearly identical fit. The bifactor
model confirmed prior evidence of the PVSS’s strong general factor by showing that
items loaded more highly on the general factor than on the subfactors. As can be expected
when items load strongly on a general factor, the reliability coefficients for the subscales
were low when controlling for the general factor (Rodriguez et al., 2016); such
coefficients tend to be low because they represent the variance remaining after
accounting for the general factor and are therefore residualized variables (Rodriguez,
Reise, & Haviland, 2015). By contrast, subscale reliabilities were high when both the
general and specific factors were considered together. Lastly, the model clarified that
much of each subscale’s variance can be attributed to the general factor, although specific
variance contributes to the score as well.
Overall, as in Study 2, the PVSS-21 was more strongly related to anhedonic
depression than anxious arousal and was associated, but not redundant, with general
depression. The PVSS-21 shared a marginally stronger association with extraversion than
neuroticism. The pattern was similar to Study 2, wherein correlations appeared higher
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with extraversion than neuroticism in Samples 1 and 2 but the difference reached
significance only in Sample 2. As in Sample 1, extraversion and neuroticism were highly
correlated in the present sample (r = -.55), raising questions about the differentiability of
these constructs as assessed by the BFI. Finally, as in Study 2, the PVSS-21 was not more
strongly related to extraversion than to agreeableness or conscientiousness, suggesting
that the PVS constructs captured by the scale are meaningfully related to other positive
personality constructs.
The PVSS-21 significantly predicted anhedonic depression and social
impairment, and marginally predicted overall depression, even when accounting for the
DARS and SHAPS. The PVSS-21 was a particularly robust predictor of anhedonic
depression relative to these scales. However, its prediction of these outcomes fell to
nonsignificance when accounting for the MAP-SR. Importantly, the PVSS-21
significantly predicted hypomanic symptoms when accounting for the MAP-SR as well
as the DARS and SHAPS, underscoring its value beyond existing reward processing
measures and supporting its relevance to hypomania as well as depression. None of the
reward measures predicted work/school impairment when accounting for the other
measures, perhaps reflecting unique occupational characteristics of MTurk workers, who
were engaging in a work task by completing the survey.
General Discussion
We developed the PVSS to provide a comprehensive self-report measure of the
RDoC Positive Valence Systems domain. The PVSS assesses the constructs in this
domain in relation to a diverse array of primary and secondary rewards in social,
physical, and recreational categories. We first developed a 45-item scale that measured
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each PVS construct in relation to all reward categories, selecting items that loaded highly
on the strong overall factor. Results across two samples supported the reliability and
validity of the PVSS-45, but revealed that its one-factor model did not adequately
represent the scale’s heterogeneous content. Based on these results, we developed a 21item scale, further selecting items to represent the reward-specific subfactors that
emerged in the community and student samples. The PVSS-21 includes seven rewardspecific subscales (Food, Physical Touch, Outdoors, Positive Feedback, Hobbies, Social
Interactions, and Goals) in addition to the overall score. Each subscale is represented by
three items, and the total scale includes at least three items for each construct retained
across the 2011 and 2018 versions of this RDoC domain. The higher-order factor
structure of the PVSS-21 demonstrated good fit in three distinct samples, and extensive
tests in these samples provided strong support for its validity. While the reported analyses
focus on the PVSS-21 due to its stronger factorial validity and shorter length, the PVSS45 may be useful to researchers who are interested in administering items that reference
only a subset of PVS domains.
Participants found the PVSS to be clear, relevant, and easy to complete. The
rewards assessed were rated as generally available to participants over the previous two
weeks. Retest reliability was high over a two-week interval, and both the overall scale
and the subscales demonstrated high internal consistency. The PVSS-21 was more
strongly related to reward sensitivity than punishment sensitivity, to positive affect than
negative affect, and to anhedonic depression than anxious arousal. It was unrelated to
social desirability, minimally related to social fears, and associated—but not redundant—
with overall depression severity. Importantly, the PVSS-21 robustly discriminated
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persons with and without MDD and was strongly related to clinician-rated and selfreported anhedonia, even when controlling for depression status. The PVSS-21 exhibited
strong incremental validity as well, in many cases predicting symptom and functional
outcomes over and above other available reward processing measures.
Our findings demonstrate that the PVSS-21 is best conceptualized as a scale
measuring individual differences in responding to rewards, with an overall factor that
comprises differences in responding to specific reward types that are closely related (as
represented by a higher-order factor model). This is in contrast to a scale in which the
subscales account for substantial additional variance over and above the general factor (as
represented by a bifactor model; Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006; Reise, 2012). All three
studies provided evidence for a strong overall factor, and Study 3 further showed that the
reward-specific subscales include more variance from the general factor than the specific
factors. These findings support the use of the overall score as a global measure of reward
responding. At the same time, given evidence for the reliability and validity of the
subscales, these scores can be used by researchers or clinicians who wish to examine the
types of rewards that contribute most to prediction of outcomes.
Despite its strengths, the PVSS-21 has several other limitations. First, its
correlations with hypomanic personality traits were small to moderate. After controlling
for other reward measures, the PVSS-21 no longer predicted hypomanic traits in Sample
1, although it was the only measure to continue predicting hypomanic traits after
controlling for other reward measures in Sample 4. Second, while the PVSS-21
consistently demonstrated larger correlations with extraversion than neuroticism, this
difference did not always reach statistical significance, perhaps owing to the strong
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relationship between extraversion and neuroticism. Additionally, while the PVSS-21 was
more strongly related to extraversion than creativity, it was not more strongly related to
extraversion than to other positive personality traits such as agreeableness and
conscientiousness. Third, one reward measure, the MAP-SR, outperformed the PVSS-21
in several incremental validity analyses in Sample 4. Importantly, however, the MAP-SR
has its own limitations, including its lack of differentiation of reward types and PVS
constructs, its restriction to social and recreational rewards, its aggregation of responses
over the past week and upcoming weeks, and its limited psychometric data at present.
Utility of the PVSS
Given rising interest in reward processing abnormalities as a clinical feature and
potential risk factor for a range of mental disorders, the PVSS may be useful to a growing
number of researchers. The PVSS is especially timely as RDoC becomes a more
influential model for understanding psychopathology in general and reward processing in
particular. While the RDoC matrix includes “self-report” as a unit of analysis, some PVS
constructs are not assessed by any self-report measure, and most measures map poorly
onto current construct definitions. By contrast, the PVSS-21 provides excellent content
coverage of the RDoC PVS domain. It includes 3-4 items for each PVS construct, as well
as 3 items per reward type. Thus, although the subscales are organized by reward types
rather than PVS constructs based on results of factor analyses, the total scale provides
balanced representation of PVS constructs and reward types, with responses to each PVS
domain contributing to the total score.
A further advantage of the PVSS is its assessment of responses to positive stimuli
without reference to feelings of depression, making it appropriate for transdiagnostic
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research. The PVSS is therefore an answer to calls to develop self-report measures that
map directly onto RDoC dimensions and can be used for transdiagnostic investigations of
psychopathology. The PVSS’s prediction of clinically relevant anhedonia, and the large
impact of anhedonia on functioning and treatment, suggests that the scale may also be
useful in clinical settings. For example, PVSS scores could be utilized to recommend
reward-focused treatment for depression (Craske, Meuret, Ritz, Treanor, & Dour, 2016).
The utility of the PVSS is enhanced by its assessment of responses across a wide range of
reward types. While other PVS measures include assessment of multiple rewards, we are
unaware of any other scale in which reward types were derived analytically rather than
through a priori groupings. For example, the DARS asks individuals to rate items that
have already been grouped into “pastimes/hobbies”, “foods or drinks”, “social activities”,
and “sensory experiences”. Similarly, the MAP-SR asks individuals to rate pleasure from
“being with other people”, pleasure from “hobbies, recreation, or from work”, and so on.
The DARS, unlike the MAP-SR, includes subscales derived from these item groups. The
DARS and the PVSS-21 are the only PVS measures that allow for measurement of
responses by reward type, and the PVSS-21 is the only measure that assesses a wide
range of reward types grouped using empirically-based methods.
The PVSS-21 reward-specific subscales have a number of potential uses. First,
they can help investigate which reward experiences are most strongly associated with
mental health outcomes. In our studies, Hobbies, Outdoors, and Goals emerged as
particularly strong predictors of outcomes, with Hobbies being the most robust and
consistent predictor. These results suggest that research into reward responding in
depression, as well as treatments targeting these processes, may wish to focus on
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responding to leisure and goal-oriented activities. Second, the subscales can used to
quantify the magnitude of the disturbance in clinical populations by reward type. Our
analyses showed that depressed individuals had particularly low ratings relative to
healthy individuals on Hobbies and Social Interactions, a finding with some prior support
(Olino, Silk, Osterritter & Forbes, 2015; Rizvi et al., 2015). Third, clinicians could use
the subscales to identify the extent to which responses to particular types of rewards are
impaired for particular patients, thereby informing treatment planning.
Implications for the RDoC Positive Valence Systems Domain
The present findings have two main implications for the organization of the
RDoC PVS domain. First, they add to a growing body of work demonstrating that the
PVS constructs are not differentiable by self-report. The PVS constructs are listed
separately in the RDoC matrix based on evidence suggesting that they map onto
differentiable neural units (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011). However, as noted in the
Introduction, few neurobiological studies have directly compared the PVS constructs or
examined the associations between them. By contrast, several questionnaire studies using
multiple measures of reward processing and/or positive emotionality have found positive
valence dimensions to be highly correlated (Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2014; NaragonGainey, Watson, & Markon, 2009; Stanton & Watson, 2015; Watson, Stasik, EllicksonLarew, & Stanton, 2015) or to have strong relationships with an overarching factor
(Olino, McMakin, & Forbes, 2016). Questionnaires that directly assess PVS constructs
have yielded similar findings: the ACIPS and DARS provide weak differentiation of the
constructs they assess (Gooding & Pflum, 2014; Rizvi et al., 2015). Although the TEPS
distinguishes anticipatory from consummatory pleasure, this differentiation was achieved
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by purposely retaining items with low inter-correlations after finding that the two
constructs were strongly related (Gard et al., 2006). The close relationships between
positive valence constructs in past studies and in the present research highlight the need
for further investigation into the structure of the PVS, as well as of other RDoC domains.
The available data, however, suggest that participants do not readily distinguish PVS
constructs via self-report, even when, as in the present study, they are encouraged to
attend to these differences.
Second, our results indicate that although self-reported responses to rewards are
characterized by a strong overall factor, they vary based on reward type. This suggests
that, at least at the self-report level, the RDoC PVS domain may be better organized by
reward type than by reward construct. Not only are reward types not reflected in the
current RDoC matrix, but they have not traditionally been incorporated into behavioral
paradigms that are used to assess PVS constructs. These paradigms mainly test
individuals’ responses to small monetary rewards, which may have limited ecological
validity and may also miss the types of rewards (e.g., hobbies, social interactions) that
most strongly distinguish clinical from nonclinical populations. Fortunately, new work is
beginning to examine different types of rewards (Dutra, Cunningham, Kober, & Gruber,
2015; Olino et al., 2015), and further investigation—facilitated by measures like the
PVSS that explicitly assess responses to a wide range of appetitive stimuli—could help
inform the development of potent, non-monetary behavioral paradigms.
Importantly, while current evidence suggests that RDoC PVS constructs are not
differentiable at the self-report level, this does not imply that the constructs themselves
are invalid. Instead, these results underscore the need for psychometric studies that test
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differentiability of PVS constructs at multiple levels of analysis (e.g., neural, behavioral).
At the same time, growing evidence that the PVS constructs are poorly differentiated by
self-report invites more fundamental questions about how the RDoC framework should
be evaluated and what evidence would suggest the need for changes to its structure or
content. A useful analogy may be offered by another classification of psychopathology,
the DSM. Like DSM-5, RDoC is a product of expert consensus guided by available theory
and research on (putatively) distinct constructs. Scales are routinely developed to assess
DSM disorder constructs, and research evaluating the construct validity and factor
structure of these scales has sharpened understanding of the constructs themselves (Clark
& Watson, 1995), leading to improved classification (cf. Yufik & Simms, 2010). In a
similar vein, developing scales that carefully operationalize RDoC dimensions, and
rigorously evaluating their construct validity, can help advance understanding of the
dimensions and suggest improvements to the RDoC framework. This is especially the
case if multiple measures, assessing the dimensions at different units of analysis, reveal
consistent discrepancies between the framework and the data.
Limitations
This research had several limitations. First, we based definitions of the PVS
constructs (and therefore item wording) on the RDoC matrix, seeking additional guidance
from the research literature and from experts in the field. However, there is not yet
consensus on precise operational definitions of the RDoC constructs, meaning that some
judgment was required when writing items. Of note, although we based item wording on
the 2011 RDoC PVS matrix, construct definitions were very similar to those in the 2018
matrix and items did not require revisions to fit the newer definitions. Second, the PVSS84

21’s reward-specific subfactors were found to include substantial portions of variance
belonging to a strong general factor. This finding may diminish the value of the PVSS-21
subscales, as they do not account for substantial additional variance over and above the
general factor. Nevertheless, evidence for the validity of a higher-order factor model,
coupled with the high reliability of the subscales when all sources of variance were
considered, suggests that the subscales can still be used to understand how responses to
particular rewards contribute to individual differences in reward processing. Third, each
PVSS-21 subscale includes only three items. We selected high-loading items that
together provided an adequate level of reliability; consequently, the correlations among
items were high.
Fourth, we did not test the PVSS in relation to behavioral measures of reward
processing, given feasibility concerns, limited research supporting their validity, and their
measurement of only one PVS construct and reward type. Future research aimed at
evaluating behavioral measures and examining their relationships to the PVSS would be
of value. Fifth, the subsample for estimating the retest coefficient was relatively small,
although even at this sample size the 95% confidence interval was favorable (.73-.90).
Sixth, given our focus on depression, we selected samples based on depression scores and
restricted symptom measures to depression, anxiety, and—to a lesser extent—hypomania.
Future studies should examine measures of clinically significant mania as well as other
disorders involving abnormal responses to positive stimuli. Relatedly, future research
should clarify the extent to which individuals with conditions involving cognitive
impairment (e.g., schizophrenia; Schultze-Lutter, 2009) have difficulty imagining how
they would have felt had they experienced the rewards in the PVSS over the prior two
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weeks. Finally, while there is extensive research examining anhedonia as a decrease in
positive valence processes, anhedonia is also listed as a behavior under the “loss”
construct of the RDoC negative valence systems domain (NVS Proceedings, 2011). This
discrepancy highlights the complex, multifaceted nature of anhedonia and the gaps that
remain in our understanding of it.
Despite these limitations, the PVSS is the first measure of an RDoC domain with
strong evidence of reliability and validity across diverse samples. It offers a powerful tool
for probing the nature and correlates of positive valence processes, with the potential to
advance understanding of depression and other conditions in which these processes are
disrupted.

86

Table 2.1
Existing Self-Report Measures of Positive Valence Processes
Positive Valence Systems Domain
Reward
Valuation

Generalized Reward Expectancy Scale (Ball & Zuckerman, 1990)

Reward
Expectancy

Effort
Valuation

Reward
Anticipation

Initial
Responsiveness

Reward
Satiation

x

Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (Torrubia et al., 2001)

x

Fawcett-Clark Pleasure Scale (Fawcett et al., 1983)

x

Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith et al., 1995)

x

Chapman Anhedonia Scales (Chapman et al., 1976)

x

x

Specific Loss of Interest and Pleasure Scale (Winer et al., 2014)

x

x

Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (Gard et al., 2006)

x

x

Anticipatory and Consummatory Interpersonal Pleasure Scale

x

x

(Gooding & Pflum, 2014)
Rewarding Events Inventory (Hughes et al., 2017)

x

x

Behavioral Activation Scale (Carver & White, 1994)

x

x

x

x

Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality Questionnaire

x

x

x

x

Motivation and Pleasure Scale – Self-Report (Llerena et al., 2013)

x

x

x

Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (Rizvi et al., 2015)

x

x

x

(Corr & Cooper, 2016)

Reward Category

x

x
x
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Scales

Overall
Motivation

Scales

Primary Rewards

Social rewards

Generalized Reward Expectancy Scale (Ball & Zuckerman, 1990)

Physical Rewards

Recreational Rewards

x

x

Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (Torrubia et al., 2001)

x

x

x

x

Fawcett-Clark Pleasure Scale (Fawcett et al., 1983)

x

x

x

x

Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith et al., 1995)

x

x

x

x

Chapman Anhedonia Scales (Chapman et al., 1976)

x

x

x

x

Specific Loss of Interest and Pleasure Scale (Winer et al., 2014)
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (Gard et al., 2006)

x
x

Anticipatory and Consummatory Interpersonal Pleasure Scale

x
x

x

x

x

x

Rewarding Events Inventory (Hughes et al., 2017)

x

x

Behavioral Activation Scale (Carver & White, 1994)

x

Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality Questionnaire

x

(Corr & Cooper, 2016)
Motivation and Pleasure Scale – Self-Report (Llerena et al., 2013)
Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (Rizvi et al., 2015)

x
x

x

x
x

x

Note. Overall Motivation is not a construct in the Positive Valence Systems domain, but was included here to identify scales that provide a broad assessment of motivation rather than
assessing specific subconstructs. Primary rewards are defined as rewards related to food or sex.
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(Gooding & Pflum, 2014)

Table 2.2
Demographic Characteristics by Sample
Sample 1
(N = 356)

Sample 2
(N = 358)

Sample 2 follow-up
(n = 59)

Sample 3
(N = 76)

Sample 4
(N = 266)

36.96 (10.94)

19.96 (1.82)

19.90 (2.16)

32.73 (12.96)

36.84 (10.82)

50.6

56.1

61.0

61.8

41.4

87.4

60.6

55.9

48.7

80.8

% African American

3.9

7.0

10.2

32.9

9.8

% Asian

4.2

24.6

27.1

11.8

6.8

% Multiracial

3.4

6.4

6.8

N/A

2.2

% Other

1.1

1.4

0.0

6.6

0.4

3.1

8.4

11.9

1.5

3.8

Demographic Characteristics
Age
% Female

% Caucasian

Ethnicity
% Hispanic/Latino

Note. M (SD) are presented for dimensional variables; all other values represent percentages. In Study 3, multiracial
participants were included in the “Other” category.
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Race

Table 2.3
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for the Positive Valence Systems Scale, 45 items (PVSS-45)
Item

Sample 1

Sample 2

I had the desire to feel part of a group or community

.52

.41

I craved a delicious food

.52

.43

I wanted to spend time doing productive activities

.56

.35

I wanted to spend time with people I know

.70

.60

I wanted to participate in a fun activity with friends

.71

.69

I wanted to accomplish goals I set for myself

.55

.51

I expected to master the tasks I undertook

.59

.47

I expected to hear positive comments about my work

.61

.53

I expected to enjoy a brief moment outdoors

.52

.46

I expected to be received warmly by people I met

.66

.62

I expected to enjoy being hugged by someone I love

.66

.58

I expected to enjoy my meals

.63

.59

.65

.64

Reward Expectancy

Effort Valuation
I invested time in my friendships
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Reward Valuation

I actively pursued activities I thought would be fun

.70

.74

I worked hard to earn positive feedback on my projects

.65

.59

I went out of my way to admire the beauty around me

.60

.48

I put energy into activities I enjoy

.72

.65

I went out of my way to find a food I enjoy

.55

.54

I really looked forward to watching a movie I heard might be good

.51

.41

I looked forward to hugging someone I felt close to

.57

.58

I looked forward to an upcoming meal

.56

.59

I looked forward to spending time with others

.77

.72

I really looked forward to spending time on my hobbies

.63

.62

I looked forward to hearing feedback on my work

.68

.58

I cooked or went out for a special meal even though it took considerable time or efforta

.44

.48

I worked hard to earn praise from someone I respected, even though it required a lot

.54

.52

I made time to pursue my hobbies even when it was inconvenient

.55

.58

I went out with friends even when there were other things I could have been doinga

.37

.50

I focused on pursuing my long-term goals even when it was difficult

.57

.58

Even when I had limited free time, I carved out time to spend with loved ones

.72

.66

Action Selection

more of my time
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Reward Anticipation

I was excited to discover that someone I met shared my interests

.49

.39

Laughing with friends lifted my spirits

.69

.63

When an upbeat song came on, I got really into it

.62

.48

I felt pleased when I reached a goal I set for myself

.67

.58

It felt good to have physical contact with someone I felt close to

.68

.59

I felt delighted when someone complimented me

.72

.62

I savored my first bite of food after feeling hungry

.59

.56

I felt great when someone listened carefully to a story I told

.66

.67

I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors

.58

.51

My excitement about buying myself something new lasted into the next day

.49

.42

Receiving praise about my work made me feel pleased for the rest of the day

.70

.49

The inspiration I felt while watching a great movie persisted after the movie ended

.62

.48

Getting a hug from someone close to me made me happy even after we parted

.67

.63

I felt satisfied and relaxed for a long time after a good meal

.64

.66

A fun activity during the weekend sustained my good mood throughout the new week

.71

.61

Reward Satiation

Note. aItems were worded slightly differently in the two studies. The wording in the table represents the final wording that was
used in Sample 2.
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Initial Responsiveness

Table 2.4

Model

Description

Scale

Sample

χ2

df

RMSEA with 90%
CI

SRMR

CFI

1

1 general factor

PVSS-45

Sample 1

4796.32

945

.11 [.10, .11]

.08

.63

2

1 general factor

PVSS-45

Sample 2

4186.35

945

.10 [.10, .10]

.08

.61

3

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-45

Sample 1

2986.60

938

.08 [.08, .08]

.07

.81

4

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-45

Sample 2

2865.62

938

.08 [.07, .08]

.07

.77

5

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

Highest loading items in Sample 1

Sample 1

480.75

182

.07 [.06, .08]

.05

.94

6

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

Highest loading items in Sample 1

Sample 2

525.94

182

.07 [.07, .08]

.06

.90

7

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 1

523.97

182

.07 [.07, .08]

.05

.93

8

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 2

495.44

183

.07 [.06, .08]

.06

.91

9

1 general factor; 3 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-45

Sample 1

4336.95

942

.10 [.10, .10]

.08

.67

10

1 general factor; 3 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-45

Sample 2

3885.41

942

.09 [.09, .10]

.08

.65

11

1 general factor; 3 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 1

1364.04

186

.13 [.13, .14]

.08

.74

12

1 general factor; 3 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 2

1208.09

186

.12 [.12, .13]

.08

.70

13

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 4

509.33

182

.08 [.07, .09]

.05

.91

14

1 general factor; 3 subfactors (higher-order)

PVSS-21

Sample 4

940.83

186

.12 [.12, .13]

.07

.79

15

1 general factor; 7 subfactors (bifactor)

PVSS-21

Sample 4

471.49

168

.08 [.07, .09]

.05

.92

Note. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CI = confidence intervals; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; CFI = comparative fit index.
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Fit Indices for Positive Valence Systems Scale (PVSS) Factor Solutions

Table 2.5
Correlations of the Positive Valence Systems Scale (PVSS) with Convergent and Discriminant Measures
PVSS-45
Scale

PVSS-21

Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 4

Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS): Total

.67***

.48***

.66***

.46***

_____

Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS): Reward Responsiveness

.65***

.44***

.65***

.39***

_____

Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire

.37***

_____

.34***

_____

_____

Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS): Drive

.54***

.37***

.55***

.38***

_____

GRAPES Generalized Reward Expectancy

.56***

.37***

.55***

.39***

_____

Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS): Anticipatory

.73***

.66***

.72***

.62***

_____

Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS): Consummatory

.64***

.39***

.66***

.39***

_____

Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS)

.72***

_____

.72***

_____

.69***

Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (DARS)

_____

_____

_____

_____

.56***

Motivation and Pleasure Scale - Self-Report (MAP-SR)

_____

_____

_____

_____

.76***

.61***

.60***

.61***

.61***

_____

Convergent measures

Positive emotionality
PANAS - State Positive Affect

94

Reward processing

Big Five Inventory (BFI): Extraversion

.52***

.42***

.52***

.42***

.45***

Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9)

-.49***

-.35***

-.48***

-.37***

-.37***

MASQ Anhedonic Depression

-.62***

-.64***

-.63***

-.65***

-.66***

Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS-20)

.28***

_____

.25***

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

.21*

Mood symptoms

Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI): Mania Subscale

_____

Reward Probability Index (RPI) - Reward Probability

.71***

_____

.71***

_____

_____

Reward Probability Index (RPI) - Environmental Suppressors

-.47***

_____

-.49***

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

-.60***

_____

-.61***

_____

_____

Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale (BADS) - Work/School Impairment

_____

_____

_____

_____

-.13

Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale (BADS) - Social Impairment

_____

_____

_____

_____

-.46***

Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale (BADS) – Activation

.56***

Functioning
Social Functioning Questionnaire (SFQ)

Discriminant measures
Punishment sensitivity
Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS)

-.15*

.01

-.17*

-.05

_____

GRAPES Generalized Punishment Expectancy

-.23**

-.03

-.23**

-.05

_____

-.37***

-.16*

-.40***

-.18**

_____

Negative emotionality
PANAS - State Negative Affect
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Contact with rewarding stimuli

Big Five Inventory (BFI): Neuroticism

-.40***

-.24***

-.42***

-.27***

-.31***

MASQ Anxious Arousal

-.26**

-.24***

-.29***

-.24***

-.03

Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale - Straightforward Items (BFNE-S)

-.23**

-.09

-.25**

-.13*

_____

Creative Behavior Inventory - Short Form (CBI-SF)

.22**

_____

.22**

_____

_____

Big Five Inventory (BFI): Agreeableness

.36***

.46***

.40***

.45***

.53***

Big Five Inventory (BFI): Conscientiousness

.38***

.37***

.42***

.36***

.34***

.06

_____

.10

_____

_____

Anxiety symptoms

Positive personality traits

Shortened Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD)

Note. GRAPES = Generalized Reward and Punishment Expectancy Scale; PANAS - State = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - State version
(past few weeks); MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire. The Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire is a subscale of the Sensitivity to
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Social desirability

Table 2.6
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for the Positive Valence Systems Scale, 21 items (PVSS-21)
Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 3

Sample 4

α = .84

α = .76

α = .69

α = .77

I expected to enjoy my meals

.87

.78

.82

Reward Expectancy

I looked forward to an upcoming meal

.81

.78

.84

Reward Anticipation

I savored my first bite of food after feeling hungrya

.74

.67

.58

Initial Responsiveness

.71

.73

.72

α = .89

α = .82

It felt good to have physical contact with someone I felt close to

.86

.78

.81

Initial Responsiveness

I expected to enjoy being hugged by someone I love

.87

.78

.86

Reward Expectancy

Getting a hug from someone close to me made me happy even after we parted

.85

.78

.82

Reward Satiation

.73

.73

.83

α = .86

α = .84

I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors

.87

.90

.80

Initial Responsiveness

I expected to enjoy a brief moment outdoors

.83

.82

.84

Reward Expectancy

I went out of my way to admire the beauty around me

.78

.69

.77

Effort Valuation

.66

.56

.85

α = .78

α = .69

I looked forward to hearing feedback on my work

.77

.69

.72

Reward Anticipation

I worked hard to earn positive feedback on my projects

.74

.73

.82

Effort Valuation

Food

Loading on general factor
Physical Touch

Loading on general factor
Outdoors

Loading on general factor
Positive Feedback

α = .82

α = .82

α = .71

PVS construct

α = .87

α = .85

α = .81
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Item

.72

.57

.78

.89

.85

.83

α = .81

α = .69

I actively pursued activities I thought would be fun

.78

.75

.74

Effort Valuation

I put energy into activities I enjoy

.83

.69

.77

Effort Valuation

A fun activity during the weekend sustained my good mood throughout the new weekb

.72

.61

.77

Reward Satiation

.90

1.00c

.95

α = .88

α = .84

I looked forward to spending time with others

.90

.85

.85

Reward Anticipation

I wanted to participate in a fun activity with friends

.80

.82

.84

Reward Valuation

I wanted to spend time with people I know

.85

.72

.84

Reward Valuation

.83

.79

.86

α = .71

α = .66

I wanted to accomplish goals I set for myself

.67

.68

.78

Reward Valuation

I felt pleased when I reached a goal I set for myself

.74

.68

.88

Initial Responsiveness

I expected to master the tasks I undertook

.66

.57

.65

Reward Expectancy

.91

.81

.79

α = .94

α = .91

Loading on general factor
Hobbies

Loading on general factor
Social Interactions

Loading on general factor
Goals

Loading on general factor
Total

α = .86

α = .88

α = .70

α = .93

Reward Satiation

α = .80

α = .88

α = .80

α = .95

Note. aHigher loading item in Sample 1 replaced with item that loaded more strongly in Sample 2.
bHigher
cThe

loading item in Sample 1 replaced with item that represented Reward Satiation construct.

variance for this subfactor was constrained to 0 because it originally had a negative residual variance and a correlation of >1 with the general factor.
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Receiving praise about my work made me feel pleased for the rest of the dayb

Table 2.7
Incremental Validity for Positive Valence Systems Scale, 21 items (PVSS-21) - Total Score and Subscales
Anhedonic depression
(MASQ)

Overall depression
(PHQ-9)

Hypomanic symptoms
(HPS-20)

Social/occupational
impairment (SFQ)

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

Total

-.30**

.03

-.34**

.04

-.04

<.01

-.36**

.04

Food

.17*

.02

.19*

.02

.05

<.01

.14

.01

Physical Touch

-.11

.01

-.15

.02

-.06

<.01

-.25**

.04

Outdoors

-.25**

.03

-.22*

.02

-.04

<.01

-.17

.01

Positive Feedback

-.06

<.01

-.01

<.01

.05

<.01

-.01

<.01

Hobbies

-.36***

.06

-.35***

.06

.05

<.01

-.33***

.05

Social Interactions

-.28***

.04

-.37***

.08

-.10

.01

-.35***

.07

Goals

-.15

.01

-.21*

.02

-.04

<.01

-.17*

.02

Total

-.49***

.13

-.32***

.05

Food

-.16*

.02

-.20**

.03

Physical Touch

-.21**

.02

-.05

<.01

Outdoors

-.22***

.04

-.16*

.02

Sample 2b
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Sample 1a

Positive Feedback

-.20**

.03

-.16*

.02

Hobbies

-.50***

.16

-.35***

.08

Social Interactions

-.27***

.06

-.12

.01

Goals

-.28***

.06

-.15*

.02

Anhedonic depression
(MASQ)

Overall depression
(PHQ-9)

Hypomanic symptoms
(PAI-MAN)

Social impairment
(BADS)

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

β

ΔR2

Total

-.14

.01

-.05

<.01

.32*

.04

-.06

<.01

Food

.02

<.01

.02

<.01

.17

.02

.06

<.01

Physical Touch

.01

<.01

.11

.01

<.01

<.01

<.01

<.01

Outdoors

-.15*

.01

-.10

.01

.26*

.04

-.09

.01

Positive Feedback

-.02

<.01

.06

<.01

.29**

.06

.15

.02

Hobbies

-.33***

.05

-.28*

.03

.26*

.03

-.17

.01

Social Interactions

.03

<.01

.05

<.01

.05

<.01

-.08

<.01

Goals

-.08

.01

-.15

.02

.02

<.01

-.14

.01

Total

-.43***

.09

-.20

.02

.33**

.05

-.23*

.02

Food

-.06

<.01

-.02

<.01

.19

.02

.02

<.01

Sample 4d
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Sample 4c

Physical Touch

-.20*

.03

-.01

<.01

.06

<.01

-.12

.01

Outdoors

-.26**

.05

-.15

.02

.28**

.05

-.15

.02

Positive Feedback

-.20**

.03

-.03

<.01

.30**

.07

.04

<.01

Hobbies

-.55***

.18

-.36***

.08

.27*

.04

-.30**

.06

Social Interactions

-.18*

.02

-.06

<.01

.10

.01

-.19*

.02

Goals

-.21**

.03

-.20*

.03

.05

<.01

-.21*

.03

Note. MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire; HPS-20 = Hypomanic Personality
Scale; SFQ = Social Functioning Questionnaire; PAI-MAN = Personality Assessment Inventory - Mania subscale; BADS =

a

Aside from the PVSS-21, measures entered included the Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) total, Temporal Experience of Pleasure

Scale (TEPS): Anticipatory, TEPS: Consummatory, and the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS).
b

Aside from the PVSS-21, measures entered included the BAS, TEPS: Anticipatory, TEPS: Consummatory, and the Generalized

Reward and Punishment Expectancy Scale (GRAPES), Reward subscale.
c

Aside from the PVSS-21, measures entered included the SHAPS, Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (DARS), and the Motivation

and Pleasure Scale-Self-Report (MAP-SR)
d

Aside from the PVSS-21, measures entered included the SHAPS and DARS. Given the high correlation between the PVSS-21 and the

MAP-SR, the MAP-SR was excluded from these analyses.
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Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale.

Table 2.8

Item

General factor

Specific factor

ω = .80

ωhs = .35

I expected to enjoy my meals

.57

.59

I looked forward to an upcoming meal

.59

.62

I savored my first bite of food after feeling hungrya

.51

.28

ω = .88

ωhs = .27

It felt good to have physical contact with someone I felt close to

.70

.37

I expected to enjoy being hugged by someone I love

.68

.65

Getting a hug from someone close to me made me happy even after we parted

.71

.37

ω = .85

ωhs = .23

I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors

.66

.51

I expected to enjoy a brief moment outdoors

.72

.41

I went out of my way to admire the beauty around me

.68

.35

ω = .82

ωhs = .24

I looked forward to hearing feedback on my work

.63

.31

I worked hard to earn positive feedback on my projects

.63

.51

Receiving praise about my work made me feel pleased for the rest of the dayb

.68

.43

ω = .83

ωhs = .11

Food

Physical Touch

Outdoors

Positive Feedback

Hobbies
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Bifactor Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for the Positive Valence Systems Scale, 21 items (PVSS-21) in Sample 4

.70

.17

I put energy into activities I enjoy

.72

.55

A fun activity during the weekend sustained my good mood throughout the new weekb

.75

.11

ω = .88

ωhs = .23

I looked forward to spending time with others

.73

.47

I wanted to participate in a fun activity with friends

.73

.44

I wanted to spend time with people I know

.71

.39

ω = .82

ωhs = .30

I wanted to accomplish goals I set for myself

.58

.60

I felt pleased when I reached a goal I set for myself

.69

.51

I expected to master the tasks I undertook

.58

.28

Social Interactions

Goals

ωh = .94
Note. ω = coefficient omega; ωhs = coefficient omega hierarchical subscale; ωh = coefficient omega hierarchical.
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I actively pursued activities I thought would be fun

Illustration 2.1 Scree Plot of the Exploratory Factor Analysis Conducted in Sample 1.
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Illustration 2.2 Scree Plot of the Exploratory Factor Analysis Conducted in Sample 2.
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Illustration 2.3. Mean Differences on the PVSS-21 Between Individuals with MDD (major
depressive disorder; n = 34) and Nondepressed Controls (n = 42).
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CHAPTER 3
Cognitive Responses to Anticipated and Experienced Daily Positive Events in Depression
Abstract
Depressed individuals show altered emotional reactivity to positive events, but our
understanding of the cognitive processes by which these reactions occur is limited.
Furthermore, studies of daily positive events have largely neglected to separate
anticipatory from consummatory responses. The present study used ecological
momentary assessment to investigate anticipatory reactions to impending positive events
and consummatory reactions in the immediate aftermath of positive events in clinically
depressed (n = 37) and healthy (n = 34) individuals. We measured negative and positive
emotional reactions to these events, along with cognitive responses hypothesized to
enhance or dampen these emotions, and symptoms of depression throughout the day.
Depressed individuals reported higher negative affect and lower positive affect than
controls both when anticipating and after experiencing positive events. Persons with
depression reported higher levels of dampening responses, but similar levels of enhancing
responses, following positive events relative to controls. Both dampening and enhancing
responses predicted momentary depression symptoms. By contrast, lower expectations
for future positive events was the only anticipatory response related to depression
symptoms. Cognitive responses predicted affect levels, as well as greater changes in
affect, during both anticipatory and consummatory phases. This research provides new
insight into the cognitive processes that influence depressed individuals’ emotional
reactions to daily positive events. These cognitive responses could be targeted by
interventions aiming to improve reactivity to positive events in depression.
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Depressed individuals show altered reactivity to positive events that is evident in
self-reported, behavioral, and neural responding (Pizzagalli, 2014). This altered reactivity
predicts important outcomes, including levels of functioning (Khazanov, Xu, Dunn,
Cohen, & DeRubeis, 2018), treatment response (Wichers et al., 2009) and risk for future
depression (Wardenaar, Giltay, van Veen, Zitman, & Penninx, 2012). Additionally, the
relationship between positive events and psychological adjustment is stronger for
individuals with elevated depression symptoms than for those without (Nezlek & Gable,
2001).
Recent research has provided a more nuanced understanding of this topic, with
two particularly noteworthy developments. First, anticipating or seeking out future
positive events (“anticipatory” responses) may be differentiable from engaging with
positive events that have already occurred (“consummatory” responses), and both
processes appear to be impaired in depression (Admon & Pizzagalli, 2015; Treadway &
Zald, 2011; Wu et al., 2017). Second, the context in which responses are measured yields
crucial differences. For example, lab studies have found evidence of diminished
responding to standardized positive stimuli in depressed relative to nondepressed persons,
whereas ecological momentary assessment (EMA) studies have found evidence of
heightened responding to daily positive events (Bylsma, Taylor-Clift, & Rottenberg,
2011; Khazanov, Ruscio, & Swendsen, 2019; Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, &
deVries, 2003; Thompson et al., 2012). Additionally, depressed individuals may differ
from healthy individuals more when recalling their responses to past events or projecting
their responses to future events than when rating their responses in the present moment
(Thomsen, Whybrow, & Kringelbach, 2015).
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Our understanding of depressed individuals’ in-the-moment responses to positive
events is limited. While a substantial number of laboratory studies have examined
consummatory reactions to positive events (see Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 2008 for
a meta-analysis), only a few have examined emotional reactions to anticipated positive
events (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; McFarland & Klein,
2009). Only one EMA study has investigated depressed individuals’ momentary
anticipatory responses to daily activities to which they looked forward (Wu et al., 2017).
These studies have found evidence of reduced anticipatory pleasure (MacLeod & Byrne,
1996; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; McFarland & Klein, 2009) and increased
anticipatory displeasure (Wu et al., 2017) in depressed relative to nondepressed
individuals. No EMA study has yet investigated positive and negative affective responses
to anticipated positive daily events.
Additionally, research on responding to positive events in depression has not
focused on investigating the processes by which these differences occur. By contrast,
studies in healthy individuals have documented the variety of cognitive responses people
have to positive events that can enhance or dampen emotions surrounding these events
(Heiy & Cheavens, 2014; Hurley & Kwon, 2013; Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012).
Preliminary evidence suggests that depression is associated with greater difficulty
utilizing these cognitive responses to regulate emotional reactions to positive events.
Greater dampening responses to positive events have been associated with increased
depression symptoms in children and adolescents (Gentzler, Morey, Palmer, & Yi, 2013;
Gilbert, Luking, Pagliaccio, Luby, & Barch, 2017). Furthermore, fewer enhancing
responses to positive events partially accounted for the relationship between low positive
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affect and elevated symptoms of depression (Harding, Hudson, & Mezulis, 2014). These
processes have not been examined in clinically depressed individuals, and only two of the
studies investigated responding to daily positive events (Gentzler et al., 2013; Harding et
al., 2014). Additionally, these studies either examined only one or two cognitive
responses in isolation, or combined all enhancing or dampening responses into one
category, thereby making it difficult to compare the cognitive responses to one another.
Developing a deeper understanding of these processes may be useful for identifying
modifiable treatment targets with the potential to change dysregulated responding to
positive events. These insights could also impact outcomes outside the immediate context
of these events, as the ability to use positive stimuli to regulate negative and positive
emotions has long-lasting consequences (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Three separate, though overlapping, literatures hint at cognitive processes that
may influence positive event responding. Research on reward responding indicates that
reactions to positive stimuli are impacted by one’s expectations about them (Jones et al.,
2012), valuation of their importance (Pizzagalli, 2014), and assessment of the potential
costs associated with them (Treadway & Zald, 2011). The literature describing cognitive
features of emotional disorders has found that perseverative thought negatively affects
reactions to events, including worrying about future events (Feldman, Joormann, &
Johnson, 2008) and ruminating about past events (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). While
research on perseverative thought has largely focused on responses to negative events,
some studies have found that positive events lead to changes in perseverative thought
(Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013), more so for depressed than nondepressed
individuals (Khazanov & Ruscio, 2016). This literature has also found that suppressing
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one’s emotional responses to events is related to worse outcomes (Kashdan & Steger,
2006).
Finally, the emotion regulation literature has identified a wealth of cognitive
responses that influence reactivity to events. This field has also described the negative
impact of emotional suppression on wellbeing, relationships, and symptoms (Chervonsky
& Hunt, 2017; Naragon-Gainey, McMahon, & Chacko, 2017). It has further shown that
reactivity to positive events can depend on the ability to visualize future events (Bryant &
Veroff, 2017) and efforts made to focus on (Bryant & Veroff, 2017; Quoidbach, Berry,
Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2010) and have gratitude for (Jose et al., 2012; Wood, Froh, &
Geraghty, 2010) events that have taken place. Lastly, these studies have demonstrated the
benefits of capitalizing, or sharing positive events with others (Gable, Reis, Impett, &
Asher, 2004; Jose et al., 2012). Some of these cognitive responses, such as suppression,
have been studied extensively, whereas research on others, like the visualization of future
events, is sparse.
The Present Study
The present study had three aims. First, we intended to use EMA to separately
examine depressed individuals’ in-the-moment anticipatory responses to impending
positive events and consummatory responses to recently experienced positive events,
given evidence of the importance of this distinction. Second, we aimed to measure
multiple cognitive responses to daily positive events simultaneously in order to compare
how often these responses are utilized for depressed and nondepressed individuals. Third,
we set out to test the extent to which these cognitive responses predict emotional
reactions during day-to-day positive event anticipation and consumption, as well as
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symptomatic outcomes. To our knowledge, the present study is the first to examine
cognitive responses as predictors of emotional reactions to daily positive events in
clinically depressed individuals.
When examining consummatory reactions, we tested both responses that may
enhance the impact of positive events (focusing on the event, having gratitude for the
event, and sharing the event with others) and those that may dampen the impact of
positive events (suppressing emotions, ruminating). We made this decision because of the
conflicting evidence described above regarding whether affective responses to recently
experienced positive events are heightened or diminished in depressed relative to healthy
individuals. For anticipatory reactions, we tested only dampening responses (lower
expectations, decreased valuation, difficulty visualizing, increased worry, and perceptions
of high costs associated with the event) as studies have only found evidence of decreased
anticipation of future positive events in depressed relative to healthy individuals.
Hypotheses
We hypothesized that depressed individuals would show heightened negative
affect and diminished positive affect relative to controls during anticipatory as well as
consummatory responses to daily positive events, similar to a recent study showing
heightened displeasure and diminished pleasure for future and past daily activities (Wu et
al., 2017). Based on past studies examining the relationship between subclinical
depression symptoms and cognitive reactions to positive emotions (Bryant, 2003; Carl,
Fairholme, Gallagher, Thompson-Hollands, & Barlow, 2014; Eisner, Johnson, & Carver,
2009; Feldman et al., 2008; Gentzler, Palmer, & Ramsey, 2016) and events (Harding et
al., 2014), we predicted that depressed individuals would respond to positive events with
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more dampening and less enhancing responses than controls. Finally, we hypothesized
that the cognitive responses we assessed would be associated with affective and
symptomatic outcomes in both anticipatory and consummatory phases. Given the dearth
of previous research, we did not have strong hypotheses about which of these cognitive
responses would be the strongest predictors of emotional reactivity to positive events.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the community with advertisements on Craigslist
and flyers posted on community boards and in clinics. Participants were initially screened
for depression with a survey completed online or by phone. Potentially eligible
participants were administered the Anxiety and Related Disorders Interview Schedule for
DSM-5 (ADIS-5; Brown & Barlow, 2014). Inclusion in the major depressive disorder
(MDD) group required a current diagnosis of MDD and inclusion in the control group
required no current or past psychopathology and no mental health treatment. Exclusion
criteria for both groups included active psychosis, active suicide intent, and history of
mania or hypomania. Participants with a current substance use disorder were also
excluded because of the potential impact of these disorders on the quality of responses.
Following published guidelines (Berkel, Ferreira, & Kostakos, 2017; McCabe,
Mack, & Fleeson, 2012; Nezlek, 2012), we excluded five participants who demonstrated
set responding (i.e., provided the same responses regardless of the content or valence of
questions) and two participants for responding to fewer than 20% of surveys. Of the 78
participants who began the study, the final sample included 71 participants: 37 in the
MDD group and 34 in the control group (see Table 3.1). The groups did not differ in age
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(t(69) = .82, p = .416) nor in sex, race, marital status, or education level (all χ2 < 5.62, all
p > .060).
Procedure
Participants first came to the lab to complete the ADIS-5, which was administered
by diagnosticians with Master’s or Bachelor’s degrees in psychology who had undergone
extensive training and had reached a high level of interrater agreement with the
supervising licensed psychologist. The diagnosticians and supervising psychologist
discussed interviews as a team and assigned diagnoses by consensus. Ratings made by a
blinded diagnostician based on audio-recorded interviews (n = 32) yielded high interrater
reliability for MDD diagnoses (Κ = 0.88).
Eligible participants returned to the lab and attended an orientation, during which
they received an explanation of the study, reviewed the survey questions, and practiced
completing reports. Beginning the next day, participants completed surveys nine times
daily for one week. Participants were signaled to complete each survey via a text message
sent to their phone with the survey link. To ensure that individuals from all
socioeconomic backgrounds could participate, those without smartphones or adequate
phone plans borrowed a phone from the lab with all capabilities blocked aside from those
needed to complete surveys.
Participants were alerted every 1.5 hours during the 12-hour period they selected,
which was most typically 10AM-10PM. We utilized a protocol based on fixed intervals
instead of a random sampling strategy because, in order to rate anticipated events that
were expected to occur before the next signal, participants needed to know when the next
signal would occur. Once participants received the signal, they had 15 minutes to respond
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before the survey was counted as missed. If participants did not respond within the first
five minutes, they received a reminder text message.
At each assessment, participants first rated their affect and depression symptoms
at the time they were signaled (Time of Signal, or TS). Given our interest in positive
event reactivity, participants then rated the most significant positive event that occurred
to them since the previous signal, i.e., in the past 90 minutes (Consummatory ratings).
Participants were told that any positive event would qualify, no matter how small, and
were provided with a list of sample events that included very minor positive events (e.g.,
catching the bus on time). They were also given the option of rating a neutral event (an
event that was neither positive nor negative) if no positive event had occurred.
Participants answered questions about their cognitive and affective responses to this past
event. Lastly, participants rated the most significant positive event that they were
anticipating in the next 90 minutes (Anticipatory ratings) and answered questions about
their cognitive and affective responses to this future event.
Participants were instructed to provide Anticipatory ratings for an event before it
occurred and Consummatory ratings for the same event after it occurred. However, if the
anticipated event did not occur or another, more significant, event occurred, they were
asked to rate this different event in the Consummatory assessment. Participants answered
the same survey at each signal, except that the first survey of the day included only
Anticipatory ratings and the final survey of the day included only Consummatory ratings.
Participants were contacted on the second day of the study to ensure that study
procedures were being followed, and were debriefed after the study. Participants were
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paid $50 for participating in the study, and were offered an additional $20 for answering
over 85% of surveys.
Measures
Time of Signal (TS) ratings.
Affect. Participants rated how they were feeling at the time they were signaled
using four positive affect (PA; satisfied, enthusiastic, happy, confident) and six negative
affect (NA; sad, tense, dissatisfied with myself, anxious, upset, and stressed) terms. These
terms were chosen to correspond to past studies of positive event responding in
depression (Bylsma et al., 2011; Peeters et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2012) as well as to
represent relevant PA and NA domains included in the expanded Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). More NA than PA terms were
included due to the greater number of NA domains in the PANAS-X. Emotions were
rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) and were
averaged to form momentary PA and NA composite variables (within-person ω = .80 for
both variables; Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014). We calculated correlations of these
composites with participants’ scores on the PANAS-X completed prior to the study week,
based on pseudo R2 values from hierarchical models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).
Correlations were high between momentary and trait PA (r = .57) and momentary and
trait NA (r = .70), although effect sizes based on R2 should be interpreted with caution
(Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998).
Depression symptoms. Participants rated their symptoms of depression using nine
items drawn from the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, &
Williams, 2001), a widely used measure of depression. Symptoms were rated on a 1 (not
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at all) to 7 (very much) scale and formed a reliable composite (within-person ω = .76)
that was strongly related to MDD status on the ADIS-5 (rpb = .53, calculated using
pseudo R2). The final symptom assessed was suicidal ideation. Participants who entered a
rating above 2 were presented with emergency referrals before continuing the survey. At
the debriefing, a risk assessment was conducted with participants who reported suicidal
ideation at any signal.
Time of Event (TE) ratings.
Event positivity. Participants rated event valence on a Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (neutral) to 7 (very positive), with 4 being moderately positive. For
Consummatory ratings (past events), participants were asked: “How positive was the
event?” For Anticipatory ratings (future events), they were asked: “How positive do you
think the event will be?”
Cognitive responses to the event. As part of the Consummatory assessment,
participants rated their responses to the most significant positive event that occurred since
the previous signal, including: 1) Efforts to focus on the event (Focus); 2) Gratefulness
for the event (Gratitude); 3) Planning to share the event with others (Capitalizing); 4)
Suppressing emotions about the event (Suppression); 5) Ruminating about the event
(Rumination). As part of the Anticipatory assessment, participants rated their responses
to the most significant positive event they anticipated would occur before the next signal,
including: 1) Negative expectations about the event (Expectations); 2) Decreased
valuation of the event (Valuation); 3) Difficulty visualizing the event (Visualization); 4)
Worrying about the event (Worry); 5) Perceived cost of the event (Cost). All items were
rated on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale.
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Items were derived from scales of relevant constructs, including the Ways of
Savoring Checklist (Bryant & Veroff, 2017), Responses to Positive Affect Questionnaire
(Feldman et al., 2008), Emotion Regulation Profile–Revised (Nelis, Quoidbach,
Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2011), Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1991), Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). We wrote
two items to assess each of the 10 cognitive constructs, then averaged the item pairs into
composites (see Table 3.2). Composite reliabilities (within-person α)9 were in the range
of .58 to .85. These reliabilities were considered acceptable given that (a) within-person
reliability coefficients tend to be more conservative than between-person coefficients and
(b) the composites were utilized in hierarchical models, which adjust for unreliability
(Nezlek, 2017).
Affective responses to the event. Participants rated their affective responses to
events using the same PA and NA terms described above, rated on the same scale. In the
Consummatory assessment, participants were prompted with: “Immediately after the
event, I felt…” In the Anticipatory assessment, participants were prompted with: “As I
anticipate the event, I feel…” These event-related PA (within-person ω = .65-.78) and
NA (both within-person ω = .79) composites showed acceptable reliability and correlated
strongly with trait PA and NA on the PANAS-X (r = .53-.73).

9

We estimated reliability using within-person α; this is a good alternative when the
confirmatory factor model that is used to calculate within-person ω fails to converge,
which often happens (Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014).
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Statistical Analyses
Within-person correlations were calculated using Multilevel Structural Equation
Modeling (MSEM) in MPlus 7.0, which separates observed variables into within- and
between-person components (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015). We also used MSEM to
calculate within-person reliability, which utilizes the within-subjects portions of these
models to estimate measures’ true vs. error variance. As MSEM cannot be used to
calculate correlations among within- and between-person measures, coefficients based on
both EMA and trait measures were calculated with pseudo R2. These hierarchical models
and the remaining analyses were run with Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Models 7.01
(Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2013).
Analyses used three-level models, with surveys nested within days and days
nested within persons. All variables described are at the level of surveys (Level 1) or
persons (Level 3). Variables were standardized before analysis. Continuous Level 1
variables were centered around the group mean. Group status, a binary Level 3 variable,
was not centered. All Level 1 variables were modeled with random errors; when error
terms could not be estimated reliably (p > .10) they were excluded from the model10
(Nezlek, 2012). When analyses involved the relationship between Level 1 variables,
significant results were rerun controlling for the linear effect of time over the course of
the day using orthogonal polynomials that test trends (Anderson & Houseman, 1942).
Results remained the same unless noted in the text.
As we were interested in responses to positive events, we excluded neutral events
(those rated 1 on the 1-7 scale) from the dataset prior to analysis. The first type of model
10

Models are presented with these unreliable error terms deleted, but results remained the
same when these error terms were included.
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examined differences in means of Level 1 variables (affective and cognitive responses to
positive events) depending on group status (Level 3). Group was dummy coded as 0 =
Control and 1 = MDD, and the coefficients presented reflect the difference between
groups. The second type of model tested the relationship between Level 1 variables. In
these models, depression at the signal (TS) or NA/PA at the event (TE) were entered as
outcomes. To test the relationship between cognitive responses at the event (TE) and
levels of these outcomes, we used the following types of models, illustrated here using
the cognitive response of Focus rated in the Consummatory assessment:
Level 1: Consummatory PAtij = π0ij + π1ij(Focustij) + etij
where Consummatory PA is the rating for individual j on day i at observation t; intercept
π0ij is the expected PA rating for individual j on day i; slope π1ij is the change in PA with 1
SD change in the Focus rating for individual j on day i at observation t, and etij is the error
term associated with observation t for individual j on day i. These Level 1 intercepts and
slopes are predicted with the following Level 2 equations:
Level 2: π0ij = β00j + r0ij
π1ij = β10j + r1ij
where β00j is the intercept and β10j is the slope for individual j on day i, and r0ij and r1ij are
the unique increments to the intercept and slope associated with individual j on day i.
These Level 2 terms are predicted by the following Level 3 equations:
Level 3: β00j = γ000 + u00j
β10j = γ100 + u10j
where γ000 is the intercept and γ100 is the regression slope representing the relationship
between PA and Focus for all participants, and u00j and u10j are the unique increments to
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the intercept and slope associated with individual j. For the third type of model, we tested
the relationship between Focus at the event (TE) and change in PA by repeating the
above model with the inclusion of a covariate adjusting for PA rated at the previous
signal (PA TSt-1). When results were significant, these models were repeated with the
inclusion of a covariate adjusting for the linear trend of time (Timetij). The fourth type of
model tested the time-lagged associations between cognitive responses at TE and
outcomes at the subsequent signal (PA TSt+1), always within the same day. For all
models, we report the average within-person regression coefficients (γ100).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Of all submitted surveys (4050), we excluded those completed on the wrong day
(7) or initiated more than 15 minutes after the signal (480), as well as those submitted by
the seven participants who demonstrated set responding or completion rates below 20%
(252), leaving 3311 surveys available for analysis. The average completion rate was
74.0% (SD = 20.3%) and rates did not differ across the MDD (M = 73.9%; SD = 21.2%)
and control (M = 74.2%; SD = 19.6%) groups, t(69) = 0.06, p = .949. Time to survey
initiation also did not differ across groups, t(69) = 0.47, p = .637.
As we were primarily interested in responses to events that were perceived as
positive by participants, we excluded ratings for the 501 neutral events. As each survey
included signal ratings and ratings for future and past events, this process did not further
reduce the number of surveys. The final sample included 3311 signal ratings, with 2,644
past positive events (Consummatory assessment) and 2,724 future events (Anticipatory
assessment). The MDD (M = 35.32, SD = 13.59) and control (M = 39.32, SD = 11.71)
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groups did not significantly differ in the average number of past positive events reported,
t(69) = 1.32, p = .190. The MDD (M = 36.81, SD = 12.39) and control (M = 40.06, SD =
11.26) groups also did significantly not differ in the average number of future positive
events reported, t(69) = 1.15, p = .253.
To provide context for the remaining analyses, we examined group differences in
mean positivity ratings, as well as affect. While individuals with MDD rated events as
less positive than controls, these differences were not significant during the Anticipatory
assessment (γ = -.15, t = 1.00, p = .322) and were only marginally significant during the
Consummatory assessment (γ = -.26, t = 1.86, p = .067). Individuals with MDD reported
more NA than controls at the signal (γ = .81, t = 5.10, p < .001) and during Anticipation
(γ = .86, t = 5.46, p < .001) as well as Consumption (γ = .86, t = 5.21, p < .001) of
positive events. Individuals with MDD also reported less PA than controls at the signal (γ
= -.70, t = 3.92, p < .001) and during Anticipation (γ = -.60, t = 3.25, p = .002) as well as
Consumption (γ = -.60, t = 3.39, p = .001) of positive events. Notably, the group
differences for Anticipation were comparable to those for Consumption.
Descriptive Analyses for Cognitive Responses
As the relationship among the cognitive responses tested has not yet been
established (Naragon-Gainey et al., 2017), we calculated within-person correlations to
examine their differentiability. Consummatory and Anticipatory responses were weakly
related or unrelated (|r| = .02-.15). Among Consummatory responses, Focus and
Gratitude were strongly related to each other (r = .65) and were also associated with
Capitalizing (r = .37-.45). Suppression and Rumination were weakly related to each other
(r = .22) and to the other Consummatory responses (r = .01-.06). Among Anticipatory
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responses, Valuation was weakly related to all other cognitive responses (r = .05-.21),
while the remaining responses were more strongly correlated (r = .37-.55).
Table 3.3 shows each cognitive response, along with the proportion of variance
for this response attributed to each level of analysis. These numbers were derived from
“null” hierarchical models with only the response as outcome and no predictors. Variance
explained by study day was minimal (<=10%), whereas variance related to the survey
and the person were each about 40-50%, demonstrating roughly equivalent variability at
both within- and between-person levels. Null models for outcomes (not shown)
demonstrated that the variance for depression at TS was largely between- rather than
within-person (78.9% vs. 14.9%). Similarly, between-person variance for affect variables
(64.1%-70.1%) was larger than within-person variance (22.1%-28.7%). Day-level
variance was also minimal (<8.0%) for outcomes. In sum, variation in cognitive
responses was about equally attributed to differences between persons and within each
person, whereas variation in depression symptoms and affect was more due to differences
between persons than within each person.
Next, we examined group differences in the mean level of each cognitive
response, as well as in the proportion of events at which that response was reported at any
level (i.e., either item of the composite was rated higher than 1 on the 1-7 scale; Table
3.3). While mean levels of dampening responses were relatively low, they were reported
at 34-46% of positive events by depressed individuals compared to 14-28% of positive
events by controls. Hierarchical analyses revealed that depressed individuals reported
significantly higher rates of all Anticipatory responses than controls except for Valuation,
which reached marginal significance. By contrast, depressed individuals reported higher
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levels of only the two dampening responses—Suppression and Rumination—during the
Consummatory phase. Group differences were not found for the three enhancing
responses of Focus, Gratitude, and Capitalizing; in fact, depressed individuals reported
these responses at (nonsignificantly) higher levels than controls.
Consummatory Cognitive Responses
We began by using Consummatory responses to predict depression symptoms at
the signal (TS), as well as levels of affect at the event (TE). Affect at TE was rated during
the Consummatory assessment, and therefore described emotional responses to the
recently experienced event. In these initial analyses (Table 3.4; “level of outcome”), all
variables were measured at the same sampling occasion. All five Consummatory
cognitive responses predicted depression at the signal and levels of PA at TE, whereas all
responses aside from Capitalizing predicted levels of NA at TE.
Next, we repeated these analyses controlling for the outcome at the prior
assessment (depression, NA, or PA at TS of the previous signal) to examine which
responses predicted changes in depression and affect (Table 3.4; “change in outcome”).
All Consummatory responses continued to predict changes in depression, aside from
Gratitude, which declined to marginal significance. All five responses continued to
predict changes in PA, and all responses aside from Capitalizing continued to predict
changes in NA. Positive responses (Focus, Gratitude, and Capitalizing) were particularly
robust predictors of levels of and changes in PA.
Following these analyses, we included responses that significantly predicted each
outcome in a single model to test for unique predictors. In these analyses, Focus (γ = -.04,
t = 2.47, p = .016) and Rumination (γ = .07, t = 3.71, p < .001) continued to predict

124

depression; Gratitude (γ = -.07, t = 2.76, p = .007), Suppression (γ = .06, t = 2.17, p =
.033), and Rumination (γ = .20, t = 7.57, p < .001) continued to predict NA; and all
cognitive responses continued to predict PA (all γ > |.05|, all p < .001).
Finally, we used cognitive responses to predict levels of depression, NA, and PA
rated at the following signal (1.5 hours later). No responses predicted future depression.
However, Rumination continued to predict NA at the next signal (γ = .06, t = 2.34, p =
.020), and Focus continued to predict PA at the next signal (γ = .05, t = 2.81, p = .005).
Anticipatory Cognitive Responses
We repeated the analyses described above for Anticipatory cognitive responses,
substituting levels of affect at the event reported during the Anticipatory assessment. In
contrast to Consummatory responses, only one Anticipatory response—Expectations—
predicted levels of depression at the signal, and Expectations did not continue to
significantly predict changes in depression from the previous signal. All Anticipatory
cognitive responses predicted levels of NA and PA at TE. All responses continued to
predict changes in PA, and all responses aside from Valuation predicted changes in NA.
When all significant predictors were entered in the same model, Visualization (γ =
.04, t = 2.00, p = .047), Worry (γ = .18, t = 7.15, p < .001), and Cost (γ = .10, t = 4.39, p <
.001) continued to predict NA, whereas Expectations (γ = -.08, t =3.97, p < .001),
Valuation (γ = -.05, t = 4.04, p < .001), and Cost (γ = -.08, t = 3.44, p < .001) continued
to predict PA. However, cognitive responses while anticipating the event did not predict
depression, NA, or PA at the following signal.
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Discussion
The present study used EMA to examine depressed and nondepressed individuals’
anticipatory responses to impending positive events and consummatory responses in the
immediate aftermath of positive events. We found that depressed individuals reported
higher NA and lower PA than controls when anticipating future positive events, as well
as in the immediate aftermath of positive events. While persons with MDD reported
higher dampening responses to positive events compared with controls, they did not
report lower enhancing responses. Even so, both dampening and enhancing responses in
the aftermath of positive events related to depression symptoms at the signal. By contrast,
only lower expectations for the upcoming event related to depression levels. The
cognitive responses measured predicted affect levels, as well as changes in affect, in
response to positive events. Of the cognitive responses assessed in the aftermath of
positive events, efforts to focus on the event, and ruminating about the negative aspects
of the event, emerged as particularly strong predictors of outcomes. Of the cognitive
responses assessed to upcoming positive events, lower expectations for the event, and
higher perceived costs of the event, emerged as strong predictors of outcomes.
First Aim
Our first aim was to separately examine anticipatory and consummatory responses
to positive events. We demonstrated that depressed individuals had higher NA and lower
PA for anticipatory, as well as consummatory, responses, and that group differences in
affect were comparable across both phases. This pattern is consistent with the few
laboratory studies showing reduced anticipatory responding to positive events in
depressed relative to healthy participants (MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; McFarland &
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Klein, 2009), as well as the evidence found for neural differences during event
anticipation (Zhang, Chang, Guo, Zhang, & Wang, 2013). These findings are also
consistent with those of a previous EMA study showing that depressed individuals rated
future events to which they looked forward as less pleasant and more unpleasant than
controls (Wu et al., 2017), and extends these findings by relating them to positive and
negative affective responding.
Second Aim
Our second aim was to investigate cognitive responses to positive events,
measuring different responses within the same study to compare the frequency with
which they are utilized by depressed and non-depressed individuals. We found that while
many of the cognitive responses were related to one another, these correlations were
mostly small to moderate. This pattern suggests that individuals utilize multiple,
reasonably differentiable cognitive strategies to modulate their emotional reactions to
positive events in daily life.
Our results also show that both depressed and nondepressed individuals reported
frequent use of cognitive responses that enhance the impact of positive events. Cognitive
responses that dampen the impact of positive events were used less often, but were still
employed at some level with surprising frequency by depressed individuals. As expected,
depressed individuals reported more dampening responses to positive events than
controls. Contrary to expectations, however, depressed individuals did not report less
enhancing responses to positive events, such as efforts to focus on and feel gratitude for
the event, as well as plans to share the event with others. Our results diverge from those
of studies with nonclinical samples, which have found that depression relates to less use
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of enhancing responses, as well as more use of dampening responses in reaction to
positive mood states overall (Bryant, 2003; Carl et al., 2014; Eisner et al., 2009; Feldman
et al., 2008; Gentzler et al., 2016) and to positive events (Harding et al., 2014). They also
diverge from one previous study of persons with remitted depression, which found
greater use of strategies to regulate emotional states regardless of whether these were
adaptive or maladaptive (Gruber, Kogan, Mennin, & Murray, 2013), although the
strategies investigated were aimed more at mitigating negative emotions and events than
enhancing positive events.
Differences in levels of enhancing strategies may not have emerged in our study
because of methodological differences with past studies. Specifically, in contrast to most
other studies, ours examined reactions in clinically depressed individuals and in response
to specific, daily positive events. Alternatively, the lack of group differences in
enhancing strategies may be explained by our focus on strategies involving the exertion
of effort to enhance the impact of the positive event. Preliminary evidence suggests that
individuals with mood disorders may exert more effort than others to regulate emotions,
even if these efforts are unsuccessful (Gruber, Johnson, Oveis, & Keltner, 2008). This
reasoning is more applicable to our measurement of efforts to focus on and feel gratitude
for events, however, than to capitalizing on the event by sharing it with others. Studies
that measure additional enhancing responses involving differing levels of effort (e.g.,
remembering what went well), as well as studies that measure efforts to implement
cognitive responses separately from the success of these efforts, would help clarify these
questions.
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Another possibility is that differences between depressed and non-depressed
individuals lie not only in the overall levels of enhancing responses to events, but in the
ability to use them flexibly and in appropriate contexts (du Pont, Welker, Gilbert, &
Gruber, 2016; Koole, 2009). Analyses that examine the utilization of particular cognitive
responses depending on characteristics of the positive event (e.g., social versus non-social
events; events characterized by low versus high arousal) could help determine the extent
to which differences exist among depressed and non-depressed individuals. The question
of how individuals with depression utilize cognitive responses that enhance reactions to
positive events is important for determining whether treatment should focus on simply
increasing these responses, implementing them only in particular situations, or finding
other ways to make these reactions more effective in order to maximize the impact of
positive events.
Third Aim
For our third aim, we tested the extent to which the cognitive responses predicted
symptomatic and affective outcomes. Dampening and enhancing responses in the
aftermath of a positive event predicted depression levels at the signal. By contrast, in the
lead up to a positive event, only lower expectations for that event predicted depression
levels. There are several possible explanations for the stronger associations of
consummatory than anticipatory responses with depression. First, as participants first
reported on their consummatory responses and then on their anticipatory responses, it is
possible that they were further removed from their feelings of depression at the signal
while completing the anticipatory assessment. Alternatively, as memories of past events
are more detailed and contextually specific than representations of future events
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(D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004), depression symptoms may be more strongly
linked to cognitions regarding an event that has already occurred versus one that will take
place in the future. Finally, it is possible that the anticipatory cognitive responses we
chose to measure were not reliably related to momentary depression, despite their
associations with MDD status in between-subjects analyses. Future research testing other
cognitive responses to anticipated positive events, such as focusing on positive feelings
that the event may generate (Raes, Smets, Nelis, & Schoofs, 2012), as well as varying the
order of assessment, would help clarify these issues.
Although anticipatory cognitive responses predicted momentary depression less
consistently than consummatory responses, both types of responses predicted higher PA
and lower NA, as well as greater changes in PA and NA, in connection with the event.
These results are relevant to unpacking the factors that influence emotional reactions to
positive events in daily life. Efforts to focus on the event, and ruminating about negative
aspects of the event or oneself, emerged as particularly strong predictors of depression
and affect in the wake of positive events. Both continued to predict depression symptoms
and PA when controlling for other cognitive responses, and rumination also continued to
predict NA when controlling for other responses. In addition, efforts to focus on the event
predicted PA at the following signal, and rumination predicted NA at the following
signal. Efforts to focus on positive daily events was linked to higher positive affect in one
previous study (Quoidbach et al., 2010), and longitudinal and experimental research has
shown that mindful present-moment focus, a closely related process, predicts greater
wellbeing (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Erisman & Roemer, 2010). Rumination has also
emerged as an influential response to daily negative events (Moberly & Watkins, 2008),
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particularly for depressed individuals (Ruscio et al., 2015), in past EMA studies. Two
EMA studies examining ruminative responses to positive events (Khazanov et al., in
press; Takano et al., 2013) demonstrate that positive events reduce rumination, and that
this relationship is stronger for those with more symptoms of depression.
While efforts to focus on the event and ruminating about the event emerged as
strong predictors of outcomes following experienced events, negative expectations of the
event and high perceived costs of the event emerged as strong predictors of outcomes for
upcoming events. Negative expectations of the event predicted depression levels at the
signal and continued to predict PA when controlling for other cognitive responses. High
perceived costs of the event continued to predict both NA and PA when controlling for
other responses. Deciding whether to pursue a potentially positive event involves
predictions regarding both the benefits and costs of the event (Der-Avakian & Markou,
2012). More positive expectations for future events have been linked to increased
anticipation and pursuit of these events (Jones et al., 2012; Kahnt, Heinzle, Park, &
Haynes, 2010), and some evidence suggests that depressed individuals are more
negatively biased in their predictions of future events than healthy individuals (Hoerger,
Quirk, Chapman, & Duberstein, 2012, but see Wenze, Gunthert, & German, 2012 and
Wu et al., 2017). Similarly, higher estimations of the cost of an event predict lower
likelihood of pursuing it (Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007). Studies showing impaired
decision-making and less willingness to exert effort for positive events in depression
(Mukherjee & Kable, 2014; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012) indirectly
suggest that depressed individuals assign higher costs to these events than healthy
individuals. We are unaware of prior research that has directly measured estimations of
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cost in depressed individuals. The present study extends findings from past studies by
highlighting the relative importance of these four cognitive responses, compared to the
others measured, in their associations with depression symptoms and affect. Additionally,
the current study underscores the relevance of these responses to modulating reactivity to
personally relevant positive events during the course of daily life.
Aside from efforts to focus on the event and ruminating about the event, no other
responses predicted symptoms or affect at the following signal. The effects of the
responses may have dissipated during the 1.5 hours between signals, possibly because
positive events may have relatively weaker relationships with psychological outcomes
than negative events (Nezlek & Gable, 2001). Given that the positive events included in
this study were relatively minor, it is also possible that measuring cognitive responses to
more major positive events would have resulted in longer-lasting impact on symptoms or
affect. Future EMA research that measures the impact of positive events over shorter
intervals, or measures more significant positive events fewer times a day, would help test
these questions. Additional analyses examining which of the cognitive responses mediate
the relationship between event positivity and affective responses to the event would also
help clarify the most promising of these explanations.
Clinical Implications
This study has several clinical implications. First, our finding that depressed
individuals show diminished anticipatory, as well as consummatory, responses to positive
events highlights the utility of interventions that aim to change responding to both
potential future positive events and those that have already occurred (Craske, Meuret,
Ritz, Treanor, & Dour, 2016). Second, our results shed light on types of interventions that
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may be most effective. To increase the positive impact of recently experienced events,
interventions can emphasize enhancing attentional focus on the events and decreasing
rumination about the events. Mindfulness interventions from mindfulness-based
cognitive therapy (Ma & Teasdale, 2004) and dialectical behavior therapy (Lynch,
Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo, & Linehan, 2006) can be adapted to focus on increasing
responding to positive events. Similarly, interventions aimed at decreasing rumination,
which have been developed to improve coping with negative events (Watkins et al.,
2011), could be extended to address responding to positive events. To enhance
anticipatory responses to upcoming positive events, interventions can help patients
develop expectations for upcoming events and calculations regarding their potential costs
that are more positive. These processes are addressed to some degree by current cognitive
therapies (Blagys & Hilsenroth, 2002) and are targeted more specifically by cognitive
therapies currently being developed (Vilhauer et al., 2013). The present research supports
the use of these interventions and underscores the importance of implementing them in
the context of positive events.
Relationship to Mood Brightening
The present study’s findings that depressed individuals reported higher NA and
lower PA than healthy individuals when anticipating future positive events and in the
aftermath of positive events may seem to contradict Chapter 1’s findings that depressed
individuals reported greater reductions in NA and increases in PA following positive
events than healthy individuals. To examine this question further, we replicated the
analyses described in Chapter 1 using the present study data. The pattern of results
mirrored Chapter 1’s findings: depressed individuals showed greater reductions in NA
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and increases in PA for both future positive events and positive events that recently
occurred. Importantly, the results of these analyses were not all statistically significant,
likely due to the smaller sample size and more restricted range of event positivity in the
present study.
To understand these results, it is important to remember that although in Chapter
1 depressed individuals reported greater reductions in NA and increases in PA following
positive events than controls, despite these responses they continued to report higher NA
and lower PA over the course of the day. Therefore, in both Chapter 1 and the present
study, we found evidence of greater change in affect in response to positive events, yet
still more maladaptive levels of affect before and after positive events in depressed
relative to healthy individuals. In other words, while depressed individuals seem to
respond more strongly to positive events than healthy individuals, they continue to report
poorer overall affect before and after positive events. As described in Chapter 1 (pages 23
and 24), there are various reasons that depressed individuals may be impacted more
strongly by positive events than healthy individuals. One of the proposed explanations is
that depressed individuals’ more negative expectations for future events amplifies their
reactivity to positive events compared to controls. The present study’s findings that
depressed individuals report more negative expectations for future events and higher
perceived costs of future events are in line with this explanation. Overall, both studies
highlight the complex nature of depressed individuals’ responses to positive events in
daily life and the importance of considering contextual factors that occur before, during,
and after the event itself.
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Strengths and Limitations
This study should be considered along with several limitations. First, we
employed a fixed instead of a random sampling strategy because participants needed to
know when to expect the next signal in order to identify anticipated events; however, this
raised the possibility that expectations of signals led to increased reactivity or to
modifications in levels of engagement with events. To minimize these effects, our
statistical analyses controlled for the timing of signals across the day and we accounted
for day-level variance in our hierarchical models. Second, participants always completed
the consummatory assessment before the anticipatory assessment to streamline survey
administration, leaving open the possibility that some of the patterns we observed were
due to this study feature. Third, although EMA designs minimize retrospective and
prospective biases, these biases were not eliminated, as consummatory assessments were
completed 0-90 minutes following positive events, and anticipatory assessments were
completed 0-90 minutes before positive events. Relatedly, as we were interested in
anticipatory responses regardless of whether the event was eventually completed, we
tested all anticipatory responses regardless of whether participants indicated that they
completed the event. Examining only completed events would have resulted in a
prohibitively small sample, but it is possible that anticipatory responses for events that do
eventually occur (and consequently may be more probable or realistic) differ from those
for events that never occur. Fourth, as in all EMA studies, participants’ ratings of event
positivity were subjective. We signaled participants at regular intervals instead of relying
on participants to initiate reports in order to reduce the impact of differing thresholds for
recording positive events among depressed and non-depressed individuals. Nevertheless,
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the possibility remains that these groups differed systematically in the types of events
they considered positive.
Despite these limitations, this is the first EMA study to examine cognitive
responses to positive events in a clinical sample. Strengths include the separation of
anticipatory and consummatory responses and assessment of multiple cognitive responses
in relation to the same events. We aimed to move past descriptions of differences in
emotional reactivity to positive events in depressed and non-depressed individuals in
order to better understand the processes by which these differences occur. Our findings
shed light on extent to which certain cognitive responses are utilized by depressed and
nondepressed individuals, as well as their impact on emotional reactivity to positive
events and symptoms of depression. Following replication of these results, treatments
being developed to increase emotional responding to positive events may use these
findings to inform their choice of interventions.
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Table 3.1
Demographic Characteristics of Sample by Group
Variable

MDD (n = 37)

Control (n = 34)

35.19 (12.95)

32.68 (12.92)

% Female

59.5

58.8

% Caucasian

51.3

52.9

Never married

61.1

70.6

Married or cohabiting

25.0

20.6

Previously married

13.9

8.8

No college degree

54.1

29.4

College degree

37.8

47.1

Age
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Marital Status

Education

Higher than college

8.1

Note. MDD = major depressive disorder. M (SD) is presented for age; all other values represent percentages.

23.5

Table 3.2
Cognitive Responses to Positive Events
Definition

Consummatory

Items

Reliability

“During or immediately after the event, I…”

Focus

Efforts to focus on the event

Gratitude

Feeling grateful for the event

Capitalizing

Planning to share the event with others

Suppression

Suppressing emotions about the event

Rumination

Ruminating about the event

Anticipatory

1. Tried to enjoy the moment fully and put everything else out of my mind
2. Tried to focus on the event
1. Reminded myself to appreciate the event
2. Felt grateful for having experienced the event
1. Thought about sharing the memory of my experience with someone
2. Looked forward to telling a family member or friend about the event
1. Tried to keep my emotions to myself and not show them to others
2. Held back from expressing my feelings
1. Felt dissatisfied with my abilities and skills
2. Dwelled on how the event or my actions could have been better

.75

.66

.85

.82

.61

“As I anticipate the event, I am…”

Expectations

Negative expectations about the event

Valuation

Decreased valuation of the event

1. Expecting to be disappointed by the event
2. Feeling pessimistic about the event or its outcome
1. Thinking that the event is not that important to me
2. Recognizing that the event does not really matter

.58

.70
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Construct

Visualization

Inability to visualize the event

Worry

Worrying about the event

Cost

Perceived cost of the event

1. Having a hard time imagining the upcoming event
2. Unable to visualize how the event will play out
1. Worrying about how things will go
2. Thinking that something bad may happen
1. Focusing on the inconvenience associated with the event
2. Thinking that it will take a lot of effort to make the event a good experience

.61

.70

.59
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Note. Reliability was estimated using within-person α (Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014).

Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Responses Following Positive Events
Construct

Mean levels

Group differences

% Reported

Survey-level %
variance

Day-level %
variance

Person-level %
variance

MDD

Control

γ

t

p

MDD

Control

Focus

4.04 (1.31)

3.79 (1.24)

.13

0.82

.416

90.6

86.2

45.1

10.1

44.8

Gratitude

3.65 (1.33)

3.38 (1.07)

.15

0.93

.356

87.9

84.4

46.5

8.9

44.6

Capitalizing

2.52 (1.31)

2.43 (1.05)

.04

0.15

.782

50.9

55.1

48.8

12.7

38.5

Suppression

2.15 (1.20)

1.44 (0.55)

.52*

3.35

.001

45.2

25.0

42.8

5.5

51.7

Rumination

1.92 (0.98)

1.18 (0.32)

.69*

4.41

<.001

45.7

14.3

44.7

6.1

49.2

Expectations

1.72 (0.77)

1.29 (0.34)

.48*

3.16

.002

39.8

23.5

45.3

10.3

44.4

Valuation

1.80 (0.88)

1.50 (0.61)

.27

1.80

.076

35.1

28.2

53.0

7.7

39.3

Visualization

1.72 (0.90)

1.21 (0.29)

.52*

3.37

.001

33.9

17.8

45.3

5.6

49.1

Worry

1.78 (0.82)

1.25 (0.33)

.53*

3.62

<.001

39.7

20.2

49.9

7.7

42.4

Cost

2.00 (0.90)

1.45 (0.50)

.49*

3.30

.002

45.2

30.6

49.9

7.6

42.5

Consummatory

Note. Values for Mean levels represent M (SD) on 1-7 scales. Values for % Reported and variance levels represent percentages.
% Reported = the percentage of events for which participants rated either item of the two-item composite higher than 1 (“Not at all”). The last
three columns represent the percent of variance at each level of the hierarchical model, derived from models including only the target variable as
an outcome without any predictors.
*p < .05
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Anticipatory

Table 3.4
Cognitive Responses Predicting Level of, and Change in Depression at the Signal and Affect at the Event
Depression at the signal
Predictors
Consummatory

Level of outcome

Negative affect at the event

Change in outcome

Level of outcome

Positive affect at the event

Change in outcome

Level of outcome

Change in outcome

γ

t

p

γ

t

p

γ

t

p

γ

t

p

γ

t

p

γ

t

p

Focus

-.06*

3.07

.002

-.05*

2.18

.032

-.12*

3.40

.001

-.11*

3.10

.003

.33*

10.20

<.001

.33*

10.66

<.001

Gratitude

-.06*

2.80

.007

-.04

1.95

.055

-.12*

3.84

<.001

-.10*

2.87

.005

.36*

13.40

<.001

.34*

11.85

<.001

Capitalizing

-.03*

2.62

.009

-.03*a

2.18

.033

.00

0.20

.846

.00

0.18

.862

.26*

8.87

<.001

.25*

8.77

<.001

Suppression

.05*

2.61

.011

.05*

2.77

.007

.13*

3.61

<.001

.13*

3.58

<.001

-.10*

3.90

<.001

-.08*

2.60

.012

Rumination

.08*

3.74

<.001

.07*

2.69

.008

.22*

7.50

<.001

.22*

5.49

<.001

-.13*

5.13

<.001

-.09*

3.39

.001

Expectations

.04*a

1.98

.048

.02

1.12

.264

.21*

6.97

<.001

.19*

6.06

<.001

-.12*

5.65

<.001

-.12*

4.80

<.001

Valuation

.02

1.45

.149

.02

1.50

.135

.05*

2.32

.023

.02

0.79

.431

-.10*

5.69

<.001

-.07*

4.23

<.001

Visualization

.02

1.05

.298

.02

1.17

.245

.19*

5.87

<.001

.17*

5.34

<.001

-.06*

2.45

.017

-.08*

3.47

<.001

Worry

.03

1.46

.145

.02

1.27

.206

.26*

9.73

<.001

.20*

7.20

<.001

-.09*

4.56

<.001

-.07*

3.80

<.001

Cost

.03

1.58

.119

.01

0.76

.448

.20*

7.14

<.001

.19*

6.94

<.001

-.11*

5.01

<.001

-.11*

4.50

<.001

Note. For consummatory responses, affect variables were rated during the consummatory report; for anticipatory responses, affect variables were rated during the
anticipatory report. Depression was rated at the signal, at the same sampling occasion as events. Models predicting change in outcomes include the level of the outcome
variable at the previous signal as a covariate. All significant results were rerun with time of day as a covariate and remained significant unless otherwise noted.
a
These relationships declined to marginal significance when time of day was included as a covariate
*p < .05
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APPENDIX
Item 1.
Positive Valence Systems Scale 45 Items (PVSS-45)
Please indicate to what extent these statements describe your responses over the last two weeks,
including today.
Did you NOT have this experience? No problem. Please indicate how you would have
responded if you had experienced the situation over the last two weeks.

Please consider only the aspect of the situation that is described, paying particular attention to the
underlined text. For example, if the statement says, “I wanted to meet new people,” rate how
much you wanted or would have wanted to meet new people over the last two weeks, assuming
that the opportunity presented itself. Do not consider what the situation would have required of
you or whether it would have been possible for you to meet people.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Extremely
Very
Moderately
Slightly
Untrue of Me Untrue of Me Untrue of Me Untrue of Me

Neutral

1.
2.
3.
4.

Slightly
True of Me

Moderately
True of Me

Very
True of Me

Extremely
True of Me

I was excited to discover that someone I met shared my interests
I really looked forward to watching a movie I heard might be good
My excitement about buying myself something new lasted into the next day
I cooked or went out for out a special meal even though it took considerable time or
effort
5. I had the desire to feel part of a group or community
6. I looked forward to hugging someone I felt close to
7. I craved a delicious food
8. I wanted to spend time doing productive activities
9. I worked hard to earn praise from someone I respected, even though it required a lot
more of my time
10. Laughing with friends lifted my spirits
11. I expected to master the tasks I undertook
12. I invested time in my friendships
13. I wanted to spend time with people I know
14. I made time to pursue my hobbies even when it was inconvenient
15. Receiving praise about my work made me feel pleased for the rest of the day
16. When an upbeat song came on, I got really into it
17. I looked forward to an upcoming meal
18. I felt pleased when I reached a goal I set for myself
19. It felt good to have physical contact with someone I felt close to
20. I expected to hear positive comments about my work
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21. I went out with friends even when there were other things I could have been doing
22. I actively pursued activities I thought would be fun
23. I felt satisfied and relaxed for a long time after a good meal
24. I focused on pursuing my long-term goals even when it was difficult
25. I felt delighted when someone complimented me
26. The inspiration I felt while watching a great movie persisted after the movie ended
27. I worked hard to earn positive feedback on my projects
28. I looked forward to spending time with others
29. I savored my first bite of food after feeling hungry
30. I wanted to participate in a fun activity with friends
31. I expected to enjoy a brief moment outdoors
32. I expected to be received warmly by people I met
33. I went out of my way to admire the beauty around me
34. Even when I had limited free time, I carved out time to spend with loved ones
35. I expected to enjoy being hugged by someone I love
36. I wanted to accomplish goals I set for myself
37. I expected to enjoy my meals
38. I really looked forward to spending time on my hobbies
39. I put energy into activities I enjoy
40. I looked forward to hearing feedback on my work
41. A fun activity during the weekend sustained my good mood throughout the new week
42. I felt great when someone listened carefully to a story I told
43. I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors
44. I went out of my way to find a food I enjoy
45. Getting a hug from someone close to me made me happy even after we parted
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Item 2.
Positive Valence Systems Scale 21 Items (PVSS-21)
Please indicate to what extent these statements describe your responses over the last two weeks,
including today.
Did you NOT have this experience? No problem. Please indicate how you would have
responded if you had experienced the situation over the last two weeks.

Please consider only the aspect of the situation that is described, paying particular attention to the
underlined text. For example, if the statement says, “I wanted to meet new people,” rate how
much you wanted or would have wanted to meet new people over the last two weeks, assuming
that the opportunity presented itself. Do not consider what the situation would have required of
you or whether it would have been possible for you to meet people.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Extremely
Very
Moderately
Slightly
Untrue of Me Untrue of Me Untrue of Me Untrue of Me

Neutral

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Slightly
True of Me

Moderately
True of Me

Very
True of Me

Extremely
True of Me

I savored my first bite of food after feeling hungry
I put energy into activities I enjoy
I was delighted to catch a breath of fresh air outdoors
I wanted to spend time with people I know
A fun activity during the weekend sustained my good mood throughout the new
week
6. It felt good to have physical contact with someone I felt close to
7. I expected to enjoy a brief moment outdoors
8. I looked forward to hearing feedback on my work
9. I expected to enjoy my meals
10. Receiving praise about my work made me feel pleased for the rest of the day
11. I looked forward to spending time with others
12. I wanted to accomplish goals I set for myself
13. I expected to enjoy being hugged by someone I love
14. I wanted to participate in a fun activity with friends
15. I worked hard to earn positive feedback on my projects
16. I looked forward to an upcoming meal
17. I felt pleased when I reached a goal I set for myself
18. Getting a hug from someone close to me made me happy even after we parted
19. I expected to master the tasks I undertook
20. I actively pursued activities I thought would be fun
21. I went out of my way to admire the beauty around me
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